Quote from: james03 on Today at 03:52:04 PMThe Occasionalists, like Banezians, believe that God is the cause of every thing, without distinguishing First Cause. So they have a problem, because this must lead to Universalism. Also, your damnation MUST rest ONLY upon God's decision. So they came up with the kooky Insufficient Grace/ Efficacious Grace to explain the scripture. Why?Occasionalist sound like Nominalist.
QuoteBecause they HAVE to reject regeneration, whereby your Will is strengthened. Because to them you have no will for Good, even AFTER baptism. Before or after Baptism, you are a dung pile. Sanctifying Grace is just snow that covers the dung pile.I think you are pushing the criticism of Banezianism too far. Speaking for the Banezians they would respond: Yes, man in the state of Sanctifying Grace has a new supernatural organism infused into his soul, with the corresponding virtues and gifts of the Holy Ghost i.e. His "ontological" being. But in order to set this new organism in motion, man needs God's actual graces, without with he could not do anything.
QuoteOn the Occasionalist angle, could you explain this more thoroughly and also why you think it leads to the pile of dung covered with snow of Lutheranism.
QuoteI have read a lot of Banezian dogmatic material; they all uphold sanctifying grace and the ontological difference between a creature being in the state of nature and the state of grace. From what I have read it is their theory of actual grace that is the problem, not sanctifying grace.
QuoteNone of that refutes my conclusion. They had grace and merited beatitude without the possibility of sin. The universalist and non-universalist agree, then, that there are circumstances where grace can't be impeded. The debate is about what circumstances this can happen under. That it can happen is clear.1. No this is not entirely true. They were created in the state of Sanctifying grace, TRUE; but had not yet merited the beatific vision;
I defend universalism hypothetically in the spirit of "Iron sharpens iron". I don't preach it.
Quote from: james03 on Today at 03:03:00 PMBanezianism's main error is not with regards to predestination. It is with Cause, and their failure to distinguish between First Cause and Efficient Cause. They are Occasionalists. They therefore must adopt Luther's dung pile covered with snow and reject regeneration, like Luther did. Calvin preached regeneration and sanctification of the elect. Banezians are closer to Luther than Calvin.On the Occasionalist angle, could you explain this more thoroughly and also why you think it leads to the pile of dung covered with snow of Lutheranism.
Quoteedit: Banezians must also reject Sanctifying Grace. It accomplishes nothing. It is a legal decree only, which makes you elect. If that sounds like Luther, it's because it is Lutheranism.I have read a lot of Banezian dogmatic material; they all uphold sanctifying grace and the ontological difference between a creature being in the state of nature and the state of grace. From what I have read it is their theory of actual grace that is the problem, not sanctifying grace.
Quote from: james03 on Today at 03:21:15 PMQuote from: clau clau on Today at 05:56:31 AMQuote from: drummerboy on December 13, 2024, 07:54:56 PMQuote from: Heinrich on December 13, 2024, 02:49:05 PMAccording to the free media of the free West, freedom fighters in F16's supplied by the Land of the Free intercepted 75 of the 50 missiles.
Not only did they intercept them, but they hacked their guidance systems and sent 100 missles back to Russia!
I don't believe that, it's bollocks. I'm fed up with this hacker crap. You've been watching too much Top Gun Maverick.
I don't know if this is clau's dry British humor. It's clear to me that Drummer is being facetious.
QuoteConditional election only seems to make sense if God has middle knowledge. Otherwise, God would be predestining on the basis of foreseen merit that He already decreed to happen; He'd be predestining based on who He predestined. The problem I have with middle knowledge is that if choices are caused by God (nothing can happen without God's sustaining it), then to have middle knowledge of creaturely choices would imply God has middle knowledge of His own choices. However, middle/prevolitional knowledge of one's own choices is impossible.Choices of intelligent creatures are made by themselves freely; God sustains and enables our free will, but does not determine it, that is up to us. Therefore the objection that you posited to middle knowledge is based on the false assumption that God determines our free choices.
QuoteAlso, it seems like a self-righteous position to say that if you go to heaven and someone else doesn't, it's because you were better than them.That is not "self righteous", it is God's very revelation:
QuoteHe that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved: but he that believeth not shall be condemned.Therefore the person who is saved, believed and is better than the person who refused to believed and is therefore condemned. There is an essential ontological difference between a man in the state of grace and one in the state of Mortal Sin.
QuoteDenying Molinism need not lead to Calvinism. God's control of our choices is compatible with our power to do otherwise.I didn't say that it did. For example, the Congruist, and the Syncretist deny Molinism, yet their theories still preserve the freedom of the will under the influence of God's grace.
QuoteI can't speak to whether Banezianism and/or neo-Banezianism leads to a denial of free will. I don't know how they're different. But the mere denial of predestination based on foreseen merit doesn't lead to such denial.Because the Banezian theory of God's future knowledge of the future free acts of creatures, come through His "physical premotion" of their acts; therefore only those acts that God endows His creatures with the ability to consent to and actually perform, will take place, so that ultimately nothing happens except through God's positive decrees to endow His creature with free-will to perform this act or that one.
QuoteInasmuch as the Divine influence precedes all acts of the creature, not in the order of time, but in that of causality, the motion emanating from God and seconded by free intelligent agents takes on the character of a physical premotion (proemotio physica) of the free acts, which may also be called a physical predetermination (proedeterminatio physica), because the free determination of the will is accomplished only by virtue of the divine predetermination.
In this premotion or predetermination is also found the medium of the Divine knowledge by which God's omniscience foresees infallibly all the future acts, whether absolute or conditional, of intelligent creatures, and which explains away at once the undemonstrable and imaginary scientia media of the Molinists. For just as certainly as God in His predetermined decrees knows His own will, so certainly does He know all the necessarily included determinations of the free will of creatures, be they of absolute or conditional futurity. Now if we carry these philosophical principles from the domain of the natural to the supernatural, then efficacious grace (gratia efficax) must be regarded as a physical premotion of the supernaturally equipped will to the performance of a good act, for revelation undeniably refers back to grace not only the possibility, but also the willing and the actual performance of a good act. But the will predetermined to this free good act must with a metaphysical certainty correspond with grace, for it would be a contradiction to assert that the consensus, brought about by efficacious grace, can at the same time be an actual dissensus. This historical necessity (necessitas consequentiae), involved in every act of freedom and distinguishable from the compelling necessity (necessitas consequentis), does not destroy the freedom of the act.
QuoteThe first objection is the danger that in the Thomistic system the freedom of the will cannot be maintained as against efficacious grace, a difficulty which by the way is not unperceived by the Thomists themselves. For since the essence of freedom does not lie in the contingency of the act nor in the merely passive indifference of the will, but rather in its active indifference — to will or not to will, to will this and not that — so it appears impossible to reconcile the physical predetermination of a particular act by an alien will and the active spontaneousness of the determination by the will itself; nay more, they seem to exclude each other as utterly as do determinism and indeterminism, necessity and freedom. The Thomists answer this objection by making a distinction between sensus compositus and sensus divisus, but the Molinists insist that this distinction is not correctly applicable here. For just as a man who is bound to a chair cannot be said to be sitting freely as long as his ability to stand is thwarted by indissoluble cords, so the will predetermined by efficacious grace to a certain thing cannot be said to retain the power to dissent, especially since the will, predetermined to this or that act, has not the option to receive or disregard the premotion, since this depends simply and solely on the will of God. And does not the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. v, can. iv) describe efficacious grace as a grace which man "can reject", and from which he "can dissent"? Consequently, the very same grace, which de facto is efficacious, might under other circumstances be inefficacious.
Herein the second objection to the Thomistic distinction between gratia efficax and gratia sufficiens is already indicated. If both graces are in their nature and intrinsically different, it is difficult to see how a grace can be really sufficient which requires another grace to complete it. Hence, it would appear that the Thomistic gratia sufficiens is in reality a gratia insufficiens. The Thomists cannot well refer the inefficacy of this grace to the resistance of the free will, for this act of resistance must be traced to a proemotio physica as inevitable as the efficacious grace.
Moreover, a third great difficulty lies in the fact that sin, as an act, demands the predetermining activity of the "first mover", so that God would according to this system appear to be the originator of sinful acts. The Thomistic distinction between the entity of sin and its malice offers no solution of the difficulty. For since the Divine influence itself, which premoves ad unum, both introduces physically the sin as an act and entity, and also, by the simultaneous withholding of the opposite premotion to a good act, makes the sin itself an inescapable fatality, it is not easy to explain why sin cannot be traced back to God as the originator. Furthermore, most sinners commit their misdeeds, not with a regard to the depravity, but for the sake of the physical entity of the acts, so that ethics must, together with the wickedness, condemn the physical entity of sin. The Molinists deny that this objection affects their own system, when they postulate the concursus of God in the sinful act, and help themselves out of the dilemma by drawing the distinction between the entity and malice of sin. They say that the Divine co-operation is a concursus simultaneus, which employs the co-operating arm of God only after the will by its own free determination has decided upon the commission of the sinful act, whereas the Thomistic co-operation is essentially a concursus proevius which as an inevitable physical premotion predetermines the act regardless of the fact whether the human will can resist or not.
Quote from: clau clau on Today at 05:56:31 AMQuote from: drummerboy on December 13, 2024, 07:54:56 PMQuote from: Heinrich on December 13, 2024, 02:49:05 PMAccording to the free media of the free West, freedom fighters in F16's supplied by the Land of the Free intercepted 75 of the 50 missiles.
Not only did they intercept them, but they hacked their guidance systems and sent 100 missles back to Russia!
I don't believe that, it's bollocks. I'm fed up with this hacker crap. You've been watching too much Top Gun Maverick.
QuoteThe loss of a single soul is a great tragedy; Christ denounced the hardness of heart of the Jewish people, and the wickedness of their leaders in clear and explicit terms, prophesying their temporal and even worse, their eternal damnation; but He also wept over Jerusalem and the tragic fate that awaited its inhabitants.