A well-argued post, and one refreshingly devoid of vitriol.
Although we often disagree, I hope I did not come off as vitriolic in any of my previous posts - I try to stick to arguments.
That for a Catholic, the essential truth of the Catholic faith cannot be subjected to a judgment of reason, admitted; that this makes Catholic doctrine first in an epistemological chain (axiomatic), denied. If this were the case it would be impossible for an unbeliever to convert; there must be some epistemological means by which he can come to know the truthfulness of the Catholic faith - and that means (whatever it happens to be) is epistemologically prior to the truth of Catholicism.
I addressed that later, discussing reason 2. I distinguish between two separate "phases" (no better word comes to my mind at the moment): 1) arriving to the faith and 2) after having accepted faith. Reason, arguments and evidence are part of the process of arriving to the faith, for sure. However, once one is convinced of the truthfulness of the faith, from that point on it must be taken presuppositionally, not merely because the evidence is convincing enough. So, arguments and evidence are epistemologically prior in phase 1, but not in phase 2. I know the following analogy is not perfect, but I would compare it to visiting a city: I travel there by bus, but once I arrive to the city, I no longer need a bus to be there. Even if the bus breaks down later, I am still at the city. Bus = evidence/argumentation, city = faith.
What I am getting at is this - do you accept the Catholic teaching because:
1) Because truthfulness of the Catholic Church is your fundamental presupposition, and any evidence which is claimed to prove to the contrary must necessarily be wrong (in which case the Catholic faith is epistemologically prior to evidence)
2) Because you currently judge the evidence to be convincing enough (in which case evidence is epistemologically prior to the Catholic faith).
The problem with 2) is that it is essentially rationalism in a Christian garb. A person accepts Catholicism only as long as the evidence and apologetic arguments are sufficient to convince him/her, and should new evidence emerge, which in the judgment of a person refutes Catholicism or disproves the evidence for Catholicism, the Catholic faith is abandoned. In other words, if apologetic arguments and their strength are the condition and basis for one's adherence to Catholicism, then the faith has no solid epistemological basis at all, it becomes a mere personal judgment which makes a person the final authority rather than the Catholic Church. This results in relativism.
And: that the essential truth of the Catholic faith (e.g. doctrines of faith) cannot be subject to a judgment of reason, admitted; that this applies to Catholic doctrines taught only at a level of "theologically certain" or less, which are themselves arrived at (partially) through reason, denied. Everything arrived at through reason is subject to a judgment of reason, in the final analysis. I'm not denying that usually it is sinful for one to question a doctrine taught with this theological note (due to the defects in one's knowledge or one's reason) on his own initiative, nor that Church indefectibility logically entails that such doctrines be infallibly safe, even if not infallible in the absolute sense. However, in the final analysis, they are subject to the judgment of reason since they were arrived at via reason.
I'm not sure if I understand you correctly here - are you arguing that indefectibility of the Church in the Catholic understanding was not defined solemnly enough and therefore it is licit to question it, in a manner which is not licit for, say, Immaculate Conception or Papal infallibility?
But this is exactly what traditionalists do with regard to Vatican II and the post-Conciliar Magisterium. They use their reasoning and judgment to compare such teaching with past teaching, conclude a contradiction, and thus reject it. Of course they deny this with the argument that they aren't using their reason to reject Catholic teaching per se, but rather to reject something as Catholic teaching, but that's a distinction without a real difference. The Catholic Church is de facto not the final epistemological authority if it is a matter of private judgment by an external authority whether something is actually taught by the Church or not, based on his private judgment whether that something is true and good, or false and evil (which is exactly what the Church is supposed to be deciding, epistemologically). Traditionalists rant and rave when I bring this up but can't really refute the argument, which puts them in the same boat as the "subjectivists" they are ostensibly opposing.
Yes, I conceded that the argument is sound, at least in my judgment (but, coming back to presuppositionalism, I know that what the Church teaches is true, therefore some explanation which preserves indefectibility of the Church must exist - I admit I don't have a fully satisfying one now). The only thing I can say against this is that the Catholic doctrine of membership in the Church permits a situation when an anti-Pope sits in the Chair of Peter and teaches as a putative Pope. We know that a Pope can fall into heresy, lose membership in the Church (as numerous Popes taught, heresy and apostasy separate one from the Church) and become an anti-Pope, and there is no guarantee that he will be deposed immediately. So, in that case by using their reason Catholics would not be judging teaching of the Church, but rather teaching of an apostate non-Catholic. Of course, that he is an anti-Pope can be at this point concluded only on the basis of private judgment. That could be resolved by an imperfect council declaring a heretic to be anti-Pope, but currently that is not realistic. My point is that if you accept the Catholic teaching on membership in the Church and losing it through heresy, you accept that a Pope can fall into heresy to, and implicitly accept that the current situation is within the boundaries of Catholic teaching.
Also, I would argue that the solution which is epistemologically most consistent with my argument is to suspend judgment regarding Vatican II claimans to the Papacy and their teachings due to common doubts regarding their legitimacy in accordance with
papa dubius, papa nullus rule. I think it is as far as I can get at the moment in maintaining normative Catholic epistemology in current situation.
that this means it is rational to conclude a priori any and all counter arguments made against the original argument will be sound, denied. If you insist an unsound counter-argument be used to defend the Catholic faith, then yes, you are making the Catholic faith irrational. It is not because the Catholic faith is irrational per se.
I agree. I never made a claim that any counter-argument against the original argument which we know a priori to be false can be used as sound (I've seen a number of terribly bad arguments made by Catholic apologists in debates with Protestants). My point here was that an argument against something I know for sure to be true can be known to be wrong a priori, which you agreed with.
And do you know that by facts alone or logic alone, or is that also just your interpretation?
Yes, it is my interpretation, which demonstrates my point - every argument involves interpretation.
And do you know this (that it is my judgment according to personal argumentation) by facts and logic alone, or is this just your interpretation? If it is never possible to come down to just facts and logic alone, but there is always some interpretation necessary, then reason doesn't exist, truth is subjective, and you might as well just go home and start condemning traditionalism SJW-style as one of the last "bastions of white male hegemony", Newton's Principia as a "rape manual", and physics and math in general as mere "patriarchal constructions".
So, that it is my judgment based on reason, I admit; that there is any subjectivism whatsoever in concluding the Church now condemns as evil what she formerly permitted, I deny. That it is my judgment based on reason, I admit; that there is any subjectivism whatsoever in concluding that a Church which formally permits a grave evil is a defected Church, according to the post-Reformation understanding of the term, I deny; that's exactly what post-Reformation theologians maintain is impossible due to indefectibility of the Church.
Yes, it is my interpretation, because it is an argument (and, as I pointed out above, it demonstrates my point). However, I never implied that it is not possible to get down just to facts. When I wrote "there is no such thing as facts alone or logic alone" I refered to making a reasoned argument. Obviously, you can state facts alone without forming any argument involving interpretation (just like a Protestant can read the Bible without making any interpretation of it). It is when you try to make a reasoned argument on the basis of facts is when interpretation comes in. Continuing with the example of indefectibility of the Church - compare these two statements:
1) "Francis taught X about death penalty. The Catholic Church teaches indefectibility of the Church." - this is a statement of facts without interpretation involved.
2) "Francis taught X about death penalty, which undermines the doctrine of indefectibility of the Church" - that is a statement which involves interpretation, as you apply your subjective judgment of whether the current situation in the Church is compatible with the doctrine of indefectibility. You evaluate whether you can square the situation in the Church with the doctrine, and since you find yourself unable to do that, you conclude that the doctrine is wrong. Of course, that is contrary to Catholic epistemology. The correct approach is: "because the Church teaches indefectibility, and I know that Church's teaching is true, Francis' teaching on death penalty cannot and does not constitute defection of the Church. There must be some explanation, even if I can't find it now".
It is not the same case, because there are multiple possible interpretations of the Bible, and they are choosing one which contradicts the Church, but they could have chosen one in harmony with it, and thus they don't prove the Church wrong. Whereas there are not multiple possible interpretations about what was said about the death penalty.
You miss the point. It is not about interpretation of what Francis taught about the death penalty (although some have argued that he taught that death penalty is only wrong now, with current social and economical situation - admittably, I find this defence really feeble) but about interpretation of what does the fact that he taught it mean in context of indefectibility of the Church, and that is wheter your interpretation and private judgment comes in:
1) That Francis became a formal heretic, is an anti-Pope and his teachings are null and void, the Church did not defect (most plausible);
2) That Siri theory could be true and there is a true parallel hierarchy, the Church did not defect;
3) That election of Francis could not have been valid and Benedict probably remains a Pope, the Church did not defect (although I find that least helpful, since Benedict is a modernist heretic too);
4) That there is another solution which preserves indefectibility of the Church, but we have not figured it out yet, the Church did not defect;
5) That the Church indeed defected.
Your interpetation is just one of many subjective interpretations among many.
I know a priori that any interpretation of the fact that Francis taught what he taught must result in a conclusion that the Church did not defect, because the Church is indefectible.
You can't just appeal to God's grace and sovereignty to get yourself out of this dilemma. How can epistemological presuppositions be challenged, and how are epistemological presuppositions of Catholicism immune from the challenge?
I think it just shows limitation of apologetics and reasoning. At the end of the day, faith
is a gift from God - you can't arrive to the faith merely following a certain model of epistemology step-by-step. Maybe there is no way of challenging epistemological presuppositions other than simply counting on presenting enough evidence to convince a person to abandon his epistemological presupposition (at which point it is no longer epistemological presupposition at all). I can present tons of evidence that the Quran is not inspired by God, but if a Muslim will remain steadfast in his epistemological presupposition that he knows that the Quran is inerrant and therefore all of my arguments must be wrong a priori, it is the limit of what an apologist can do. As I said, everyone's epistemology is circular at some level, there are always some axioms at the bottom, so it seems logical that there are limitations in possibilities of challenging one's epistemological presuppositions.
In the meantime, Merry Christmas.
Merry Christmas to you too.