Author Topic: Thomist theory of grace and predestination  (Read 9282 times)

Offline Non Nobis

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #195 on: May 11, 2017, 03:22:23 PM »
...
5.  For anything willed not identical to God, its willing is an ontological thing, related to the thing willed as cause to effect . (Premise)
...
Of course I deny 5.  Every other premise can be known to metaphysical certainty.  Willing simpliciter is an ontological thing, but willing of this thing or that thing is not.  It is a relation.

I'll just quote St. Thomas without much comment. (Of course "he is just another man with an opinion", but take it for what it is worth)

 
Quote from: St. Thomas Aquinas S.T. I Q45 A3  Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Objection 1. It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the creature.

Reply to Objection 1. Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (I:13:7) in treating of the divine names.

So I think St. Thomas would disagree with premise 5 too - willing creation doesn't mean an ontological thing,  but an ontological thing (God's essence) with a logical relationship (which does not qualify God) to a creature (something external). It isn't anything in God.

For a more disciplined, scholarly consideration of these things one could read http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1013.htm#article7
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You accept the fact that many things are said only analogically of God. I say that things that we do not understand as they really are in God are mysteries to US.
« Last Edit: May 11, 2017, 03:32:04 PM by Non Nobis »
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Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #196 on: May 12, 2017, 09:16:13 AM »
I'll just quote St. Thomas without much comment. (Of course "he is just another man with an opinion", but take it for what it is worth)

As a minor (perhaps somewhat peevish) point, please do not highlight objections in the Summa as though they were the actual opinions of St. Thomas.

But as a major point, when you quote the Summa, please be sure that what you quote actually disagrees with me.  Otherwise, it looks like you are just looking for a five-second soundbite "refutation".

 
Quote from: St. Thomas Aquinas S.T. I Q45 A3  Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Reply to Objection 1. Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (I:13:7) in treating of the divine names.

Quote
So I think St. Thomas would disagree with premise 5 too - willing creation doesn't mean an ontological thing,  but an ontological thing (God's essence) with a logical relationship (which does not qualify God) to a creature (something external). It isn't anything in God.

No, he would have to agree with premise 5.  Creation means the divine action, which is God's essence.  Thus, it is God's essence, which is obviously an ontological thing.
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Offline Non Nobis

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #197 on: May 12, 2017, 04:38:15 PM »
Quote from: St. Thomas Aquinas S.T. I Q45 A3  Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Objection 1. It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the creature.

As a minor (perhaps somewhat peevish) point, please do not highlight objections in the Summa as though they were the actual opinions of St. Thomas.

St. Thomas does not always disagree with objections in their entirety.  Based on the objection and its answer I understand his thinking this way:

Objector: A)  "creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator" ... and B) "this implies creation taken passively is not anything in the creature."

St. Thomas: A) is correct, B) is not.

 
Quote from: St. Thomas Aquinas S.T. I Q45 A3  Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Reply to Objection 1. Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (I:13:7) in treating of the divine names.

I think that St. Thomas believes that A) is correct because he says "in God relation to the creature is not a real relation".  I think St. Thomas thinks that B) is not (that there is no implication) because he says "the relation of the creature to God is a real relation". He makes the distinction between two types of relation; the objector does not.  A logical relation is not something real in God's essence.

When He says "Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature" the "with" refers to logical relation only, not something that inheres in His essence. 

But as a major point, when you quote the Summa, please be sure that what you quote actually disagrees with me. 

I'm saying that he agrees with you in denying premise 5.  Sorry if I did not make that clear.

No, he would have to agree with premise 5.  Creation means the divine action, which is God's essence.  Thus, it is God's essence, which is obviously an ontological thing.

I think he is saying that God has an association (logical relation) with His creatures, but that it is not something in His essence. "God creates X" means (the ontological being God's essence) logical_association_only-->(the ontological being X). On the other hand "X is created by God" means the ontological being God's essence) <--real_relation (the ontological being X)

I will admit that I do not understand "logical relation" very well at all.  I can't argue these things very well. But I don't think St. Thomas agrees with premise 5.

Quote
5.  For anything willed not identical to God, its willing is an ontological thing,

Maybe we'll have to agree to disagree (about whether St. Thomas like you would reject premise 5).  But however obscure he is I don't think St. Thomas' thinking leads to believing that the universe is absolutely necessary.
« Last Edit: May 12, 2017, 04:55:32 PM by Non Nobis »
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Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #198 on: May 13, 2017, 12:01:24 PM »
I think that St. Thomas believes that A) is correct because he says "in God relation to the creature is not a real relation".  I think St. Thomas thinks that B) is not (that there is no implication) because he says "the relation of the creature to God is a real relation". He makes the distinction between two types of relation; the objector does not.  A logical relation is not something real in God's essence.

When He says "Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature" the "with" refers to logical relation only, not something that inheres in His essence. 

Granted, but he still equates creation with God's essence, which means it is an ontological thing.

Quote
I'm saying that he agrees with you in denying premise 5.  Sorry if I did not make that clear.

OK, but he does not.  There is a difference between saying creation is God's essence with a logical relation to the creature, and saying creation is the logical relation to the creature.  In the former, creation is an ontological thing (since God's essence is an ontological thing); in the latter, it is not.

Quote
Maybe we'll have to agree to disagree (about whether St. Thomas like you would reject premise 5).  But however obscure he is I don't think St. Thomas' thinking leads to believing that the universe is absolutely necessary.

If it is held that creation (or willing) is an ontological thing, then I have shown that premise does lead to that conclusion.  The only way to avoid the conclusion is to deny the premise.  Put another way, if God's existence does not entail the existence of X, neither can God's willing or God's causing, since it is identical to His existence - it forces the conclusion causation is non-determinative.


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Offline james03

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #199 on: May 14, 2017, 02:06:45 PM »
Quote
Put another way, if God's existence does not entail the existence of X, neither can God's willing or God's causing, since it is identical to His existence - it forces the conclusion causation is non-determinative.
You are swapping perspectives.  St. Thomas addresses this with the Socrates sitting example.  If Socrates is sitting, then it is ontologically necessary that he sits.  However it is not ontologically necessary for Socrates to sit to be Socrates.

If God creates this world, then it is an ontological necessity that this world exists.  However it is not an ontological necessity for God to create this world for God to be God.  GIVEN the entire essence of God, I'd say it is a modal necessity for this world to exist the way it exists.
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Offline LouisIX

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #200 on: May 15, 2017, 04:15:01 PM »
You have the power to stick your hand into a meat grinder, but you'll never do so according to your wisdom. That doesn't mean that you lack the power. So, is it possible for you to stick your hand in a meat grinder? Of course. It is possible that God could have created other universes given the divine omnipotence, but, given the divine wisdom, there's no reason to expect that He ever would have done so. This is why I'm stating that He never would have actually created a different universe.

For me, power is distinct from wisdom, so I have the power to act in a way that is not wise.  For God, however, His power is identical to His wisdom.  So it is logically impossible for any given hypothetical universe to be consistent with His power but inconsistent with His wisdom.

Which is why I said that, conceptually, one could imagine that God had the power to create otherwise but since His wisdom and power are one, it is the case that no other universe would ever have been truly created.
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Offline LouisIX

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #201 on: May 15, 2017, 04:15:53 PM »
I'll put this in a way where the problem can't be muddied by sidetracks about accidents and attributes or about appeals to motion "ad extra" (whatever that is).

Here are the premises, which every Thomist would accept (I think):

1.  An (ontological) thing either is or is not; non datur tertium.  (Premise)
2.  A thing that is either exists in act or in potency; non datur tertium. (Premise)
3.  Two things that exist are either identical to or not identical to each other; non datur tertium. (Premise)
4.  For anything which exists and is not identical to God, God wills it to exist.  (Premise)
5.  Willing of anything is an ontological thing, related to the thing willed as cause to effect. (Premise)
6.  This universe (meaning, the set of all existing things excluding God) exists. (Premise)
7.  There cannot exist an infinite chain of hierarchically subordinated (per se) causes. (Premise)
8.  God's existence is absolutely necessary.  (Premise)

And the logical argumentation:

9.  God willing this universe is or is not. (1,5).
10.  If the willing of the universe were not, this universe would not exist. (4)
11.  Therefore, the willing of this universe exists. (6,9,10)
12.  Willing of this universe exists in act or in potency. (2,11)
13. If the willing of the universe existed in potency, this universe would not exist. (4)
14. Therefore, the willing of this universe exists in act.  (6,12,13)
15.  Willing of this universe is either identical to or not identical to God's existence. (3,14)
16.  If willing of this universe is not identical to God's existence, then God wills the willing of this universe. (4)
17. By a repeat of (9-16), willing of willing of this universe exists in act, is either identical to or not identical to God's existence, and if not, was willed by God.
18. Willing of willing is related as cause to effect. (5)
19.  Therefore this chain cannot go on to infinity (willing of willing of willing of willing...) but must terminate at a willing identical to God's existence. (7,15,18)
20.  Such willing is absolutely necessary (8, 19)
21.  Therefore, willing of willing of willing, etc., down the chain until willing of the universe are absolutely necessary (5)
22.  Therefore, the universe is absolutely necessary (5,21).

This argument is logically valid.  That means, the conclusion is entailed by the premises.  It is not a refutation to merely explain why the conclusion must be false without saying which of the premises you reject (and why).  But rejecting any of the premises is fatal to Thomism.

You can't imagine willing ad extra because you're anthropomorphizing the divine will. Either you admit that divine willing is at best analogous to human willing or you do not. You're speaking as if willing is univocal between the two.

When you say things like "willing ad extra (whatever that means)" although you're being snarky, you're actually beginning to recognize what Thomists believe about the divine transcendence. We can make certain claims of an analogical sort, but no wayfarer can understand the synthesis of the divine perfections nor can he apprehend the ways in which God is good, wills, thinks, etc. Our only experience relies upon divisibility and particulars.
« Last Edit: May 15, 2017, 04:21:27 PM by LouisIX »
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Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #202 on: May 15, 2017, 06:59:56 PM »

Which is why I said that, conceptually, one could imagine that God had the power to create otherwise but since His wisdom and power are one, it is the case that no other universe would ever have been truly created.

One could imagine that God had the power to create otherwise but in reality He actually didn't.

So you're actually going to embrace modal collapse (this world is the only possible one).  The implications of this are that whatever evil is in it, including moral evil, is logically and metaphysically necessary.

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Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #203 on: May 15, 2017, 07:06:45 PM »
You can't imagine willing ad extra because you're anthropomorphizing the divine will. Either you admit that divine willing is at best analogous to human willing or you do not. You're speaking as if willing is univocal between the two.

Not at all.  I'm pointing out that non-determination is precisely why Divine willing is one of the ways it is only analogous to human willing.

Of course, you've now accepted this universe is the only possible one, so you shouldn't be bothered by the conclusion.


Quote
When you say things like "willing ad extra (whatever that means)" although you're being snarky, you're actually beginning to recognize what Thomists believe about the divine transcendence. We can make certain claims of an analogical sort, but no wayfarer can understand the synthesis of the divine perfections nor can he apprehend the ways in which God is good, wills, thinks, etc. Our only experience relies upon divisibility and particulars.

I actually agree, but since you can't apprehend the ways in which God is good, and wills, etc., you have no argument for premotion and for Banezian predestination.  You have to assume something about how God wills and knows in order to make the claim.
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Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #204 on: May 17, 2017, 05:56:02 PM »
You can't imagine willing ad extra because you're anthropomorphizing the divine will. Either you admit that divine willing is at best analogous to human willing or you do not. You're speaking as if willing is univocal between the two.

Of course not.   The very argument depends on our willing being analogous to God's: our willing is distinct from our existence, whereas God's willing is identical to His existence.  The entire argument depends on that last point.[/quote]

Of course, but you're forgetting another necessary point, the divine transcendence. That which God wills is separate from His pure act of willing.

Quote
When you say things like "willing ad extra (whatever that means)" although you're being snarky, you're actually beginning to recognize what Thomists believe about the divine transcendence. We can make certain claims of an analogical sort, but no wayfarer can understand the synthesis of the divine perfections nor can he apprehend the ways in which God is good, wills, thinks, etc. Our only experience relies upon divisibility and particulars.

Quote from: Q
So the true answer to Perry Robinson's dilemma is to say the identity relation across possible worlds breaks down when we are dealing with the Infinite: God is both identical and different across them just like the jar with or without the added marble.

How can you hold the bolded above and maintain the divine transcendence? The divine nature itself is mutable and has a real relation to the created order.

« Last Edit: May 23, 2017, 03:15:20 PM by LouisIX »
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Offline Non Nobis

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #205 on: May 19, 2017, 01:56:32 AM »
There is a difference between saying creation is God's essence with a logical relation to the creature, and saying creation is the logical relation to the creature.  In the former, creation is an ontological thing (since God's essence is an ontological thing); in the latter, it is not.

At one point you(/we) were discussing the possibility that God's creating could be considered a "Cambridge property".  What happened to that consideration?

I don't see that "butter with a relation to (affecting) the price of butter" is an ontological being, or that "God with a relation to (creating) creation" is an ontological being.   Butter is unchanged; the relationship is explicitly made, but is logical only and non-inherent in butter. The change is in the price being affected.  Similarly, "God creating" is God, just logically related to creation. Both God and the relationship to creatures matter in creation (it is explicitly God WITH the relationship), but the relationship is non-inherent in God. The "coming to be/timing" of the creation is on the creature's side, not God's.

We can say what is NOT true of God; any relation to a being that is not God is NOT inherent in God. But from Scripture we CAN say that God is related to creatures; a logical relation is there, and the creatures are affected. A logical relationship is there when creatures are created.

Put another way, if God's existence does not entail the existence of X, neither can God's willing or God's causing, since it is identical to His existence - it forces the conclusion causation is non-determinative.

Could you expand on the meaning/implications of "non-determinative causation"? Do good things come about that are not caused by God?  Does God cause things that don't happen?  Is it all random? (goodness is sometimes a coincidence not caused by God?) Where are God's  power and wisdom in this?
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Offline Quaremerepulisti

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #206 on: May 19, 2017, 08:31:58 AM »
There is a difference between saying creation is God's essence with a logical relation to the creature, and saying creation is the logical relation to the creature.  In the former, creation is an ontological thing (since God's essence is an ontological thing); in the latter, it is not.

At one point you(/we) were discussing the possibility that God's creating could be considered a "Cambridge property".  What happened to that consideration?

It's rejected as a category error; the category of "Cambridge properties" only applies to finite creatures and not to the Infinite.

Quote
I don't see that "butter with a relation to (affecting) the price of butter" is an ontological being..

Well it clearly is, just like "Jane with red hair" an ontological being.

Quote
Similarly, "God creating" is God, just logically related to creation.

Then obviously "God creating" is an ontological thing, regardless of relations it has or doesn't have.

Quote
Both God and the relationship to creatures matter in creation (it is explicitly God WITH the relationship), but the relationship is non-inherent in God.

So then exactly how is it God "with" a relationship that is "non-inherent"?  For Jane with red hair, the hair and redness are inherent.

Quote
We can say what is NOT true of God; any relation to a being that is not God is NOT inherent in God. But from Scripture we CAN say that God is related to creatures; a logical relation is there, and the creatures are affected. A logical relationship is there when creatures are created.

Yes, we can say these things, but the difficulty lies in showing their logical coherence.  And the horn of the dilemma is this: Is this relation intrinsic or extrinsic to God?  If intrinsic, it is something He must have and therefore must be there (e.g. modal collapse); if extrinsic, it is really nothing about God to start with (e.g. "God is Creator" is a semantically meaningless phrase).

Quote
Could you expand on the meaning/implications of "non-determinative causation"? Do good things come about that are not caused by God?  Does God cause things that don't happen?  Is it all random? (goodness is sometimes a coincidence not caused by God?) Where are God's  power and wisdom in this?

No, it simply means that looking at God alone has no predictive value in terms of knowledge of what He causes.  Just like looking at an infinite set of marbles.  You cannot know, just from looking at that, whether any marbles have been added or removed, or will be added or removed.

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #207 on: May 20, 2017, 10:49:04 AM »
... I maintain that, while it is possible for God to have created the universe different than He did, He would never have actually done so. So Q's positing of other universes is entirely hypothetical. It's possible in the abstract but under the supposition of an unchanging wisdom, the universe that exists is the one that God would always have created, as it were.

I don't understand this. It seems to be saying if God has unchanging wisdom and creates at all, then He would necessarily create the current universe (because He would never have created another one).

(Or, in other words) If you say God supposedly could have created something less perfect (or different) but never would (because of Who He IS), then I don't see how He really COULD have created something less perfect (or different). Unchanging Wisdom is a given.

God could have created a different universe, but He created this one and "saw that it was good".  He would have created another one if He (from eternity) chose another one, and it too would be good. "Choosing" is said analogously of God; there isn't a pot full of choices or multiple eternities.

Absolutely speaking, God could create any universe which He likes, but that doesn't mean that He would ever actually have created a different universe. What difference could account for God deciding to create a different universe than the one He indeed created?

Under the supposition that God is going to create a universe according to His divine wisdom, it seems to me that He would decide to create this one, but that's not an absolute necessity because God would always retain the power to have made it otherwise.

This is exactly what I was arguing when I was active on the forum last year. I thought you said you disagreed, but perhaps I wasn't explaining myself well.
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Offline Non Nobis

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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #208 on: May 20, 2017, 06:09:46 PM »
... I maintain that, while it is possible for God to have created the universe different than He did, He would never have actually done so. So Q's positing of other universes is entirely hypothetical. It's possible in the abstract but under the supposition of an unchanging wisdom, the universe that exists is the one that God would always have created, as it were.

I don't understand this. It seems to be saying if God has unchanging wisdom and creates at all, then He would necessarily create the current universe (because He would never have created another one).

(Or, in other words) If you say God supposedly could have created something less perfect (or different) but never would (because of Who He IS), then I don't see how He really COULD have created something less perfect (or different). Unchanging Wisdom is a given.

God could have created a different universe, but He created this one and "saw that it was good".  He would have created another one if He (from eternity) chose another one, and it too would be good. "Choosing" is said analogously of God; there isn't a pot full of choices or multiple eternities.

Absolutely speaking, God could create any universe which He likes, but that doesn't mean that He would ever actually have created a different universe. What difference could account for God deciding to create a different universe than the one He indeed created?

Under the supposition that God is going to create a universe according to His divine wisdom, it seems to me that He would decide to create this one, but that's not an absolute necessity because God would always retain the power to have made it otherwise.

This is exactly what I was arguing when I was active on the forum last year. I thought you said you disagreed, but perhaps I wasn't explaining myself well.

I'm happy that you two both understand and agree with each other now  :D, but I'm still not quite sure that I do (maybe I just don't understand).

On the supposition (or based on the actual fact) that God did create the world (vs not create), and did create this one (vs any other), I see that He would not have done otherwise. That is the choice that He made from eternity, and there is no reason for Him to have made another choice.  But if we leave the supposition behind, I don't see why we couldn't say that "He would not have created or would have created another world, IF He had made another choice".

God chose to create this world; it is His freedom once exercised that made the world necessary  "on supposition". But saying that in every sense God would NEVER have created another world seems to be saying that one particular use of that freedom (one choice) was necessary. God's choice is only analogous to ours, but isn't there some kind of choice not confined in this way? If God decides to create at all, then I still don't see His Wisdom being confined to one choice.

Any world that God created would have given Him the greatest possible glory that that world could give.  But no created world can give God as much glory as He gives Himself. It seems there is no limit to the possible goodness (glory it gives) of a created world, but the actual goodness is limited to what God chooses to give.

However, adding Christ to the considerations would make a big impact...God creating a world united in a way with God Himself; a world that in some way is best; goodness unlimited, best fitted with Divine Wisdom.  This is beyond my paygrade.
« Last Edit: May 20, 2017, 11:19:04 PM by Non Nobis »
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Re: Thomist theory of grace and predestination
« Reply #209 on: May 21, 2017, 12:48:23 PM »
... I maintain that, while it is possible for God to have created the universe different than He did, He would never have actually done so. So Q's positing of other universes is entirely hypothetical. It's possible in the abstract but under the supposition of an unchanging wisdom, the universe that exists is the one that God would always have created, as it were.

I don't understand this. It seems to be saying if God has unchanging wisdom and creates at all, then He would necessarily create the current universe (because He would never have created another one).

(Or, in other words) If you say God supposedly could have created something less perfect (or different) but never would (because of Who He IS), then I don't see how He really COULD have created something less perfect (or different). Unchanging Wisdom is a given.

God could have created a different universe, but He created this one and "saw that it was good".  He would have created another one if He (from eternity) chose another one, and it too would be good. "Choosing" is said analogously of God; there isn't a pot full of choices or multiple eternities.

Absolutely speaking, God could create any universe which He likes, but that doesn't mean that He would ever actually have created a different universe. What difference could account for God deciding to create a different universe than the one He indeed created?

Under the supposition that God is going to create a universe according to His divine wisdom, it seems to me that He would decide to create this one, but that's not an absolute necessity because God would always retain the power to have made it otherwise.

This is exactly what I was arguing when I was active on the forum last year. I thought you said you disagreed, but perhaps I wasn't explaining myself well.

I'm happy that you two both understand and agree with each other now  :D, but I'm still not quite sure that I do (maybe I just don't understand).

On the supposition (or based on the actual fact) that God did create the world (vs not create), and did create this one (vs any other), I see that He would not have done otherwise. That is the choice that He made from eternity, and there is no reason for Him to have made another choice.  But if we leave the supposition behind, I don't see why we couldn't say that "He would not have created or would have created another world, IF He had made another choice".

God chose to create this world; it is His freedom once exercised that made the world necessary  "on supposition". But saying that in every sense God would NEVER have created another world seems to be saying that one particular use of that freedom (one choice) was necessary. God's choice is only analogous to ours, but isn't there some kind of choice not confined in this way? If God decides to create at all, then I still don't see His Wisdom being confined to one choice.

Any world that God created would have given Him the greatest possible glory that that world could give.  But no created world can give God as much glory as He gives Himself. It seems there is no limit to the possible goodness (glory it gives) of a created world, but the actual goodness is limited to what God chooses to give.

However, adding Christ to the considerations would make a big impact...God creating a world united in a way with God Himself; a world that in some way is best; goodness unlimited, best fitted with Divine Wisdom.  This is beyond my paygrade.

Hmm. Perhaps this is a better way to explain it...

His wisdom doesn't confine His liberty of choice; it is the reason for it. His wisdom is that which made this particular world the most fitting one for Him to make, though He could have made others, since, all of them being infinitely inadequate compared to Himself, none of them could necessitate His will. And it is the fitness of this or that object as judged by the intellect that is the very motive of free action.

In order to speculate as to whether He would have EVER made a different world is to ask whether His wisdom would ever judge the fitness of another possible world differently that we know He judges it now. But if God is Pure Act, He cannot admit an admixture of potency, even within His intellect.

Remember, His will is not capricious. His attributes of omniscience and omnipotence produce His infallible foreknowledge of all possible worlds. In order for His wisdom to judge one to be most fitting, but then a different one to be most fitting, He would [1] have no sufficient motive for willing one rather than another and [2] would be admitting a change of His unchangeable essence, a deficiency in His intellect, and an imperfection of His wisdom.
I  n
N omine
P atris,
E t
F ilii,
E t
S piritus
S ancti

>))))))> "Wherefore, brethren, labour the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election. For doing these things, you shall not sin at any time" (II Peter 1:10). <((((((<

 
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