"St. Augustine: Metaphysics in Plato" by Dr. William Marra

[Geremia]

Today's FSSP Keep the Faith Talk:
http://fssp.com/press/2014/09/keep-the-faith-talk-for-september-8-2014/

He's a traditional Catholic who insists Plato shouldn't be so easily discredited in favor of Aristotle.

Here're Dr. Marra's books.

[Gardener]

Listening right now...

Heavy.

[Lynne]

This page, http://proecclesia.com/page_free%20talks.htm has several other talks by Dr. Marra too.

[Geremia]

I don't understand what his beef was with St. Thomas's 4th Way. He acted as though St. Thomas didn't formulate it in a way that accords with Platonic thought.

[Dominic]

I don't understand what his beef was with St. Thomas's 4th Way. He acted as though St. Thomas didn't formulate it in a way that accords with Platonic thought.

Thanks for posting the link to this talk.  I happen to agree with him 110%.  I think Aristotle is way of overrated in philosophy.  But, I believe Aristoteleanism is a essentially a confused version of Platonism.

My understanding on his beef with the 4th way is that it sounds like St. Thomas is reducing God to an Aristotelian first-cause again.  In Platonic/Augustinian/Bonaventurian writings it is more clearly stated that God IS the goodness in all created things that gives them their very being.  "In Him we live and move and have our being."  The beauty in creatures is a but a shadow in Plato's cave of Beauty Itself which is God.  Isn't that a clearer and more profound way of looking at it than saying, "Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things."--besides being also a completely wrong example.  It's not just that the wording is not acceptable to a platonist.  From this sentence you have to wonder if St. Thomas is somehow missing the whole point of the argument.

I agree with Dr. Marra that the restoration of Tradition will have a harder time if it attaches itself to St. Thomas so intimately.  It is my belief that the answer to the problems posed by modern science can only be answered effectively from a Platonic/Augustinian perspective. 

[Geremia]

My understanding on his beef with the 4th way is that it sounds like St. Thomas is reducing God to an Aristotelian first-cause again.  In Platonic/Augustinian/Bonaventurian writings it is more clearly stated that God IS the goodness in all created things that gives them their very being.  "In Him we live and move and have our being."  The beauty in creatures is a but a shadow in Plato's cave of Beauty Itself which is God.  Isn't that a clearer and more profound way of looking at it than saying, "Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things."--besides being also a completely wrong example.

Could you please explain what is "wrong" about it?

It's not just that the wording is not acceptable to a platonist.  From this sentence you have to wonder if St. Thomas is somehow missing the whole point of the argument.

Goodness itself is the causes of all goodness; same for beauty, truth, etc.

I agree with Dr. Marra that the restoration of Tradition will have a harder time if it attaches itself to St. Thomas so intimately.  It is my belief that the answer to the problems posed by modern science can only be answered effectively from a Platonic/Augustinian perspective.

Which questions, specifically?

St. Thomas and St. Augustine hold exactly the same views on time, for example:
In Chapter 6 of Book XI of the City of God, St. Augustine writes that "without motion and change there is no time". This is exactly Aristotle's definition of time: the measure of change.
Also, St. Augustine says: "The world was not created in time but with time".
St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with St. Augustine: "Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together with time heaven and earth were created" [Summa I q. 46 a.3 ad 1].

St. Thomas and St. Augustine are certainly closer in thought than either are to Plato.


Also, I adhere to Aristotelian-Thomism (a.k.a. River Forest Thomism). The school's 2nd thesis is that

Aquinas ought to be interpreted as a convinced Aristotelian who vigorously opposes every tendency to Platonize in epistemology, and admits Platonic elements into this thought from the Church Fathers only in so far as he can validate them in accordance with Aristotelian epistemology.

(source)

Check out Benedict Ashley, O.P. (RIP)'s The Way toward Wisdom.

[Dominic]

Could
you please explain what is "wrong" about it?

The problem with this example is that it ignores value as we move up
the hierarchy of Being/Goodness.  The example he provides is entirely
on the physical level.  That's why Dr. Marra says he blows it. The
example St. Thomas gives doesn't show that greater and lesser are
related by greater Goodness, but, in his example, something valueless
like physical temperature.  Does this example imply that something at
the temperature of liquid water is closer to God than ice because
liquid water is 'maximizing the genus of hot things'?  But what about
the genus of cold things?  Also, there is an implicit relativism: ice
is maximizing the genus of cold things compared to the liquid water
but liquid water is maximizing the 'genus of hot things' compared to
the ice.  So, is ice or liquid water greater or lesser?  They are both
equally maximizing their respective geni. 

St. Thomas has the opportunity to mention greater goodness in a
creature is due to the participation in the Good Itself and instead he
stays completely on a valueless, materialistic level for his example.
It's disappointing and, worse, it implies relativism in thought
through the biologically-inspired genus example.

I really believe latching onto Aristotle is a HUGE mistake for many
reasons.  St. Thomas saw this and (intentionally or unintentionally)
platonized Aristotle to correct him and make him compatible with
Christianity (which originally adopted Middle Platonism and
Neo-Platonism as it's philosophy primarily through St. Augustine, and
Pseudo-Dyonsius--these two authors are quoted by St. Thomas more than
Aristotle very often as corrective authorities).  Take, for instance,
two main problems in Aristotelianism: 1) Matter-Form duality and 2)
knowledge from the senses.  According to Aristotle, you can't have
form without matter since the form exists in the matter as
potentiality.  But since the soul is the Form of the Body, the soul
will not survive physical death.  St. Thomas had to platonize
Aristotle and say that Form can exist without Matter.  This allows for
the soul to survive bodily death and also permits God's immaterial
creation: angels and mathematical objects.

On point 2, all knowledge comes from the senses.  The problem with
this is it denies Divine Revelation, infused knowledge (Illumination),
and, more mundanely, poverty of the stimulus in language aquistion,
and mathematical intuition.  St. Thomas again had to correct Aristotle
to allow for Divine Revelation and infused knowledge but he still
affirms that all knowledge comes the senses.

I agree with
Dr. Marra that the restoration of Tradition will have a harder time if
it attaches itself to St. Thomas so intimately.  It is my belief that
the answer to the problems posed by modern science can only be
answered effectively from a Platonic/Augustinian
perspective.

Which questions, specifically?

The main problem posed by science is that new empirical findings are
used to justify mistaken metaphysical conclusions.  This comes from
the belief that all knowledge comes from the senses.  If all knowledge
comes from the senses, then metaphysical knowledge should come from
the senses as well. So, scientists feel justified in denying Divine
Revelation and infused knowledge since these are not arrived at from an
empirical epistemology.  Therefore, their conclusion is that reality is
fundamentally indifferent to our existence and arbitrary.  How did
they arrive at this knowledge? From their mistaken belief that all
knowledge comes from the senses and that matter alone exists.  But Platonism
by focusing on the reality of abstract objects (such as mathematics),
which empiricism presupposes but the knowledge of which is acquired
outside of empiricism, can bridge that gap to the reality of
value-specific abstract objects like Goodness and Justice.  Like
St. Augustine, it is often easier for certain critical thinkers to
become Platonists before they become Christians.

Arguing against the specifics of scientific findings by trying to
prove that evolution is false or that geo-centrism is really true is
the wrong approach. Most scientists won't take this seriously.  In
fact, St. Augustine wrote exactly against doing just that.

Instead we might focus on their assumption that all knowledge comes
from the senses is wrong and that abstract objects do objectively
exist (Form independent from Matter) and any science that they can come up with
must pre-suppose these ideas.  Also, we can show that this position
supports both currently accepted scientific knowledge and the reality
of God.  Tell them that by focusing on God as Goodness and Being and
the foundation for abstract objects and they will have no choice but
to listen.  This is because we are focusing on the reality above
science that science must presuppose to exist.  In my opinion,
Platonism does this much more effectively than Aristotelianism.

St. Thomas and St. Augustine hold exactly the same views on time, for
example: In Chapter 6 of Book XI of the City of God,
St. Augustine writes that "without motion and change there is no
time". This is exactly Aristotle's definition of time: the measure of
change.  Also, St. Augustine says: "The world was not created in time
but with time".  St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with St. Augustine: "Things
are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the
beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together
with time heaven and earth were created" [Summa I q. 46 a.3 ad
1].

Yes, because St. Thomas corrected Aristotle with St. Augustine

Check out Benedict Ashley, O.P. (RIP)'s
The
Way toward Wisdom. 

Thanks, I'll definitely read him.  May I suggest St. Bonaventure's
'Mind's Journey into God' and his 'Breviloqium' for the flavor of a
more Augustinian/Platonic approach to theology.

On purely philosophical grounds, I agree with the Neo-Platonist Lloyd
Gerson when he says that Philosophy = Platonism.

Aristotle is a philospher to the extent that he is a Platonist.  Lloyd
Gerson negatively defines Platonism as:

Metaphysical Assumptions:
Anti-Materialism: Denies that the only things that exist are measurable entities.
Anti-Mechanism: Denies that all change is explained via interactions of measurable entities.
Anti-Nominalism: Denies that only individual entities exist.  Universal categories do not.

Epistemological Assumptions:
Anti-Relativism: Denies that all knowledge is relative to an observer. No correct viewpoint.
Anti-Skepticism: Denies that all knowledge is tentative.

Pure Aristotleanism leads to difficulty in these areas.  It can lead
to skepticism, relativism and materialism from it's insistence that
all knowledge comes from the senses.  And nominalism, from it's denial of the reality of independently existing universals. These lead to the opposite of Philosophy or Platonism which is Naturalism.

To see how a Platonist might approach refuting Naturalism in an academic setting.  This is an interesting video.
Philosophy Series Lecture: "Platonism versus Naturalism."
[yt]Rfn0D-rkhsw[/yt]

[Geremia]

The problem with this example is that it ignores value as we move up
the hierarchy of Being/Goodness.  The example he provides is entirely
on the physical level.  That's why Dr. Marra says he blows it.

Perhaps this relates to his acceptance of Platonist epistemology; although he does mention Rom. 1:20, that we can know God through creatures, he seems to take it for granted that there are immaterial beings. Our intellects proceed from is more known to what is lesser known. The existence of material beings is more known to us (via our senses) than immaterial beings like angels and God. So this is why St. Thomas gives an example in the material world, because everything that is in our intellects first comes through the senses.

The
example St. Thomas gives doesn't show that greater and lesser are
related by greater Goodness, but, in his example, something valueless
like physical temperature.  Does this example imply that something at
the temperature of liquid water is closer to God than ice because
liquid water is 'maximizing the genus of hot things'?

What would Plato say?

But what about
the genus of cold things?  Also, there is an implicit relativism: ice
is maximizing the genus of cold things compared to the liquid water
but liquid water is maximizing the 'genus of hot things' compared to
the ice.  So, is ice or liquid water greater or lesser?  They are both
equally maximizing their respective geni.

All the 4th way is getting at is that because there are beings (things with being), there must be a 100% completely being Being.

St. Thomas has the opportunity to mention greater goodness in a
creature is due to the participation in the Good Itself and instead he
stays completely on a valueless, materialistic level for his example.

He does:

Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

It's disappointing and, worse, it implies relativism in thought
through the biologically-inspired genus example.

I really believe latching onto Aristotle is a HUGE mistake for many
reasons.  St. Thomas saw this and (intentionally or unintentionally)
platonized

or "baptized"

Aristotle to correct him and make him compatible with
Christianity (which originally adopted Middle Platonism and
Neo-Platonism as it's philosophy primarily through St. Augustine, and
Pseudo-Dyonsius--these two authors are quoted by St. Thomas more than
Aristotle very often as corrective authorities).  Take, for instance,
two main problems in Aristotelianism: 1) Matter-Form duality and 2)
knowledge from the senses.  According to Aristotle, you can't have
form without matter since the form exists in the matter as
potentiality.  But since the soul is the Form of the Body, the soul
will not survive physical death.

I don't think Aristotle believed that.

St. Thomas had to platonize
Aristotle and say that Form can exist without Matter.

Yes, more so in his Treatise on the Angels.

This allows for
the soul to survive bodily death and also permits God's immaterial
creation: angels and mathematical objects.

On point 2, all knowledge comes from the senses.  The problem with
this is it denies Divine Revelation

That still comes through our senses.

, infused knowledge (Illumination),
and, more mundanely, poverty of the stimulus in language aquistion,
and mathematical intuition.  St. Thomas again had to correct Aristotle
to allow for Divine Revelation and infused knowledge but he still
affirms that all knowledge comes the senses.

Those are exceptions. This is not the natural way of knowing.

I agree with
Dr. Marra that the restoration of Tradition will have a harder time if
it attaches itself to St. Thomas so intimately.  It is my belief that
the answer to the problems posed by modern science can only be
answered effectively from a Platonic/Augustinian
perspective.

Which questions, specifically?

The main problem posed by science is that new empirical findings are
used to justify mistaken metaphysical conclusions.  This comes from
the belief that all knowledge comes from the senses.  If all knowledge
comes from the senses, then metaphysical knowledge should come from
the senses as well.

indeed

So, scientists feel justified in denying Divine
Revelation and infused knowledge since these are not arrived at from an
empirical epistemology.

The most modern natural science can do is establish that an immaterial being exists. That is the ultimate goal of physics. Before proceeding in a science, like metaphysics, one must first establish that its object exists, and since metaphysics is the study of being qua being, one must establish that a being qua being (pure being) exists.

Therefore, their conclusion is that reality is
fundamentally indifferent to our existence and arbitrary.  How did
they arrive at this knowledge? From their mistaken belief that all
knowledge comes from the senses

Does this axiom necessarily lead to positivism or empiricism?

and that matter alone exists.

Has modern science really proved that?

But Platonism
by focusing on the reality of abstract objects (such as mathematics),
which empiricism presupposes

It's the other way around. This is precisely the issue with many philosophies of science. Equations and mathematics don't determine reality; they presuppose it.

but the knowledge of which is acquired
outside of empiricism,

What makes you think mathematical knowledge does not come from observing the creatures in nature?

can bridge that gap to the reality of
value-specific abstract objects like Goodness and Justice.  Like
St. Augustine, it is often easier for certain critical thinkers to
become Platonists before they become Christians.

Arguing against the specifics of scientific findings by trying to
prove that evolution is false or that geo-centrism is really true is
the wrong approach. Most scientists won't take this seriously.  In
fact, St. Augustine wrote exactly against doing just that.

¿Are you referring to the following:

It not infrequently happens that something about the earth, about the sky, about other elements of this world, about the motion and rotation or even the magnitude and distances of the stars, about definite eclipses of the sun and moon, about the passage of years and seasons, about the nature of animals, of fruits, of stones, and of other such things, may be known with the greatest certainty by reasoning or by experience, even by one who is not a Christian. It is too disgraceful and ruinous, though, and greatly to be avoided, that he [the non-Christian] should hear a Christian speaking so idiotically on these matters, and as if in accord with Christian writings, that he might say that he could scarcely keep from laughing when he saw how totally in error they are. In view of this and in keeping it in mind constantly while dealing with the book of Genesis, I have, insofar as I was able, explained in detail and set forth for consideration the meanings of obscure passages, taking care not to affirm rashly some one meaning to the prejudice of another and perhaps better explanation.

With the scriptures it is a matter of treating about the faith. For that reason, as I have noted repeatedly, if anyone, not understanding the mode of divine eloquence, should find something about these matters [about the physical universe] in our books, or hear of the same from those books, of such a kind that it seems to be at variance with the perceptions of his own rational faculties, let him believe that these other things are in no way necessary to the admonitions or accounts or predictions of the scriptures. In short, it must be said that our authors knew the truth about the nature of the skies, but it was not the intention of the Spirit of God, who spoke through them, to teach men anything that would not be of use to them for their salvation.

He also wrote:

Taking these theories into account, a certain commentator [Basil] has made a praiseworthy attempt to demonstrate that the waters are above the heavens, so as to support the word of Scripture with the visible and tangible phenomena of nature... Hence, from the existence of the air between the vapors that form the clouds above and the seas that stretch out below, our commentator proposed to show that there is a heaven between water and water. This painstaking enquiry is, in my opinion, quite praiseworthy.

Certain writers, even among those of our faith, attempt to refute those who say that the relative weights of the elements make it impossible for water to exist above the starry heaven. They base their arguments on the properties and motions of the stars. They say that the star called Saturn is the coldest star, and that it takes thirty years to complete its orbit in the heavens because it is higher up and therefore travels over a wider course.

It is true, indeed, that by its own motion, moving over a vast space, it takes thirty years to complete its orbit; yet by the motion of the heavens it is rotated rapidly in the opposite direction...and therefore, it ought to generate greater heat by reason of its greater velocity. The conclusion is, then, that it is cooled by the waters that are near it above the heavens, although the existence of these waters is denied by those who propose the explanation of the motion of the heavens and the stars that I have briefly outlined.

With this reasoning some of our scholars attack the position of those who refuse to believe that there are waters above the heavens while maintaining that the star whose path is in the height of the heavens is cold. Thus they would compel the disbeliever to admit that water is there not in a vaporous state but in the form of ice. But whatever the nature of that water and whatever the manner of its being there, we must not doubt that it does exist in that place. The authority of Scripture in this matter is greater than all human ingenuity.

Instead we might focus on their assumption that all knowledge comes
from the senses is wrong and that abstract objects do objectively
exist

Are those two views mutually exclusive?

(Form independent from Matter) and any science that they can come up with
must pre-suppose these ideas.  Also, we can show that this position
supports both currently accepted scientific knowledge and the reality
of God.  Tell them that by focusing on God as Goodness and Being and
the foundation for abstract objects and they will have no choice but
to listen.  This is because we are focusing on the reality above
science that science must presuppose to exist.

Why must it presuppose it? That would imply scientists there couldn't be atheist, material, or naturalist scientists, and yet there are and can be.

In my opinion,
Platonism does this much more effectively than Aristotelianism.

St. Thomas and St. Augustine hold exactly the same views on time, for
example: In Chapter 6 of Book XI of the City of God,
St. Augustine writes that "without motion and change there is no
time". This is exactly Aristotle's definition of time: the measure of
change.  Also, St. Augustine says: "The world was not created in time
but with time".  St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with St. Augustine: "Things
are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the
beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together
with time heaven and earth were created" [Summa I q. 46 a.3 ad
1].

Yes, because St. Thomas corrected Aristotle with St. Augustine

On his view of the eternity of the world, but also on his view of time itself?

Check out Benedict Ashley, O.P. (RIP)'s
The
Way toward Wisdom. 

Thanks, I'll definitely read him.  May I suggest St. Bonaventure's
'Mind's Journey into God' and his 'Breviloqium' for the flavor of a
more Augustinian/Platonic approach to theology.

It's been awhile since I've looked at St. Bonaventures Mind's Journey into God; I'll re-look at it.

On purely philosophical grounds, I agree with the Neo-Platonist Lloyd
Gerson when he says that Philosophy = Platonism.

Aristotle is a philospher to the extent that he is a Platonist.  Lloyd
Gerson negatively defines Platonism as:

Metaphysical Assumptions:
Anti-Materialism: Denies that the only things that exist are measurable entities.
Anti-Mechanism: Denies that all change is explained via interactions of measurable entities.

Plato himself also holds to anti-mechanism?

Anti-Nominalism: Denies that only individual entities exist.  Universal categories do not.

Epistemological Assumptions:
Anti-Relativism: Denies that all knowledge is relative to an observer. No correct viewpoint.
Anti-Skepticism: Denies that all knowledge is tentative.

Pure Aristotleanism leads to difficulty in these areas.  It can lead
to skepticism, relativism and materialism from it's insistence that
all knowledge comes from the senses.  And nominalism, from it's denial of the reality of independently existing universals. These lead to the opposite of Philosophy or Platonism which is Naturalism.

To see how a Platonist might approach refuting Naturalism in an academic setting.  This is an interesting video.
Philosophy Series Lecture: "Platonism versus Naturalism."
[yt]Rfn0D-rkhsw[/yt]

thanks
I look forward to listening to his lecture.


Also, one aspect of Plato that really interests me is that he coined the phrase "?????? ?? ?????????" ("to save the phenomena", or, as St. Thomas renders it in Summa Theologica, I q. 32 a. 1 ad 2, "salvari apparentia sensibilia"), which is very important in the "structural realism vs. scientific formalism" debate. Check out Catholic physicist Pierre Duhem's book on the subject: To save the phenomena, an essay on the idea of physical theory from Plato to Galileo, esp. this excerpt from it.

[Dominic]

You're bringing up many interesting points. For the sake of brevity (and my non-computer life), I can only address a few of your excellent points.

St. Augustine writes that "without motion and change there is no
time". This is exactly Aristotle's definition of time: the measure of
change.  Also, St. Augustine says: "The world was not created in time
but with time".  St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with St. Augustine: "Things
are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the
beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together
with time heaven and earth were created" [Summa I q. 46 a.3 ad
1].

You might want to re-read St. Augustine's Confessions Chapter 11.  He offers a real thorough meditation on time and says that he is completely baffled by it.  He really doesn't understand it.  Time cannot be simply 'a measure of change'.   A difference of position is a measure of change, but that's not time.  Time includes notions like appearance of uni-directionality and division into past, present and future with immediate access to the present.  St. Augustine goes into a seriously deep discussion of this in his Confession as well as in City of God when he talks about the Angels and time.  He goes into some pretty wild ideas like parallel times, cyclical time, etc.  It is the questions that St. Augustine brings up about time that illuminate the Idea of Time, not some simplistic phrase like 'time is a measure of change'.  This is also how Plato in his dialogues illuminated the Ideas--by showing us the deep questions about them.  This is part of the depth that Dr. Marra was talking about.  Pat little 'definitions' don't do justice to the subject matter.

It's the other way around. This is precisely the issue with many philosophies of science. Equations and mathematics don't determine reality; they presuppose it.

The independent reality of mathematical objects is the standard view among mathematicians.  Also, many physicists have adopted this view.  Roger Penrose and Max Tegmark being two outspoken examples.   Euler's Formula was not derived empirically but by Euler's genius of mathematical intuition.  His theorem shows a deep connection between several seemingly different mathematical objects.   An insight, which Roger Penrose quite effectively demonstrates is not algorithmic but intuitional--by somehow mentally perceiving the idea itself.  The amazing relationship between math and science is that mathematicians often FIRST discover some mathematical object and then LATER that mathematical object is found to perfectly describe some physical phenomena.  No careful experiments were done to arrive at a deep universal truth like Euler's Formula. 

Moreover, God must want us to think that numbers have real existence because He reveals His most intimate nature of Himself as threeness: the Trinity.  You have to understand three to make any sense of the Trinity.   And, God's Threeness is not a human invention, it is God's invention.  And, we do not perceive this fact through our senses.  God never tells us directly that He is a Trinity.  One could invoke Aristotle's Active Intellect but I believe that that account is not satisfying.  There is a certainty to the knowledge that God is a Trinity that would not be available by merely comparing memories of sensory stimulation as in Aristotle's theory.

Additionally, there are trivial examples that all knowledge cannot come from the senses.  For instance, my knowledge that I can't remember an event from my past is not knowledge from the senses. 

---

I mean no offense in what I'm about to say.  I'm guessing by your philosophical stance that you hold Aristotle in very high regard.  However, even though we love Aristotle, we must love the truth more.  So I must say that I think the Church would have an easier time with science if they made universal the original condemnation of Aristotle's metaphysical writings from the University of Paris.  They contain much vagary and confusion posturing as definite knowledge.  Indeed, it was Aristotle's condemnation that led to the birth of modern science.  However, I believe Aristotle did very good work in Logic and the beginnings of empirical inquiry.  But, it is this 'vagary and confusion posturing as definite knowledge' in metaphysics that Dr. Marra rightfully complains about in his talk.

[SaintLouis]

I can't say I know that much about this topic (Platonism vs Aristotelianism) but it does interest me a lot.

It seems that a problem is what kind of Platonism one speaks of. As far as I know, certain strands of Platonism were not as mathematical as what you seem to be suggesting, Dominic. Sure, you have some of the Aristotelian Neoplatonists, maybe even Descartes and Leibniz, who place such a great emphasis on mathematics but I really can't say that such an approach is reflective of people like Proclus, and, especially, the Church Fathers. To me, it seems that the main point of Platonism in these figures is the idea of participation in the good. Also, it seems that people like Dietrich von Hildebrand, and the guy who made the video that started this thread, William Marra, would probably not agree with this notion of mathematical Platonism. von Hildebrand, for instance, was heavily focused on the importance of experience as opposed to sterile rationalizing.

In any case, I must say that I do prefer Platonism to Aristotelianism, provided that such Platonism has heavy influences from Aristotle such as the importance of experience, the senses, and such. I personally think that St. Thomas Aquinas provides a great example of such a Platonism in action and I think the late Joseph Pieper would agree. Regarding Platonism's relations to science and mathematics I am not so sure that Plato himself, or any of the classical Neoplatonists, would hold such an optimistic view as you seem to be holding (didn't Plato say that one could never make a science of phenomena because they are continuously changing?). I myself wholly agree with what seems to be the Thomist and Aristotelian critique, and I would dare say also Platonic critique, that modern science is seriously problematic in that it has deprived the world of what it calls "secondary qualities," those very qualities which make a thing what it is. Thus, I would agree with classical Neoplatonism, a combination of Plato and Aristotle perhaps best exemplified in St. Thomas and the Church Fathers, rather than the corrupting influence of Descartes.

[LouisIX]

I'm not sure that I have the time to listen to this talk at this time, but the Catholic theological and philosophical tradition has utilized Aristotle (to the exclusion of Plato where they disagree) for good reason.

The entire metaphysic of the Church is Aristotelian and hylomorphism is essential for our understanding of not only truth, beauty, and goodness, but the Incarnation, the sacramental life of the Church, etc.

If one shifts, for example, away from an Aristotelian metaphysics, the repercussions on the doctrine of transubstantiaton, for example, would be radical.

[SaintLouis]

I do fully agree that certain Aristotelian notions, such as the basic notion of form and matter, are fully necessary but these are not necessarily incompatible with more Platonic positions since the Church Fathers were fond of using Aristotle's categories and St. Bonaventure was an even more radical hylomorphist than St. Thomas.

[GloriaPatri]

I'm not sure that I have the time to listen to this talk at this time, but the Catholic theological and philosophical tradition has utilized Aristotle (to the exclusion of Plato where they disagree) for good reason.

The entire metaphysic of the Church is Aristotelian and hylomorphism is essential for our understanding of not only truth, beauty, and goodness, but the Incarnation, the sacramental life of the Church, etc.

If one shifts, for example, away from an Aristotelian metaphysics, the repercussions on the doctrine of transubstantiaton, for example, would be radical.

Hardly. The Real Presence was believed long before Aristotle's philosophy was baptized by Aquinas and the other Scholastics. The Church Fathers in their entirety were platonists, not aristotelians. And besides, Aristotle's philosophy has been used by the Church for less than half of its history. It's not like the very first Christians grasped onto it to rationally justify the Faith.

[SaintLouis]

Good point. However, I would disagree with saying that the Church Fathers were entirely Platonist. Although the basics of their philosophy was Platonist, they also had Aristotelian concepts like the categories and form-matter within their systems. From what I remember, St. John of Damascus was one of the fathers most heavily influenced by Aristotelianism.

And this leads to a larger point. I do think that in some sense the great contrast between Plato and Aristotle is so exaggerated when in reality the two were seen as complementary in Ancient times. The Neoplatonists, for instance, considered Aristotle as one of their own and tried to integrate aspects of his system into their thought.

I still have the feeling though that true Platonism should be distinguished from what passes as the "Platonism" of people like Descartes. I don't think true Platonism is really that different from Aristotelianism and if one looks at "Platonists" like von Hildenbrand one can see that they do emphasize, like Aristotelians, the importance of experience and sensible reality.

[Geremia]

You might want to re-read St. Augustine's Confessions Chapter 11.  He offers a real thorough meditation on time and says that he is completely baffled by it.  He really doesn't understand it.  Time cannot be simply 'a measure of change'.   A difference of position is a measure of change

What is changing there?

, but that's not time.  Time includes notions like appearance of uni-directionality and division into past, present and future with immediate access to the present.

Because natural processes are uni-directional. A rabbit corrupts (dies), a rabbit corpse does to naturally change into a live rabbit.

The independent reality of mathematical objects is the standard view among mathematicians.

But that doesn't necessarily imply they deny said objects have a foundation in reality. Mathematicals are "beings of reason with a foundation in reality."

Also, many physicists have adopted this view.  Roger Penrose and Max Tegmark being two outspoken examples.

They're modern-day Platonists.

Euler's Formula was not derived empirically but by Euler's genius of mathematical intuition.  His theorem shows a deep connection between several seemingly different mathematical objects.   An insight, which Roger Penrose quite effectively demonstrates is not algorithmic but intuitional--by somehow mentally perceiving the idea itself.  The amazing relationship between math and science is that mathematicians often FIRST discover some mathematical object and then LATER that mathematical object is found to perfectly describe some physical phenomena.

But Platonists have a hard time explaining why mathematics can "describe some physical phenomena" at all.

Additionally, there are trivial examples that all knowledge cannot come from the senses.  For instance, my knowledge that I can't remember an event from my past is not knowledge from the senses.

The memory is an internal sense.

I mean no offense in what I'm about to say.  I'm guessing by your philosophical stance that you hold Aristotle in very high regard.

I hold St. Thomas in higher regard.