Author Topic: Time and free will?  (Read 1028 times)

Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #45 on: November 28, 2018, 01:25:32 PM »
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It was metaphysically impossible for him to do otherwise, given God's willing some optimum which logically entailed depended upon that he act as he did, and which willing was ontologically prior to him acting.
  Better with the correction.

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Now, you can try to say Hitler "freely" chose what was metaphysically necessary for him to choose, but that is not a definition I will accept for "free" will.
  No one cares if you choose an unorthodox definition of free will.  You seem to ignore the term "necessity" in "necessity by supposition" or "modal necessity".  I freely admit that free will is in the realm of Divine Providence and Predestination.  Free will has historically meant absence of coercion, nothing more.

 :banghead:

If God willing the optimum is ontologically prior to and entails Hitler's action, then Hitler's action is metaphysically predetermined.  Which means, it is metaphysically impossible for him to otherwise than he does, given God's willing the optimum, which exists prior to his action.  Which means that, given the actual, concrete circumstances he finds himself in, it is metaphysically impossible for him to do other than he does.

Anyone who says that nevertheless he acts "freely" due to "absence of coercion" and that therefore it is "just" for God to punish him is an intellectually dishonest charlatan and a moral cretin.
 
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Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #46 on: November 28, 2018, 02:06:05 PM »
Xavier, you need to get the modalities right before you can begin to formulate the argument.

God knows X(GKX) implies nothing else or more than that X is actually true (i.e. GKX=>X; GKX is true if X is true. And if X is true, GKX is true. Hence GKX is actually true if and only if X is actually true. And no more). Trying to turn an actual truth into a modal necessity is the modal fallacy.

Yes, but there is no modal fallacy here.  GKX->X and X->GKX are not contingent facts.  They are necessary facts.  In every possible world where God knows X, X; and vice versa.  Not only in this one.  It not only happens to be actually the case that God knows I exist; it is impossible that He not know that I exist, given that I do.

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Now, the fatalistic atheistic reasoning is as follows.

If X is true, it is useless to prepare, because it is true that A will win.
If Y is true, it is useless to prepare(UP), because it is true that B will win.
Therefore, in either case, UP. Therefore, fatalism - nothing can be changed.

The fallacies in this mode of reasoning - which exactly parallels the atheistic error concerning divine foreknowledge - are numerous. It should be evident that the truth of either X or Y coming true is contingent precisely upon sufficient preparation for the game; it is neither caused nor affected by either statement being actually true.

I will note that you didn't actually expose the fallacies in this mode of reasoning - you merely stated the conclusion must be wrong, without argument, and your conclusion (contingency upon preparation) is precisely what the fatalist denies.  So wait a minute, the logical fatalist will respond.  X or Y doesn't come true in the future.  One of the two is true right now.  You've merely made an argument by assertion.  If one of the two is true right now, then nothing can be done to change it.

The proper answer is to say that, it is also true "right now" the team will or will not prepare for the game, and that such preparation will impact performance during the game, which will impact the final outcome, and while victory is perhaps possible with insufficient preparation, it is much less likely, given our knowledge of sporting events.

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Atheists claim, if God foreknows X (which, as shown above, means nothing more or less than that X is actually true, or simply X), then X becomes modally necessary. To quote Michael, "In all possible worlds where God foreknows A, you must do A. Obviously the necessity of doing A doesn't hold in worlds where he foreknows B".

False: the true proposition is, when God foreknows A, A will happen in the actual world. The many possible worlds for B will not actually happen. And no more. And so the atheistic claim is a non sequitur.

Michael is right and you are wrong.  It is impossible that if God foreknows A, ~A.  It is not something that merely happens to be the case in the actual world that God foreknows A -> A.  It is necessarily the case.  God is not contingently omniscient, but necessarily so.

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Quote from: Quare
Necessarily, if God knows you will choose X, then you will choose X.

3. And this changes the modality precisely how, Quare? You are still going from a contingently true proposition to a modally necessary one. Let's break it down.

Do you agree, "God knows you will choose X" implies no more or less than that X is contingently true, as shown above. If you take issue with that, let us know and explain why. If not, your statemet can be simplified.

Yes, it is impossible that God be mistaken.  Therefore, in every possible world where God knows I will choose X, I choose X.

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Necessarily, if X is contingently true, it is true that you will actually choose X. Which in no way proves " X is chosen in every possible world."

No, but in every possible world where X is true, I will actually choose X.  Understand an expression of the sort,

Necessarily, X -> Y means that every possible world that contains an X also contains a Y.  It doesn't mean X (or Y) is present in every possible world.

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God's knowledge is neither determinative nor causal. Predestination is something distinct from foreknowledge as discussed elsewhere.

That depends on exactly what the "fore" in "fore"knowledge means.  If the "fore" means ontologically prior, then it certainly is determinative.

« Last Edit: November 28, 2018, 02:08:32 PM by Quaremerepulisti »
 
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Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #47 on: November 28, 2018, 06:40:42 PM »
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My logic is absolutely correct.

Then let me know the metaphysical difference between my case A and Case B using your system.  From what I can tell, you can't distinguish between the two.

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But that's making God's ultimate plan subsequent to Hitler's choice, whereas what you said the first time was God's plan being prior to Hitler's choice
. This is always the cause of dispute.  Mixing human perspective with God's perspective.  There is no subsequent, prior, etc... with God.  He is THERE and EVERYWHERE and EVERY TIME.  That is why his foreknowledge is infallible, though we could also say His view of history is infallible.  Both are equivalent.

edit:  I'm guilty of this also.  It is easy to fall into.
« Last Edit: November 28, 2018, 06:52:27 PM by james03 »
"But he that doth not believe, is already judged: because he believeth not in the name of the only begotten Son of God (Jn 3:18)."

"All sorrow leads to the foot of the Cross.  Weep for your sins."
 

Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #48 on: November 28, 2018, 06:51:30 PM »
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If God willing the optimum is ontologically prior to and entails Hitler's action, then Hitler's action is metaphysically predetermined.  Which means, it is metaphysically impossible for him to otherwise than he does, given God's willing the optimum, which exists prior to his action.  Which means that, given the actual, concrete circumstances he finds himself in, it is metaphysically impossible for him to do other than he does.
  In other words, when St. Thomas says "necessity by supposition" he really means necessity.  I don't deny that.  I believe in predestination and Divine Providence.

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Anyone who says that nevertheless he acts "freely" due to "absence of coercion" and that therefore it is "just" for God to punish him is an intellectually dishonest charlatan and a moral cretin.
  God sees the evil in every  man's heart.  He can punish all of us, even for actual sins.  What is the fate of Hitler?  I have no idea.  I insist on only one thing: In hell there is perfect Justice.  How does that translate into existence?  I have no idea, never seen it.

Also, it is not intellectually dishonest to say Hitler acted freely and without coercion.  Unless you presuppose a metaphysical system that can't distinguish between Case A and Case B.  In which case your system is incoherent.
"But he that doth not believe, is already judged: because he believeth not in the name of the only begotten Son of God (Jn 3:18)."

"All sorrow leads to the foot of the Cross.  Weep for your sins."
 

Offline Michael

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #49 on: November 28, 2018, 10:57:25 PM »
If indeterminism is true, there are three truth values: true, false, and not-yet-determined (i.e. open). To have free will, both "X will win" and "Y will win" have to be open. If it's already true that X will win before the game even happens, then X is fated to win. Otherwise, losing would falsify the truth value of the proposition, which is absurd.

To have free will, it is not enough that in different possible worlds, you do different things. You need to have access to those alternate worlds at the time of your choice. On classical theism, once God actualizes a world (or from eternity), the alternate possibilities are closed off, and it is no longer possible for you to do B if God foreknows A, for doing B would falsify God's foreknowledge.

No one is arguing that foreknowledge means causation, so throw that red herring in the trash.
 

Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #50 on: November 28, 2018, 11:04:11 PM »
Maybe I'm wrong, but I think Q. has accomplished the following:

Starting with a Congruentist definition of Free Will, he has shown that Congruentism must arrive at a belief in Divine Providence.

"But he that doth not believe, is already judged: because he believeth not in the name of the only begotten Son of God (Jn 3:18)."

"All sorrow leads to the foot of the Cross.  Weep for your sins."
 

Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #51 on: November 29, 2018, 01:51:11 PM »
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No one is arguing that foreknowledge means causation, so throw that red herring in the trash.
  Not a red herring.  Just seeking confirmation of understanding.

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and it is no longer possible for you to do B
Correct.  For clarity, let's say it is "impossible to do B".

Here then is the dispute.  What is meant by "impossible"?

Impossible due to logical NECESSITY?  True.  And I'm freely stipulating that A will definitely happen, and it happens by NECESSITY.  This is called Divine Providence and that is the Catholic position.

Impossible due to absolute ontological necessity?  False.  There is no coercion.  The efficient cause for a free will choice is man.
"But he that doth not believe, is already judged: because he believeth not in the name of the only begotten Son of God (Jn 3:18)."

"All sorrow leads to the foot of the Cross.  Weep for your sins."
 

Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #52 on: December 01, 2018, 04:08:13 PM »
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But that's making God's ultimate plan subsequent to Hitler's choice, whereas what you said the first time was God's plan being prior to Hitler's choice
. This is always the cause of dispute.  Mixing human perspective with God's perspective.  There is no subsequent, prior, etc... with God.  He is THERE and EVERYWHERE and EVERY TIME.  That is why his foreknowledge is infallible, though we could also say His view of history is infallible.  Both are equivalent.

Again, "subsequent" and "prior" here refer to ontology, not time.  God is outside of time, granted, so there is no temporal subsequent or prior with God.  However, God is not outside of ontology, not in the West anyway, so your argument doesn't work.
 

Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #53 on: December 01, 2018, 07:02:44 PM »
For clarity:

Divine Providence is ontologically prior to Hitler's choice.
"But he that doth not believe, is already judged: because he believeth not in the name of the only begotten Son of God (Jn 3:18)."

"All sorrow leads to the foot of the Cross.  Weep for your sins."