Thomist theory of grace and predestination

Started by Quaremerepulisti, November 22, 2016, 09:27:40 AM

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Quaremerepulisti

The controversy over grace and predestination arose out of the desire to fit everything (and not just those things for which those categories were defined) Procrustes-like, into the Aristotelian-Thomist-Scholastic framework of act, potency, matter, form, essence, motion, cause, etc.  But human wills are not material objects.

Personally, I think the failure of Scholasticism on this score is to a great extent responsible for the decline in Thomism before the Leonine revival.  It's not just that seminary and university professors were lazy or guilty of "temerity"; there was a real reason for its decline.  But be that as it may.

We begin with certain doctrines:

God is the efficient cause of salvation of those who are saved.
The elect are predestined to good and salvation, but no one is ever predestined to evil and damnation.
God sincerely desires all men saved and makes their salvation possible.

Grace and salvation are completely free gifts of God (even if offered to all).
Grace is absolutely necessary for salvation and even for every supernaturally good work.
If men are not saved, it is their own fault.

I've grouped these as follows, since the meaning of the last three is completely clear, but the meaning of the first three is not.  What is the exact meaning of "cause", "desire", or "predestining" for God?

For Thomists, "cause" means cause as it is in the created order, just as touching a hot object to a cold one is the cause of the cold one heating up.  There's something about the first object (an accident) that infallibly makes it the cause of heating: that it is hot, and that it is touching the cold object.  While they will admit in theory that God is simple and therefore has no accidents, they proceed in practice as though He does; as though Him causing something in the created order is a quasi-accident of His.

"Cause" being interpreted as a quasi-accident of God, predestination naturally gets interpreted as predetermination.  Obviously there is a prior fact (the quasi-accident) which predetermines that the elect are saved.  But that being the case, secondary causes must be infallibly efficacious in themselves too, since they infallibly derive their causal power from the quasi-accident of God.  (Here Thomists and Molinists part company, with Thomists insisting grace is efficacious of itself, while Molinists instead saying the external circumstances are determinative of whether grace is effective or not.)  The Thomists say that any other theory (e.g. Molinism) makes God not the First Cause of salvation, but a passive "onlooker" whose causation of salvation is ontologically dependent on something else (e.g. non-resistance to grace).

Well, there is obviously no problem here with grace and salvation being free gifts and grace being absolutely necessary, but this does seem to yield some questions (to put it mildly) regarding God's desire of all to be saved, the possibility of salvation, predestination to evil, and man's culpability.  How do the Thomists answer these?

With regard to the possibility of salvation, the Thomists answer that God makes good acts and salvation present in potency (this is called sufficient grace).  Since they exist in potency, they possibly exist in actuality.  They say the potency gives one a true "power" to be saved.  To the argument that the actualization isn't possible if God doesn't in fact actualize it, they charge their accusers with claiming a potency isn't a real potency unless it's actualized (Megarianism). 

With regard to man's culpability, the Thomists answer that, while God's failure to give efficacious grace entails sin and damnation, it is not the cause of it - that is man's perverse will.  Some will say that God's failure to give efficacious grace is punishment for resistance to sufficient grace - if sufficient grace were not resisted, efficacious grace will follow.  Nevertheless, non-resistance is also a grace from God, so the same argument applies with respect to God's failure to give that.  With regard to lack of predestination to damnation, the Thomists likewise answer that God is not the cause of damnation.

Finally, with regard to God's desire to save all, the Thomists answer that this is not a concrete desire in the here and now, given the actual situation, but only an abstract desire, abstracting from the situation.  This is like a judge abstractly desiring all should live, but in the concrete sentencing a murderer to death.

Now if a freshman philosophy student submitted the above Thomist answers as part of a term paper today, he would receive an "F" with some pretty harsh comments.  This won't bother the Thomists.  They'll simply say the professor is a rationalist or was duped by the likes of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, etc.  In the real world, however, changing the definitions of terms post-hoc in order to fit a theory is a big no-no in intellectual circles.

Potency is not the same thing as possibility.  This is shown since it is metaphysically impossible for a potency to self-actualize (a premise the Thomists will surely agree with).  And so, if in the actual world, an external actualizer of the potency isn't present, it is likewise metaphysically impossible for it to be actualized.  Or, put another way, the facts of the actual world entail the potency won't actualize.  So if salvation is present in potency, but nothing is available to actualize it, it is impossible in actuality.  Now, to be sure, there are other possible worlds in which it is actualized, but the clear import of God's making people's salvation possible is in reference to actually existent people in the actual world.

Culpability does not necessarily refer to one's being the cause of a bad outcome, but only for an act or failure to act in which the bad outcome could be reasonably foreseen.  If I invite a known alcoholic over to my house and place lots of booze within his reach, I am culpable for his drunkenness.  With reference to sin, we are bound in justice, if we can reasonably foresee ones under our charge (e.g. children) committing sin in a certain situation, to do something about the situation.  If we fail to do so, we are not the cause of their sin, but we are culpable.  Even with regard to others, we are so bound in charity, and if we lead our neighbor into sin we are likewise culpable.  Here, however, according to Thomists, God is predeterming the situation in which, not only can sin be reasonably foreseen, it is absolutely foreseen and metaphysically inevitable.  To which the Thomists will no doubt respond: God has no obligation to keep His creatures from sin.  To which I respond: so, then, if we keep the great commandments, we love our neighbors more than God, Who is allegedly Love itself.

And the analogy of God and salvation to a judge sentencing death is completely inapt, at least insofar as the Thomists interpret it.  The judge wills that all live, not merely as an abstraction, but as a hypothetical reality - he would will that the murderer live, except for the fact that he murdered.  And thus God wills the salvation of all as a hypothetical reality, which is the clear meaning of the phrase - He would will their salvation but for their final impenitence.  This is how God's antecedent will was interpreted, for instance, by St. John Damascene.  And it simply can't be that anyone could have more zeal for salvation of souls than Christ Himself.  But for the Thomists, God doesn't really desire the salvation of some in the situation in which they actually find themselves - and so, if we do, we have more zeal than Christ.

So, obviously, something went wrong.  What a soul does is not pre-determined in time, and God can not only not cause, but can not even predetermine sin.  While a human will cannot move itself, it can determine itself.  That is what makes a human will distinct from a material object, and why categories of potency, act, etc., are not applicable.  The Thomist claim that God "is passive" in salvation and "waits" for the soul's free acceptance of grace is not well taken.  Is God "passive" if He answers prayers since this is consequent to the prayer being made?  It is no answer to say God foresaw the prayer "from all eternity" - for He likewise does so with free acceptance of grace - and doesn't change the fact God's answering prayer is consequent to the prayer.

Michael Wilson

A very good and concise summary of the arguments you have made in the various threads on grace and predestination. Thank you.
"The World Must Conform to Our Lord and not He to it." Rev. Dennis Fahey CSSP

"My brothers, all of you, if you are condemned to see the triumph of evil, never applaud it. Never say to evil: you are good; to decadence: you are progess; to death: you are life. Sanctify yourselves in the times wherein God has placed you; bewail the evils and the disorders which God tolerates; oppose them with the energy of your works and your efforts, your life uncontaminated by error, free from being led astray, in such a way that having lived here below, united with the Spirit of the Lord, you will be admitted to be made but one with Him forever and ever: But he who is joined to the Lord is one in spirit." Cardinal Pie of Potiers

Clarence Creedwater

Quote from: Quaremerepulisti on November 22, 2016, 09:27:40 AM
The controversy over grace and predestination arose out of the desire to fit everything (and not just those things for which those categories were defined) Procrustes-like, into the Aristotelian-Thomist-Scholastic framework of act, potency, matter, form, essence, motion, cause, etc.  But human wills are not material objects.

Personally, I think the failure of Scholasticism on this score is to a great extent responsible for the decline in Thomism before the Leonine revival.  It's not just that seminary and university professors were lazy or guilty of "temerity"; there was a real reason for its decline.  But be that as it may.

We begin with certain doctrines:

God is the efficient cause of salvation of those who are saved.
The elect are predestined to good and salvation, but no one is ever predestined to evil and damnation.
God sincerely desires all men saved and makes their salvation possible.

Grace and salvation are completely free gifts of God (even if offered to all).
Grace is absolutely necessary for salvation and even for every supernaturally good work.
If men are not saved, it is their own fault.

I've grouped these as follows, since the meaning of the last three is completely clear, but the meaning of the first three is not.  What is the exact meaning of "cause", "desire", or "predestining" for God?

For Thomists, "cause" means cause as it is in the created order, just as touching a hot object to a cold one is the cause of the cold one heating up.  There's something about the first object (an accident) that infallibly makes it the cause of heating: that it is hot, and that it is touching the cold object.  While they will admit in theory that God is simple and therefore has no accidents, they proceed in practice as though He does; as though Him causing something in the created order is a quasi-accident of His.

"Cause" being interpreted as a quasi-accident of God, predestination naturally gets interpreted as predetermination.  Obviously there is a prior fact (the quasi-accident) which predetermines that the elect are saved.  But that being the case, secondary causes must be infallibly efficacious in themselves too, since they infallibly derive their causal power from the quasi-accident of God.  (Here Thomists and Molinists part company, with Thomists insisting grace is efficacious of itself, while Molinists instead saying the external circumstances are determinative of whether grace is effective or not.)  The Thomists say that any other theory (e.g. Molinism) makes God not the First Cause of salvation, but a passive "onlooker" whose causation of salvation is ontologically dependent on something else (e.g. non-resistance to grace).

Well, there is obviously no problem here with grace and salvation being free gifts and grace being absolutely necessary, but this does seem to yield some questions (to put it mildly) regarding God's desire of all to be saved, the possibility of salvation, predestination to evil, and man's culpability.  How do the Thomists answer these?

With regard to the possibility of salvation, the Thomists answer that God makes good acts and salvation present in potency (this is called sufficient grace).  Since they exist in potency, they possibly exist in actuality.  They say the potency gives one a true "power" to be saved.  To the argument that the actualization isn't possible if God doesn't in fact actualize it, they charge their accusers with claiming a potency isn't a real potency unless it's actualized (Megarianism). 

With regard to man's culpability, the Thomists answer that, while God's failure to give efficacious grace entails sin and damnation, it is not the cause of it - that is man's perverse will.  Some will say that God's failure to give efficacious grace is punishment for resistance to sufficient grace - if sufficient grace were not resisted, efficacious grace will follow.  Nevertheless, non-resistance is also a grace from God, so the same argument applies with respect to God's failure to give that.  With regard to lack of predestination to damnation, the Thomists likewise answer that God is not the cause of damnation.

Finally, with regard to God's desire to save all, the Thomists answer that this is not a concrete desire in the here and now, given the actual situation, but only an abstract desire, abstracting from the situation.  This is like a judge abstractly desiring all should live, but in the concrete sentencing a murderer to death.

Now if a freshman philosophy student submitted the above Thomist answers as part of a term paper today, he would receive an "F" with some pretty harsh comments.  This won't bother the Thomists.  They'll simply say the professor is a rationalist or was duped by the likes of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, etc.  In the real world, however, changing the definitions of terms post-hoc in order to fit a theory is a big no-no in intellectual circles.

Potency is not the same thing as possibility.  This is shown since it is metaphysically impossible for a potency to self-actualize (a premise the Thomists will surely agree with).  And so, if in the actual world, an external actualizer of the potency isn't present, it is likewise metaphysically impossible for it to be actualized.  Or, put another way, the facts of the actual world entail the potency won't actualize.  So if salvation is present in potency, but nothing is available to actualize it, it is impossible in actuality.  Now, to be sure, there are other possible worlds in which it is actualized, but the clear import of God's making people's salvation possible is in reference to actually existent people in the actual world.

Culpability does not necessarily refer to one's being the cause of a bad outcome, but only for an act or failure to act in which the bad outcome could be reasonably foreseen.  If I invite a known alcoholic over to my house and place lots of booze within his reach, I am culpable for his drunkenness.  With reference to sin, we are bound in justice, if we can reasonably foresee ones under our charge (e.g. children) committing sin in a certain situation, to do something about the situation.  If we fail to do so, we are not the cause of their sin, but we are culpable.  Even with regard to others, we are so bound in charity, and if we lead our neighbor into sin we are likewise culpable.  Here, however, according to Thomists, God is predeterming the situation in which, not only can sin be reasonably foreseen, it is absolutely foreseen and metaphysically inevitable.  To which the Thomists will no doubt respond: God has no obligation to keep His creatures from sin.  To which I respond: so, then, if we keep the great commandments, we love our neighbors more than God, Who is allegedly Love itself.

And the analogy of God and salvation to a judge sentencing death is completely inapt, at least insofar as the Thomists interpret it.  The judge wills that all live, not merely as an abstraction, but as a hypothetical reality - he would will that the murderer live, except for the fact that he murdered.  And thus God wills the salvation of all as a hypothetical reality, which is the clear meaning of the phrase - He would will their salvation but for their final impenitence.  This is how God's antecedent will was interpreted, for instance, by St. John Damascene.  And it simply can't be that anyone could have more zeal for salvation of souls than Christ Himself.  But for the Thomists, God doesn't really desire the salvation of some in the situation in which they actually find themselves - and so, if we do, we have more zeal than Christ.

So, obviously, something went wrong.  What a soul does is not pre-determined in time, and God can not only not cause, but can not even predetermine sin.  While a human will cannot move itself, it can determine itself.  That is what makes a human will distinct from a material object, and why categories of potency, act, etc., are not applicable.  The Thomist claim that God "is passive" in salvation and "waits" for the soul's free acceptance of grace is not well taken.  Is God "passive" if He answers prayers since this is consequent to the prayer being made?  It is no answer to say God foresaw the prayer "from all eternity" - for He likewise does so with free acceptance of grace - and doesn't change the fact God's answering prayer is consequent to the prayer.

Such heretical garbage you keep dishing out.

Quote from: Quaremerepulisti on November 22, 2016, 09:27:40 AM
The controversy over grace and predestination arose out of the desire to fit everything (and not just those things for which those categories were defined) Procrustes-like, into the Aristotelian-Thomist-Scholastic framework of act, potency, matter, form, essence, motion, cause, etc.  But human wills are not material objects.

What is this "desire to fit everything"?  This is only ONE subject, and this subject the Church Herself said may or may not be accurate application of official Church principle. You are trying to spread mud over the official philosophy of the Church, just like a heretic would do.

Quote from: Quaremerepulisti on November 22, 2016, 09:27:40 AM
Personally, I think the failure of Scholasticism on this score is to a great extent responsible for the decline in Thomism before the Leonine revival.  It's not just that seminary and university professors were lazy or guilty of "temerity"; there was a real reason for its decline.  But be that as it may.

Scholasticism, as a whole, does not fail just because one subject that is the depth of divine mystery, has a unresolved controversy connected with it, and it may still be correct. You are just showing your hatred for a system which in God's Providence made the official philosophy of the Church.

And that's with a most deep and divine mystery. Never mind all the really easy facts and logic that you flub up on left and right on these forums. Pretty clear who is the failure, and it is NOT Scholasticism.


"Now when [the Pope] is explicitly a heretic, he falls ipso facto from his dignity and out of the Church, and the Church must either deprive him, or, as some say, declare him deprived, of his Apostolic See."
        - St. Francis de Sales, "The Catholic Controversy"

"When you start messin' with dat "truth" stuff, yer playin' with fire alright."
        - Kingfish (from Amos & Andy)

Quaremerepulisti

Quote from: Clarence Creedwater on November 22, 2016, 06:41:16 PM
Scholasticism, as a whole, does not fail just because one subject that is the depth of divine mystery, has a unresolved controversy connected with it, and it may still be correct. You are just showing your hatred for a system which in God's Providence made the official philosophy of the Church.

And that's with a most deep and divine mystery. Never mind all the really easy facts and logic that you flub up on left and right on these forums. Pretty clear who is the failure, and it is NOT Scholasticism.

This is the Sacred Sciences subforum.  It is the place for semi-scholarly debates, not personal attacks. Your lack of a substantive reply is noted.

Clarence Creedwater

Quote from: Quaremerepulisti on November 22, 2016, 07:00:32 PM
Quote from: Clarence Creedwater on November 22, 2016, 06:41:16 PM
Scholasticism, as a whole, does not fail just because one subject that is the depth of divine mystery, has a unresolved controversy connected with it, and it may still be correct. You are just showing your hatred for a system which in God's Providence made the official philosophy of the Church.

And that's with a most deep and divine mystery. Never mind all the really easy facts and logic that you flub up on left and right on these forums. Pretty clear who is the failure, and it is NOT Scholasticism.

This is the Sacred Sciences subforum.  It is the place for semi-scholarly debates, not personal attacks. Your lack of a substantive reply is noted.

The argumentum ad hominem is a legitimate tool of semi-scholarly debate. As is the reasoning I presented.
"Now when [the Pope] is explicitly a heretic, he falls ipso facto from his dignity and out of the Church, and the Church must either deprive him, or, as some say, declare him deprived, of his Apostolic See."
        - St. Francis de Sales, "The Catholic Controversy"

"When you start messin' with dat "truth" stuff, yer playin' with fire alright."
        - Kingfish (from Amos & Andy)

Quaremerepulisti

Quote from: Clarence Creedwater on November 22, 2016, 07:07:19 PM
The argumentum ad hominem is a legitimate tool of semi-scholarly debate. As is the reasoning I presented.

No, it's not (argumentum ad hominem is a fallacy), and there was no reasoning presented.

If you love Scholasticism as much as you claim, perhaps your ire would be better directed at those Thomists who make arguments that wouldn't even pass muster in freshman philosophy or logic, rather than making fruitless attempts to shoot the messenger.

"This is heretical garbage" is mere argument by assertion.

"The Church Herself has said this may or may not be correct application of principle." - that is not an argument for it being correct application of principle.

"You just hate Scholasticism and want to spread mud over it" is an argumentum ad hominem fallacy.  Whether someone hates or loves Scholasticism has nothing whatsoever to do with whether his arguments are correct.

"You flub up easy facts and logic" is likewise an ad hominem as well as an argument by assertion.


Clarence Creedwater

Quote from: Quaremerepulisti on November 22, 2016, 07:45:25 PM
Quote from: Clarence Creedwater on November 22, 2016, 07:07:19 PM
The argumentum ad hominem is a legitimate tool of semi-scholarly debate. As is the reasoning I presented.

No, it's not (argumentum ad hominem is a fallacy), and there was no reasoning presented.

It's a fallacy in logic, not in debate. Scripture has used it also. And, yes I did use reasoning - the fact that you condemn the whole Church approved and commanded system because of one possible mistaken historical application. That sentence alone reveals you have flubbed for multiple reasons.

Quote from: Quaremerepulisti on November 22, 2016, 07:45:25 PM
If you love Scholasticism as much as you claim, perhaps your ire would be better directed at those Thomists who make arguments that wouldn't even pass muster in freshman philosophy or logic, rather than making fruitless attempts to shoot the messenger.

You have already shown how terrible you do reasoning on these forums in very easy and common matters. That's the argumentum a fortiori why you are not credible, besides the fact that a pope said anyone who puts down Scholasticism is 'suspect as to the truth'.

Quote from: Quaremerepulisti on November 22, 2016, 07:45:25 PM
"This is heretical garbage" is mere argument by assertion.

It's a conclusion give before the reasoning was presented.

Quote from: Quaremerepulisti on November 22, 2016, 07:45:25 PM
"The Church Herself has said this may or may not be correct application of principle." - that is not an argument for it being correct application of principle.

It's an argument that says you shouldn't be condemning that particularly application (just not preferring it), NOR attacking the system as a whole.
"Now when [the Pope] is explicitly a heretic, he falls ipso facto from his dignity and out of the Church, and the Church must either deprive him, or, as some say, declare him deprived, of his Apostolic See."
        - St. Francis de Sales, "The Catholic Controversy"

"When you start messin' with dat "truth" stuff, yer playin' with fire alright."
        - Kingfish (from Amos & Andy)

Quaremerepulisti

Quote from: Clarence Creedwater on November 22, 2016, 08:21:19 PM
It's a fallacy in logic, not in debate.

Guess what debates are supposed to use?  That's right, logic.  If your argument hinges on a logical fallacy you lose the debate.

QuoteAnd, yes I did use reasoning - the fact that you condemn the whole Church approved and commanded system because of one possible mistaken historical application.

That is not reasoning.  That is just a statement of (mistaken) fact.  Nowhere do I "condemn the whole Church approved and commanded system".  What I condemn is people who use that as an excuse for failure to engage in critical thinking, and as a shield for weak arguments.

QuoteYou have already shown how terrible you do reasoning on these forums in very easy and common matters.

Says the one who just admitted to using a logical fallacy.  "Good reasoning" != agreeing with Clarence's biases.

QuoteThat's the argumentum a fortiori why you are not credible...

It is not an argument at all.  Attacking one's credibility rather than his arguments is a tacit admission that one really has no answer to his arguments.  What matters is what arguments are made, not who makes them.

QuoteIt's an argument that says you shouldn't be condemning that particularly application (just not preferring it), NOR attacking the system as a whole.

No, it isn't.  Plenty of others have condemned that particular application without attacking the system as a whole.

Now, if you have a substantive argument to make, by all means make it.  Otherwise,  I'll simply ignore you.  God bless.

LouisIX

The problem with this, Q, is that you set the Thomists up as holding things that they don't hold, and you know better.

For example, you say:

"Finally, with regard to God's desire to save all, the Thomists answer that this is not a concrete desire in the here and now, given the actual situation, but only an abstract desire, abstracting from the situation.  This is like a judge abstractly desiring all should live, but in the concrete sentencing a murderer to death."

You know that that analogy fails entirely to capture how Thomists self-describe because the reality of the Thomistic system in this regard is based upon permission while the analogy employed subtly shifts to causation.
IF I speak with the tongues of men, and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal.

John Lamb

#9
QuoteThe judge wills that all live, not merely as an abstraction, but as a hypothetical reality - he would will that the murderer live, except for the fact that he murdered.  And thus God wills the salvation of all as a hypothetical reality, which is the clear meaning of the phrase - He would will their salvation but for their final impenitence.  This is how God's antecedent will was interpreted, for instance, by St. John Damascene.  And it simply can't be that anyone could have more zeal for salvation of souls than Christ Himself. 

This agrees with Thomism.

Quare, what you have to answer is: why, if God wishes everyone to be saved, is not everyone in fact saved? Is God not capable of infallibly moving the will, softening the heart, towards Him? Or is the will of man omnipotent in resisting the omnipotence of God's will to save him? Why does God not do for every man what He did for St. Paul, if he desires to save everyone as much as He did St. Paul?
"Let all bitterness and animosity and indignation and defamation be removed from you, together with every evil. And become helpfully kind to one another, inwardly compassionate, forgiving among yourselves, just as God also graciously forgave you in the Anointed." – St. Paul

John Lamb

Here's an analogy.

God puts the medicine to our mouths, but we freely resist by putting our hands over our mouths. Some God takes hold of the hand and removes it from their mouth, with them finally co-operating; others He leaves with their hands over their mouth until they die.

What I can't stand about the Molinist account is the idea that God saves us according to our merits, rather than our merits being caused by God's will to save us.
"Let all bitterness and animosity and indignation and defamation be removed from you, together with every evil. And become helpfully kind to one another, inwardly compassionate, forgiving among yourselves, just as God also graciously forgave you in the Anointed." – St. Paul

Quaremerepulisti

Quote from: LouisIX on November 22, 2016, 10:23:44 PM
The problem with this, Q, is that you set the Thomists up as holding things that they don't hold, and you know better.

I assure you that every single thing I have said has been argued by Thomists before here on this very forum.

QuoteFor example, you say:

"Finally, with regard to God's desire to save all, the Thomists answer that this is not a concrete desire in the here and now, given the actual situation, but only an abstract desire, abstracting from the situation.  This is like a judge abstractly desiring all should live, but in the concrete sentencing a murderer to death."

You know that that analogy fails entirely to capture how Thomists self-describe because the reality of the Thomistic system in this regard is based upon permission while the analogy employed subtly shifts to causation.

So what?  No analogy is perfect, and the point is to illustrate what an abstract vs. a concrete desire is.  Is it or is it not true that according to Thomism God's desire to save all is only an abstract desire but not a concrete one; it doesn't exist in the concrete for person X who happens to be in situation Y, but only for a "person" considered as an abstraction?


Quaremerepulisti

Quote from: John Lamb on November 23, 2016, 01:18:58 AM
QuoteThe judge wills that all live, not merely as an abstraction, but as a hypothetical reality - he would will that the murderer live, except for the fact that he murdered.  And thus God wills the salvation of all as a hypothetical reality, which is the clear meaning of the phrase - He would will their salvation but for their final impenitence.  This is how God's antecedent will was interpreted, for instance, by St. John Damascene.  And it simply can't be that anyone could have more zeal for salvation of souls than Christ Himself. 

This agrees with Thomism.

Not according to what some Thomists have argued on this forum, most notably INPEFESS.

I certainly accept God's will to save all as a hypothetical reality, and that is the traditional Patristic interpretation.

QuoteQuare, what you have to answer is: why, if God wishes everyone to be saved, is not everyone in fact saved? Is God not capable of infallibly moving the will, softening the heart, towards Him?

That is a question everyone must answer, for God's wishing everyone to be saved is a matter of doctrine as well as a logical consequence of God's goodness.  God can't wish anyone to be damned; that would be an evil God.

But He will not do so without man's consent.  He does not force Himself upon man.  Both Scriptural sayings are true: "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you" and "Convert us to You, and we will be converted".  Why would God bother to say "Turn ye to Me" instead of simply turning them to Him?  He wants something from sinners first.  Yet if we ask God for our conversion He will infallibly convert us.  I speak from personal experience, for this was the exact prayer I made while still leading a very wicked life.

But, Thomists will argue, such consent is itself an act of the will.  It is not.  It is a mere willingness to will, or an act of will only hypothetically.

A better question is, why does God not just override everyone's lack of consent?  Obviously, there must be greater good in allowing for its possibility.

QuoteOr is the will of man omnipotent in resisting the omnipotence of God's will to save him? Why does God not do for every man what He did for St. Paul, if he desires to save everyone as much as He did St. Paul?

But He did do something much greater than the miracle on the road to Damascus for every man, did He not, on Calvary (not mankind in general, but every man in particular)?  Is it not the case that, were you or I the only man in the world needing redemption, Christ would have died for our sakes all the same?  Nothing is ever lacking from God.


LouisIX

#13
Quote from: Quaremerepulisti on November 23, 2016, 07:35:05 AM
Quote from: LouisIX on November 22, 2016, 10:23:44 PM
The problem with this, Q, is that you set the Thomists up as holding things that they don't hold, and you know better.

I assure you that every single thing I have said has been argued by Thomists before here on this very forum.

QuoteFor example, you say:

"Finally, with regard to God's desire to save all, the Thomists answer that this is not a concrete desire in the here and now, given the actual situation, but only an abstract desire, abstracting from the situation.  This is like a judge abstractly desiring all should live, but in the concrete sentencing a murderer to death."

You know that that analogy fails entirely to capture how Thomists self-describe because the reality of the Thomistic system in this regard is based upon permission while the analogy employed subtly shifts to causation.

So what?  No analogy is perfect, and the point is to illustrate what an abstract vs. a concrete desire is.  Is it or is it not true that according to Thomism God's desire to save all is only an abstract desire but not a concrete one; it doesn't exist in the concrete for person X who happens to be in situation Y, but only for a "person" considered as an abstraction?

1) Let's not use people on this forum as Thomistic models. Let's use St. Thomas and the great Thomistic commentators such as Banez, Cajtean, John of St. Thomas, Garrigou, et al.

2) It's not just an imperfect analogy, it completely fails at upholding a key aspect of the Thomistic treatment. That it fails at this task is then upheld as evidence that Thomism fails. That's not intellectually honest.

Part of the issue with this topic is that you are constantly applying language to Thomas which he does not use. If you want to properly understand him, at least begin with his own language. The antecedent will is not called "abstract" but instead a velleitas, while the consequent will is a simpliciter vult.

Quote from: ST I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1Unde magis potest dici velleitas, quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licet illud quod antecedenter vult, non fiat.

In all honesty, Q, you are among the smartest people on this forum. You very much dislike the Thomistic treatment of these issues, and I can honestly understand that. I have sympathy for it. However, it doesn't seem as though you are always willing to employ the patience necessary to actually understand Thomas and the commentators at face value. It always seems like you're simply searching for the quickest knock out.
IF I speak with the tongues of men, and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal.

John Lamb

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Yet if we ask God for our conversion He will infallibly convert us.  I speak from personal experience, for this was the exact prayer I made while still leading a very wicked life.

But this event can be explained in diverse ways. Is it that God gave you the grace of conversion because He foreknew the prayer for conversion that you would make, or is it that God had preordained that He would first move your heart to make that pray for conversion, and then supply you with the corresponding grace? Did God convert you because you prayed, or did you pray because God converted you? Which is the Prime Mover in this act?

This is the main reason I favour the Thomistic account: all is from God as Prime Mover. All the praise belongs ultimately to Him. Grace isn't a reward God gives to us as a spectator of our good actions; God's grace is the very cause of our doing good actions in the first place. Otherwise, how is it "grace"? It is merely the just reward due to our merit. You weren't rewarded with conversion because you prayed; rather, you prayed because God had predestined you to a reward.: For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will.
"Let all bitterness and animosity and indignation and defamation be removed from you, together with every evil. And become helpfully kind to one another, inwardly compassionate, forgiving among yourselves, just as God also graciously forgave you in the Anointed." – St. Paul