Author Topic: Time and free will?  (Read 1291 times)

Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #30 on: November 27, 2018, 04:34:37 PM »
There are three problems with this claim.

OK.

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First, those terms are metaphors which presuppose some truth. For instance, God "changing his mind" requires that God cause some effect in the world at t1 and another effect at t2. The "changing" of God's mind of course is a mere metaphor, but the reality that God brings about two different effects at two different times is still required in order for the metaphor to be true. So every metaphorical assertion presupposes some positive assertion regarding God.

You've argued from the particular to the general, which is a fallacy.  But I also even deny the particular claim; you merely assume, without argument, that "God brings about" or "God causes" something isn't a mere metaphor itself but a positive assertion, and so what is gratuitously asserted is gratuitously denied.

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Second, those terms specifically refer to effects of God as they appear to us. For instance, we say God is angry when the effect is punishment. However, I cannot see how a similar move can be made regarding divine knowledge since it is an attribute completely independent of creatures, it refers to God's life ad intra in addition to ad extra.

You are merely arguing by assertion that Divine knowledge is an attribute independent of creatures, without proving it so.  A similar move can be made similar to anger; for instance we say God knows our sins and is angry about them when the effect is punishment.  We say God knows our prayers and hears them when what we ask for happens.  If you don't make the move, however, you have the modal collapse issue.  If God's knowledge of X refers to His life ad intra, which cannot be otherwise than it is (because His life ad intra is identical to His essence), then X is modally necessary.

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Third, if you are correct in saying that the word knowledge when applied to God is a mere metaphor, and not, as the Thomists claim, a literally true predication, albeit applied analogically, then why is it any more appropriate than any other adjective we might want to use to describe God? Or to push a similar problem, why would I be incorrect if I denied God had knowledge?

Why should it be more appropriate?  Would you be incorrect if you denied God walked in the Garden of Eden?  If you did (and were correct in so doing), Scripture would not be inerrant.  It would be no more or less appropriate than that.  Metaphors express some truth.

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But Christians, East and West, hold that prayer has efficacy.

Yes, but the West must hold, contradictorily, that God is a se and yet that He wills something on account of the prayer.

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I don't know. Since I think the future does exist and Aquinas does not, I think this may modify how we are using those terms. I don't know if Aquinas would use "exemplar" as applying to an actually existing, present state of affairs. But regardless, this is a semantics issue and I may just be wrong about how the tradition is using those terms.

Use whatever terminology you like.  The point is that what actually exists pre-existed in the mind of God (in addition to what only possibly exists).  That is the Thomist explanation for God's knowledge of contingent facts as actually, and not only possibly, true.  Otherwise you have God "knowing" something (a contingent fact) prior to it being true.

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1. You haven't proven the antecedent, meaning you haven't shown that Western theology does not have the resources to handle the problem we are discussing. I am not arguing that Eastern theology doesn't have a separate, possibly useful or even potentially correct approach. What I am saying is that you haven't shown that Western theology fails. So I don't have to show that the antecedent is false, only that you haven't shown it to be true.

Yes you do, to make the argument you wanted to make.  You were arguing a success of the Eastern approach (complete dissimilarity) would entail a success of the Western (doctrine of analogy) and that, therefore, the problem couldn't be solved by ditching Western theology.  This I denied; it is possible that a complete dissimilarity (Eastern) succeeds while the doctrine of analogy (Western) fails. 


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2. This could get lost in the terminology of "property." But what I am saying is that God's knowledge that contingent propositions are true is not entirely grounded intrinsic to God. Or at least it is not grounded in God in such a way that if God had known something else, i.e. in a different possible world, God would be intrinsically different.

So is God's knowledge of X intrinsic to God, yes or no?  If yes, X is necessary (God can't be intrinsically otherwise than He is.)  If no, God's knowledge of X is not due to His nature, but is either due to X itself (which would violate aseity) or else an unexplained brute fact.


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I am not as familiar with Eastern theology. But I am skeptical of your characterization that the Eastern approach is essentially the same as Maimonides and denies we can have any positive knowledge of God. To the extent that this is an accurate representation of Eastern thinking, I think it carries with it the problem of making any sense of any faith claims we Christians have to make about God.

The Eastern approach has a rich tradition in Christianity.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apophatic_theology

I'm not sure why there would be a difficulty regarding faith claims; while it's true we can't understand what it means in itself for God to reveal something, we can nevertheless understand the effects of such revelation, which is that there are teachings that can be known as true.


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Regarding the blog post you link to, I agree with Vallicella that the approach is to deny (3). Matthews Grant's article I think does a good job at making this plausible. However, in order to deny (3), as Vallicella alludes to, we need not adopt belief externalism since we do not have to think of God's knowledge as a species of true belief.

In the comments, pertaining to the discussion of God and Schmod, I would point out two things briefly. First, I don't think Schmod is a possible being to begin with making the comparison hard as a thought experiment. Second, I agree with Vallicella's finally comment in the combox, it undermines the argument.

I agree that Schmod is not an ontologically possible being, but he is being posited with "for the sake of argument" a priori epistemic possibility, and the point is to deny Schmod is deny the crux of the argument, as these two contradict:

1) There can't be an intrinsic difference between a God Who knows contingent fact X (in a possible world where X is true) and God Who knows X is false (in a world where X is false).  Otherwise, if God knows X, He necessarily knows X (He cannot be intrinsically different than He is), and X is necessary.

2) There must be an intrinsic difference between a God Who knows all contingent facts and Schmod who does not.  Otherwise, Schmod is possible, since God is not by nature omniscient. 

2) asserts that there is something intrinsic to God whereby God knows what He knows in terms of contingent facts.  Otherwise there won't be an intrinsic difference between God and Schmod.  1) denies that there is such a difference.


 

Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #31 on: November 27, 2018, 06:50:57 PM »
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It as though I pinned you to the ground with a crushing force - but then said it was only a mere modal, but not an ontological necessity, that you be on the ground and not standing up, and then blamed you for not standing up.  No, it's a conditional ontological necessity.

Q., you have never backed this up.  You are begging the question.  Where have you established that God is pinning you to the ground and then blaming you for not standing up?

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That is you, verbatim, saying I will do X because God knows my choice.
  As a modal necessity, and almost like a tautology.  I will do X because I did X in the future.  Also I can't find that on this thread, maybe I am blind.  Did you pull that from some other thread?

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But if God knows my choice because of what I choose, then He is ontologically dependent.
  Understood that I did not explain that well.  I try to keep from writing a book length post.  I'll use an example:

1.  Given: God's secret and sovereign purpose.  Arguendo, we'll say He is achieving some optimum.
2.  Given: Greek Realism.  Cartesian dualism rejected.

Now a trigger warning for the logic challenged.  I'm going to use myself as an example.  If it makes you feel better, you can assume I'm a stand-in for BILLIONs of people.

It is/was God's purpose to create me.  In order to do that, then it is ontologically necessary (see "2" above) that Hitler existed and did everything he did.  In that sense and inside of time, God is ontologically dependent on all of the choices Hitler made.  The constraint on God is Truth.

Outside of time, the constraint upon God is Goodness.  However He is free to include miracles, Graces, and even the order of creation  ( e.g. the fact that we have 9 planets -- bring back Pluto! -- vs. 12 planets has an effect on Earth) to achieve His purpose, which is the optimal Good in this example.
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Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #32 on: November 27, 2018, 07:25:07 PM »
Q., you have never backed this up.  You are begging the question.  Where have you established that God is pinning you to the ground and then blaming you for not standing up?

I haven't established it, because I'm not claiming it.  I'm establishing there is such a thing as a conditional ontological necessity, which is different from a mere modal necessity as well as an absolute ontological necessity.  Me pinning you to the ground was used as an example of such.  What I did say was if God creates a conditional ontological necessity for me to act in a certain way, then it is as though I were pinned to the ground; I cannot act otherwise, given the condition.

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  As a modal necessity, and almost like a tautology.  I will do X because I did X in the future.  Also I can't find that on this thread, maybe I am blind.  Did you pull that from some other thread?

No, it's on this one.  "I will do X because I did X in the future" is different from "I will do X because God knows what my choice is."  If the former is what you mean, fine.

Where have you established that God has us pinned to the ground?  As of now we have a modal necessity.  I will do X because God is already there (either from the future looking in the past, or in the past looking at the future) and knows what my choice is.  So how has God "pinned us to the ground"?

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Understood that I did not explain that well.  I try to keep from writing a book length post.  I'll use an example:

1.  Given: God's secret and sovereign purpose.  Arguendo, we'll say He is achieving some optimum.
2.  Given: Greek Realism.  Cartesian dualism rejected.

Now a trigger warning for the logic challenged.  I'm going to use myself as an example.  If it makes you feel better, you can assume I'm a stand-in for BILLIONs of people.

It is/was God's purpose to create me.  In order to do that, then it is ontologically necessary (see "2" above) that Hitler existed and did everything he did.  In that sense and inside of time, God is ontologically dependent on all of the choices Hitler made.  The constraint on God is Truth.

Outside of time, the constraint upon God is Goodness.  However He is free to include miracles, Graces, and even the order of creation  ( e.g. the fact that we have 9 planets -- bring back Pluto! -- vs. 12 planets has an effect on Earth) to achieve His purpose, which is the optimal Good in this example.

So, you have a conditional ontological necessity for Hitler to do what he did.  It is metaphysically necessary that, given God's willing some optimum, it is necessary that Hitler do what he did; it is impossible for him to have acted otherwise.  God's willing that optimum is ontologically prior to Hitler's actions or even his existence.


 
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Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #33 on: November 27, 2018, 07:55:08 PM »
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So, you have a conditional ontological necessity for Hitler to do what he did.  It is metaphysically necessary that, given God's willing some optimum, it is necessary that Hitler do what he did; it is impossible for him to have acted otherwise.  God's willing that optimum is ontologically prior to Hitler's actions or even his existence.

I've never seen the term "conditional ontological necessity".  St. Thomas would probably call this a necessity from supposition, which I call a modal necessity or logical necessity.  There is also an absolute necessity, which I call an ontological necessity. 

Here is the problem statement:

"it is impossible for him to have acted otherwise".  By logic, this is correct.  God's view of the past (History) is infallible, or if you prefer, God's view of the future is infallible.

  By coercion, incorrect.  Hitler freely chose his actions.
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Offline TomD

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #34 on: November 27, 2018, 07:58:49 PM »


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You've argued from the particular to the general, which is a fallacy.  But I also even deny the particular claim; you merely assume, without argument, that "God brings about" or "God causes" something isn't a mere metaphor itself but a positive assertion, and so what is gratuitously asserted is gratuitously denied.

It is not itself fallacious to argue from particular cases to a general. Given the context we are discussing, I see no fallacy. Moreover, I was not making a deductive proof, which would be a fallacy if I proceeded from particular to universal, but merely pointing out a common theme among adjectives found in Scripture that are metaphors.

When something is simply a metaphor for God, I take it that literally speaking, the claim is false. So if I say God is a lion, I am speaking falsely. On this understanding, if God causes the universe is only metaphorical, then it is literally speaking, false. But if it is false, (in the same way that it is false to say that God is a lion) we cannot make sense of Christianity. This is my reasoning for "gratuitously" asserting that God causes the universe. If you dispute this reasoning, I am curious as to how?

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You are merely arguing by assertion that Divine knowledge is an attribute independent of creatures, without proving it so.

Well at the very least I think we would agree that in a possible world in which God does not create, God still has knowledge. If we do not agree on this, do you think it is false? Indeterminate? Unknowable?

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Why should it be more appropriate?  Would you be incorrect if you denied God walked in the Garden of Eden?  If you did (and were correct in so doing), Scripture would not be inerrant.  It would be no more or less appropriate than that.  Metaphors express some truth.

Well we presumably agree that "knowledge" is a term appropriately used to describe God. I am asking why you think this to be the case. In the case of metaphors, there is some reason why the metaphor is appropriate. I agree that metaphors express some truth. I am asking what truth the "knowledge" metaphor may express. My point in bringing this up is not to show you are incorrect to think knowledge in God is a mere metaphor, but to point out that if it is a mere metaphor, it must be a metaphor for something.

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Yes, but the West must hold, contradictorily, that God is a se and yet that He wills something on account of the prayer.

Not unless we identify God's contingent will pertaining to creatures with God himself. But of course, this is what the whole Cambridge property business denies.

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Use whatever terminology you like.  The point is that what actually exists pre-existed in the mind of God (in addition to what only possibly exists).  That is the Thomist explanation for God's knowledge of contingent facts as actually, and not only possibly, true.  Otherwise you have God "knowing" something (a contingent fact) prior to it being true.

What actually exists pre exists in the mind of God as possibilia. It exists as possibilia in the mind of God ontologically prior to creation and therefore across all possible worlds. God's knowlege that a particular world exists (and thus that certain contingent propositions are true) is the only issue pertaining to God's knowledge which seems to generate modal collapse, and it is the one we are discussing below.

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Yes you do, to make the argument you wanted to make.  You were arguing a success of the Eastern approach (complete dissimilarity) would entail a success of the Western (doctrine of analogy) and that, therefore, the problem couldn't be solved by ditching Western theology.  This I denied; it is possible that a complete dissimilarity (Eastern) succeeds while the doctrine of analogy (Western) fails. 

I first pointed out that I thought you misrepresented Western theology by stating Westerns maintain that knowledge means in God "pretty much exactly" what it means in humans.

 Later I argued that: "If denying the similarity between God and human knowledge does the trick, then the doctrine of analogy will do (at least a version which emphasizes the dissimilarity between God and humans). If this does not work, then unless we opt for a theology in which we can make no positive assertions about God whatsoever, the problem remains." In other words, if denying the similarity between God and human knowledge solves the problem, Western theology has the apparatus to do this. If it does not do the work, then only a completely negative theology will work. In my second post, and throughout, I have given reasons why I do not think this kind of theology will be useful in a Christian context (and I am skeptical that it is representative of Eastern Christianity).

But this is not logically equivalent to claiming that the success of the Eastern approach entails the success of the Western approach unless "denying the similarity between God and human knowledge" is identical to the Eastern approach since the point of my original comment, and my argument throughout is that there is a Western approach that does just this, viz. the doctrine of analogy. Of course we dispute whether the doctrine has sufficient dissimilarity to solve the problem at hand, but it is not up for debate that Thomists deny there is completely similarity between God and human knowledge.


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So is God's knowledge of X intrinsic to God, yes or no?  If yes, X is necessary (God can't be intrinsically otherwise than He is.)  If no, God's knowledge of X is not due to His nature, but is either due to X itself (which would violate aseity) or else an unexplained brute fact.

God’s knowledge of X is intrinsic to God insofar as he is intrinsically, necessarily omniscient. Insofar as God knows X where X is some contingent truth, then it is extrinsic to God. The fact that God knows X is a result of his nature, i.e. he is intrinsically omniscient. The truth of X is irrelevant here as it is explained by the same factors regardless of how God’s knowledge works. I do not see how this account leads to a violation of aseity or the positing of a brute fact.


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I agree that Schmod is not an ontologically possible being, but he is being posited with "for the sake of argument" a priori epistemic possibility, and the point is to deny Schmod is deny the crux of the argument, as these two contradict:

1) There can't be an intrinsic difference between a God Who knows contingent fact X (in a possible world where X is true) and God Who knows X is false (in a world where X is false).  Otherwise, if God knows X, He necessarily knows X (He cannot be intrinsically different than He is), and X is necessary.

2) There must be an intrinsic difference between a God Who knows all contingent facts and Schmod who does not.  Otherwise, Schmod is possible, since God is not by nature omniscient. 

2) asserts that there is something intrinsic to God whereby God knows what He knows in terms of contingent facts.  Otherwise there won't be an intrinsic difference between God and Schmod.  1) denies that there is such a difference.

But if Schmod is not ontologically possible, we have to be wary about reasoning from premises which posit the existence of Schmod since arguments can be constructed in such a way as to yield any conclusion whatsoever. I grant that perhaps impossible beings can be used to illustrate certain points, but not as deductive proofs. And even this use is risky.

I believe (1) to be true as it is basically a summary of the whole “Cambridge property” approach, the one which I have been defending. Of course this leads me to deny (2).

I do not see how the denial of (2) is problematic, but I am somewhat confused by the way you worded this. Why does denying (2) entail that Schmod is possible?
 

Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #35 on: November 27, 2018, 08:34:26 PM »
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So, you have a conditional ontological necessity for Hitler to do what he did.  It is metaphysically necessary that, given God's willing some optimum, it is necessary that Hitler do what he did; it is impossible for him to have acted otherwise.  God's willing that optimum is ontologically prior to Hitler's actions or even his existence.

I've never seen the term "conditional ontological necessity".  St. Thomas would probably call this a necessity from supposition, which I call a modal necessity or logical necessity.  There is also an absolute necessity, which I call an ontological necessity. 

Which is why Thomism and the Thomists get an "F" grade.  If I pin you to the ground, it is not a mere modal necessity nor a mere necessity from supposition that you are on the ground, despite not being an absolute necessity that you are on the ground.  Unlike, say, it being a modal necessity that you are not in the air if you are on the ground.  Because in the one case something (pinning) is ontologically prior to the other (being on the ground); while in the other the something (not being in the air) is not ontologically prior.

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Here is the problem statement:

"it is impossible for him to have acted otherwise".  By logic, this is correct.  God's view of the past (History) is infallible, or if you prefer, God's view of the future is infallible.

By coercion, incorrect.  Hitler freely chose his actions.

It was metaphysically impossible for him to do otherwise, given God's willing some optimum which logically entailed he act as he did, and which willing was ontologically prior to him acting.

Now, you can try to say Hitler "freely" chose what was metaphysically necessary for him to choose, but that is not a definition I will accept for "free" will.


 

Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #36 on: November 27, 2018, 08:59:22 PM »
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Which is why Thomism and the Thomists get an "F" grade.

No St. Thomas gets an "A" since your logic is fatally flawed.

Case A:   God foresees that Hitler will freely choose evil and incorporates it into His Plan.

Case B:  God is evil and sends an "evil grace" that forces Hitler to do evil to accomplish His Plan.

Your system can not distinguish metaphysically between Case A and Case B.  St. Thomas's system does.
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Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #37 on: November 27, 2018, 09:11:21 PM »
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It was metaphysically impossible for him to do otherwise, given God's willing some optimum which logically entailed depended upon that he act as he did, and which willing was ontologically prior to him acting.
  Better with the correction.

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Now, you can try to say Hitler "freely" chose what was metaphysically necessary for him to choose, but that is not a definition I will accept for "free" will.
  No one cares if you choose an unorthodox definition of free will.  You seem to ignore the term "necessity" in "necessity by supposition" or "modal necessity".  I freely admit that free will is in the realm of Divine Providence and Predestination.  Free will has historically meant absence of coercion, nothing more.

We can use this reasoning from the other angle.  If I am saved, and I freely choose to cooperate with Grace, it is still a modal necessity that I be saved according to Divine Providence.  Heck my mere existence is contingent upon God's Sovereign Plan.  Sungenis terms this "gracious merit".
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Offline james03

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #38 on: November 27, 2018, 09:23:09 PM »
For those who would like to read more about this, especially the difference between Luther and St. Thomas, this link is a pretty good write up:

https://books.google.com/books?id=KaRAAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA150&lpg=PA151
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Offline Michael

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #39 on: November 28, 2018, 12:11:22 AM »
There is no modal fallacy in arguing that foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian free will. If God foreknows I will do A, then doing B would invalidate God's knowledge, which is absurd. One would only be committing a modal fallacy if they said that doing A is necessary in the sense that it happens in all possible worlds. But that's not the argument. In all possible worlds where God foreknows A, you must do A. Obviously the necessity of doing A doesn't hold in worlds where he foreknows B. (In those worlds, doing B would be necessary, and so you still wouldn't have libertarian freedom.)

On compatibilist free will, all your choices are determined. They are "free" in the sense of not being subject to external coercion. This would entail that God is the ultimate cause of (and desires) the rape of children, the Holocaust, Satan's fall, and all other evils. God could have simply determined for everyone to be good.
« Last Edit: November 28, 2018, 12:20:58 AM by Michael »
 

Offline Michael

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #40 on: November 28, 2018, 12:14:30 AM »
Quote from: james03
Free will has historically meant absence of coercion, nothing more.
Even in Catholicism? Citation needed.
 

Offline Xavier

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #41 on: November 28, 2018, 06:23:47 AM »
God knows X(GKX) implies nothing else or more than that X is actually true (i.e. GKX=>X; GKX is true if X is true. And if X is true, GKX is true. Hence GKX is actually true if and only if X is actually true. And no more). Trying to turn an actual truth into a modal necessity is the modal fallacy.

1. Now, before we come back to the atheological sophistries against the demonstrable and demonstrated fact of Divine Omniscience, consider the following invalid syllogism that progresses as the atheists do.

Two football teams are going to play a game tomorrow. Then either "A will win the game tomorrow" (statement X, say) or "A will lose/B will win the game tomorrow" (statement Y; negation of X) is true. (Draws and other scenarios excluded for illustration. I.e. Either X or Y is true.

Now, the fatalistic atheistic reasoning is as follows.

If X is true, it is useless to prepare, because it is true that A will win.
If Y is true, it is useless to prepare(UP), because it is true that B will win.
Therefore, in either case, UP. Therefore, fatalism - nothing can be changed.

The fallacies in this mode of reasoning - which exactly parallels the atheistic error concerning divine foreknowledge - are numerous. It should be evident that the truth of either X or Y coming true is contingent precisely upon sufficient preparation for the game; it is neither caused nor affected by either statement being actually true.

2. Now, apply the same to a more important syllogism.

Atheists claim, if God foreknows X (which, as shown above, means nothing more or less than that X is actually true, or simply X), then X becomes modally necessary. To quote Michael, "In all possible worlds where God foreknows A, you must do A. Obviously the necessity of doing A doesn't hold in worlds where he foreknows B".

False: the true proposition is, when God foreknows A, A will happen in the actual world. The many possible worlds for B will not actually happen. And no more. And so the atheistic claim is a non sequitur.

Quote from: Quare
Necessarily, if God knows you will choose X, then you will choose X.

3. And this changes the modality precisely how, Quare? You are still going from a contingently true proposition to a modally necessary one. Let's break it down.

Do you agree, "God knows you will choose X" implies no more or less than that X is contingently true, as shown above. If you take issue with that, let us know and explain why. If not, your statemet can be simplified.

Necessarily, if X is contingently true, it is true that you will actually choose X. Which in no way proves " X is chosen in every possible world."

God's foreknowledge doesn't mean there is only one possible world. It means that there are many possible world which are never actualized.

God's knowledge is neither determinative nor causal. Predestination is something distinct from foreknowledge as discussed elsewhere.
Please listen to the frequent messages and take heed of the directions given from Our Living Lord and Our Loving Lady from around the world here: https://maryrefugeofholylove.com/ Great things are at stake. Please consecrate your life to the Blessed Mother so that the Kingdom of God may come, "Ad Sanctam Trinitatem per Mariam, Ut adveniat Regnum Deum, adveniat Regnum Mariae, ergo TOTUS TUUS ego sum, MARIA" See http://www.maria-domina-animarum.net/en/flowers/1-250

Mary, our Heavenly Mother, implores those who receive Holy Communion Daily, or at least Weekly, to Offer their Lives. TEXT OF THE LIFE OFFERING, adapted and pluralized: Dear Lord Jesus, before the Holy Trinity, Our Heavenly Mother, and the whole Heavenly Court, united with Your most Precious Blood and Your Sacrifice on Calvary, We hereby Offer our whole Lives to the Intention of Your Sacred Heart and to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. Together with our life, we place at Your disposal all Holy Masses, all our Holy Communions, all Rosaries, all acts of consecration, all our good deeds, all our sacrifices, and the suffering of our entire life for the Adoration and Supplication of the Holy Trinity, for Unity in our Holy Mother Church, for the Holy Father, Pope Francis the First; and for His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI. For all the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, for all Bishops of the Universal Church that they may be true Apostles and Shepherds; and for Priests, Nuns and Monks, for good Priestly and Religious Vocations, and for All Souls until the end of the world. O my Jesus, please accept our life Sacrifice and our offerings and give us Your grace that we may all persevere obediently until death. Amen." https://marianapostolate.com/life-offering/ It is recommended that you make this Life Offering as soon as you feel ready, and to renew it from time to time.

Please read the Blessed Mother's amazing promises in the link: A simple effective way for thousands of us to save millions of souls. The Doctors and Apostles say if we save even just one other soul through prayer and sacrifice, we also ensure the salvation of our own! Let us Offer our Lives in Sacrifice to Jesus and Mary Today, to save, if it were possible, all souls everywhere.
 

Offline Michael Wilson

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #42 on: November 28, 2018, 08:20:11 AM »
Quote from: james03
Free will has historically meant absence of coercion, nothing more.
Even in Catholicism? Citation needed.
I think this is incorrect; free will means "libertarian" free will, the ability to choose one course of action over another.
Here is the Catholic Encyclopedia you can read the whole article here:http://newadvent.org/cathen/06259a.htm#cat

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Will is rational appetite. Man necessarily desires beatitude, but he can freely choose between different forms of it. Free will is simply this elective power. Infinite Good is not visible to the intellect in this life. There are always some drawbacks and deficiencies in every good presented to us. None of them exhausts our intellectual capacity of conceiving the good. Consequently, in deliberate volition, not one of them completely satiates or irresistibly entices the will. In this capability of the intellect for conceiving the universal lies the root of our freedom. But God possesses an infallible knowledge of man's future actions. How is this prevision possible, if man's future acts are not necessary? God does not exist in time. The future and the past are alike ever present to the eternal mind as a man gazing down from a lofty mountain takes in at one momentary glance all the objects which can be apprehended only through a lengthy series of successive experiences by travellers along the winding road beneath, in somewhat similar fashion the intuitive vision of God apprehends simultaneously what is future to us with all it contains.
"The World Must Conform to Our Lord and not He to it." Rev. Dennis Fahey CSSP

"My brothers, all of you, if you are condemned to see the triumph of evil, never applaud it. Never say to evil: you are good; to decadence: you are progess; to death: you are life. Sanctify yourselves in the times wherein God has placed you; bewail the evils and the disorders which God tolerates; oppose them with the energy of your works and your efforts, your life uncontaminated by error, free from being led astray, in such a way that having lived here below, united with the Spirit of the Lord, you will be admitted to be made but one with Him forever and ever: But he who is joined to the Lord is one in spirit." Cardinal Pie of Potiers
 

Offline Daniel

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #43 on: November 28, 2018, 08:32:58 AM »
Necessarily, if X is contingently true, it is true that you will actually choose X. Which in no way proves " X is chosen in every possible world."

God's foreknowledge doesn't mean there is only one possible world. It means that there are many possible world which are never actualized.

God's knowledge is neither determinative nor causal. Predestination is something distinct from foreknowledge as discussed elsewhere.
I would say that modal worlds are irrelevant. There is only one actual world, and in that one world all things which will have happened will have happened and nothing more. Anything that will not have happened in the actual world cannot possibly happen in that world, so there is only one "possible" world.

If in the actual world you will choose X, then you necessarily will choose X. You cannot possibly choose not-X, because you will choose X. Still, this doesn't mean that your choice isn't "free". (Maybe the reason that you'll choose X is because you freely will to choose X.)

(Though this still doesn't seem to solve the problem with God's knowledge: X is in God's intellect, and all things in God's intellect are uncaused, yet X is caused by your will.)
« Last Edit: November 28, 2018, 08:35:16 AM by Daniel »
 

Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Time and free will?
« Reply #44 on: November 28, 2018, 01:02:58 PM »
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Which is why Thomism and the Thomists get an "F" grade.

No St. Thomas gets an "A" since your logic is fatally flawed.

Can I ask that you try to use more precise language?  This is the second time that you appear to have meant something completely different from what you said the first time.  My logic is absolutely correct.

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Case A:   God foresees that Hitler will freely choose evil and incorporates it into His Plan.

But that's making God's ultimate plan subsequent to Hitler's choice, whereas what you said the first time was God's plan being prior to Hitler's choice.  Now the latter must be true if God's plan is going to be the global optimum; the former only gets the optimum given Hitler's choice.  Also, with the former, God is not a se but dependent on something else (Hitler's choice).