Church Contradiction on Baptism of Desire

[Quaremerepulisti]

The main false assumption (regarding grace) is this: since resistance to grace is an evil, non-resistance must be a good which must therefore come from God, the source of all good.

Exactly how is this an assumption of Congruentism?

God arranges the conditions of man (Vincent Terranova is born to a Trad family) so that he will freely cooperate with the various graces He sends.  There is no sufficient/efficacious distinction, or no "enabling" grace.  There's just Graces.  Period.

This free cooperation you refer to is identical to non-resistance, so the same problem exists.  An additional problem is to explain exactly how it works out that the external conditions are arranged "so that" that non-resistance is obtained (called the "grounding objection").

[Quaremerepulisti]

I'm saying that as far as He is concerned wills to save all men; but He wills that the creature makes (under His grace) a free election to choose Him and eternal salvation; or to reject Him.

It's binary.  Are you saying God CAN'T save this person, or that God COULD save him, but does not provide enough Graces?  You see, PPM blows up.

When you really analyze this, you end up with an infinite regress, and our minds are not built to understand infinities.  The famous dictum of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, "either God determining or God determined" can be shown to be a fallacy.

God can't save a person who is determined not to be saved (this is the definition of a person with final impenitence).  This does not go against God's omnipotence, for God cannot do the logically impossible.

OK, but can't God will that such a person not determine to be not saved?  Not if the person is determined to be determined to be not saved.  Against, that's logically impossible.  (If an unrepentant person does not have such determination, he may for instance ask God for the grace of repentance even though he is not at the moment repentant, a prayer which is always granted.)

Well, then can't God will that the person not determine to determined to be not saved?
Not if the person determines that.  And on to infinity.

[james03]

This free cooperation you refer to is identical to non-resistance, so the same problem exists.

God is the cause of all good, He is not the efficient Cause.  Beauty is a Good.  Say a pink flower is beautiful.  Ultimately God is the cause of the beauty, but the efficient cause would be say some sort of chemical pigment in the petal.

Same thing.  God is the First Cause, Prime Mover, and Form of the Good, but He is not the efficient cause of Man's free will choice for Good.

It is almost like you are claiming that the pigment is not in the causal chain, or that if we assert that the pigment is in the causal chain, we are taking away from God, or something.

As far as HOW God arranges the conditions, that is explained by Molinism.  I'd prefer not to fork this thread and go into that.

[Non Nobis]

ETA: some links; more quotes from St. Thomas.

God is the cause of all good, He is not the efficient Cause.  Beauty is a Good.  Say a pink flower is beautiful.  Ultimately God is the cause of the beauty, but the efficient cause would be say some sort of chemical pigment in the petal.

Same thing.  God is the First Cause, Prime Mover, and Form of the Good, but He is not the efficient cause of Man's free will choice for Good.

St.  Thomas' second argument for the existence of God is based on the necessity of there being a first efficient cause, which is God:

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article3
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The efficient cause of the pigment in a petal is not itself.  The FIRST efficient cause is God.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1044.htm#article4
God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things

Also:

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http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1006.htm
..since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."

I think that the movement of a good free choice needs a primary efficient cause too, which is God. To say otherwise IS to take something away from God. This is my understanding.    

Philippians 2:13
For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will

I think "working in you... to will" has the nature of an efficient cause.

I know the reaction is "wrong! that is impossible!", but I think God works in our free will without violating its freedom.

St. Thomas, directly to the point:

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http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm

Reply to Objection 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

[james03]

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.

St. Thomas agrees with me.  I already said God is the First Cause, however, the color pigment in the petal is in the Causal Chain, just as man's free will choice for Good is in the causal chain for him choosing good.

[james03]

Man is an efficient cause in the Good that he does.  Otherwise you are left with the fallacy of Occasionalism.

True, God is the First Cause of this Good, but man's choice is free.

Man chooses what he views as good.  Why he considers something good is because of God's grace that works on the intellect and faculties.

Someone claiming that man is not an efficient cause must explain why this is not Occasionalism, which according to Wiki comes from nominalism (which I agree, it does).  It stinks of Hume.

[Non Nobis]

Man is an efficient cause in the Good that he does.  Otherwise you are left with the fallacy of Occasionalism...

Someone claiming that man is not an efficient cause must explain why this is not Occasionalism...

I really can't tell that you read the quotes from St. Thomas.

St. Thomas certainly puts man in the causal chain as a true efficient cause of the good he does.  But he says that God is the FIRST (primary) efficient cause in the chain.

I'll repeat the last quote since it was "ETA" so maybe you missed it:
(Read it all closely.  I almost  put the whole thing in boldface)

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http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm

Reply to Objection 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

... God is the primary cause of man's good (even naturally good) free willing; God is "a cause that moves a voluntary cause".  But He cannot cause evil, and will not destroy what He Himself causes: the very freedom in man's actions.

This is huge and hard to understand; but this is what St. Thomas is saying.

Supernatural good in addition requires grace.

[james03]

Again, I have in no way denied that God is the First Cause.  I stipulate, God is the First Cause of all Good.  Let's quit talking about First Causes.

That taken care of, man's free will is the efficient cause of his choosing the good.

[Non Nobis]

Again, I have in no way denied that God is the First Cause.  I stipulate, God is the First Cause of all Good.  Let's quit talking about First Causes.

That taken care of, man's free will is the efficient cause of his choosing the good.

Even in everyday talk, when A is the cause of B, and B is the cause of C, we sometimes say simply "B is the cause of C" (this is true), but we sometimes say "A is the cause of C" (also true; maybe less direct, but often more fundamental).  The same thing is true for efficient causality.

Man's free will is the efficient cause of his choosing the good - TRUE
God is the efficient cause of Man's freely choosing the good - ALSO TRUE

It must be understood (and explained here, where it is not obvious) that in the first case we are talking about SECONDARY efficient causality, but in the second case about PRIMARY efficient causality.

St. Thomas says  "for one thing to be cause of another [it need not] be the first cause".
Both the secondary cause and the primary cause cause the same thing, but the primary cause is more fundamental. In the case of God, He CAUSES the  secondary causality itself, even while it is causing. 

We can't stop talking about First Causes because every secondary efficient cause requires a first (primary) efficient cause, and we are not only talking about man but also about God. Or, do you want to leave God out of the discussion? (Maybe that is it, as far as thinking about free will goes....)     

.
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1006.htm
..since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."

[james03]

Even in everyday talk, when A is the cause of B, and B is the cause of C, we sometimes say simply "B is the cause of C" (this is true), but we sometimes say "A is the cause of C" (also true; maybe less direct, but often more fundamental).  The same thing is true for efficient causality.

Which is why I stipulated that God is the First Cause, which in your example is A causing C.  I stipulated that because I have always said that, and it has never been in dispute.  So why won't you let it drop?

At issue is that "B causes C".  It appears (I probably misunderstand) that Q. is denying "B causes C" and is presupposing an occasionalist system.  So what I am attempting to discuss is how Q is not an occasionalist.

Man's free will is the efficient cause of his choosing the good - TRUE

I'm waiting to find out if Q agrees.

We I can't stop talking about First Causes

True.

Furthermore, since God is the Form of the Good, we can also say that God is the formal cause of man choosing the good.  However, man is the efficient (or instrumental) cause of his free will choice to do good.

[Quaremerepulisti]

At issue is that "B causes C".  It appears (I probably misunderstand) that Q. is denying "B causes C" and is presupposing an occasionalist system.  So what I am attempting to discuss is how Q is not an occasionalist.

You must be misunderstanding something.  Nowhere do I deny secondary causality of man.

Man's free will is the efficient cause of his choosing the good - TRUE

I'm waiting to find out if Q agrees.

Yes.

Furthermore, since God is the Form of the Good, we can also say that God is the formal cause of man choosing the good.  However, man is the efficient (or instrumental) cause of his free will choice to do good.

Man is the secondary efficient cause.  God is the First Cause, not only first formal cause but also first efficient cause.

[Non Nobis]

I almost posted at greater length, but QMR said it better.

Man is the secondary efficient cause.  God is the First Cause, not only first formal cause but also first efficient cause.

[james03]

Man is the secondary efficient cause.  God is the First Cause, not only first formal cause but also first efficient cause.

Agreed.  So what is the problem with the Molinist system?  In that system, God is the First Cause and man is the secondary efficient cause.

[Non Nobis]

Man is the secondary efficient cause.  God is the First Cause, not only first formal cause but also first efficient cause.

Agreed.  So what is the problem with the Molinist system?  In that system, God is the First Cause and man is the secondary efficient cause.

My understanding is that in the Thomist system the Primary efficient cause moves the Secondary efficient cause infallibly, although freely in the case of a voluntary cause.

CONTRA GENTILES
BOOK THREE: PROVIDENCE
Part II:
C148 [3]
Again, that divine help is provided man so that he may act well is to be understood in this way: it performs our works in us, as the primary cause performs the operations of secondary causes, and as a principal agent performs the action of an instrument. Hence, it is said in Isaiah (26:1213): "You have wrought all our works for us, O Lord." Now, the first cause causes the operation of the secondary cause according to the measure of the latter. So, God also causes our works in us in accord with our measure, which means that we act voluntarily and not as forced. Therefore, no one is forced to right action by the divine help.

I don't think the Molinists have this idea of primary and secondary causes.

[james03]

Why not?  Take St. Robert:  God sends the Grace (Primary Cause) that is congruent with the circumstances.  The Grace works on the intellect, and the person chooses to do a certain good thing.  His will is the secondary cause.