An argument against Molinism

[Michael]

Premise 1, P1: If Molinism is true, then God has prevolitional (or middle) knowledge of what creatures would freely do.

P2. If nothing can occur without God causing it, then any middle knowledge of what creatures would cause is, by implication, middle knowledge of what God would cause.

P3. Nothing can occur without God causing it.

P4. Any middle knowledge of what creatures would cause is, by implication, middle knowledge of what God would cause.

P5. One cannot have middle knowledge of one's own choices.

P6. God cannot have middle knowledge.

Conclusion: Molinism is false.

I think the Molinist would have to go after premise 2 and/or 3. I don't yet claim this argument is sound. I want to get feedback first. I can't be the first one to think of this, so I'm sure some Molinist somewhere has addressed this type of argument.

[Michael Wilson]

If I had to guess, I would say that a Molinist would agree that God causes all actions, but that there was more than one "future". Therefore God would have before Him several "scenarios" or hypothetical futures of which He could create, and that He could foresee in all of these different ones, how His creatures would act, with the graces that He would bestow on them in these, and therefore would act accordingly. God then chose what "future" He would create for his creatures, and the graces that they needed to save their souls.
Here is a "Molinist" study and comparison between Molinism and Banezism:
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4752&context=masters_theses

[Michael Wilson]

Also, there have been several threads on this forum dealing with the subject in the "Sacred Sciences" section. Just look up the poster: Quaremerepulistis and go to his page and click on "show posts"; He would be the main critic of the Banezian system here.

[ChairmanJoeAintMyPrez]

Propositions 5 and 6 are where the argument breaks down.

There is no unrealized potential within God.  He does not exist in one state and then make a "choice" which results in His existing in a different, more realized state.

Aside from that, He necessarily has perfect knowledge of all of His actions--past, present, and future--because to assert something contrary would mean that He is either not omniscient or that He is bound by time.

[james03]

The argument lacks due to imprecision with the term "cause".  God is the First Cause.  He is not the efficient cause of all things. 

But man, judging about his course of action by the power of reason, can also judge about his own decision inasmuch as he knows the meaning of an end and of a means to an end, and the relationship of the one with reference to the other. Thus he is his own cause not only in moving but also in judging. He is therefore endowed with free choice—that is to say, with a free judgment about acting or not acting.

[Michael Wilson]

Premise #1: "If Molinism is true, then God has prevolitional (or middle) knowledge of what creatures would freely do."
God does have such knowledge, because He demonstrated it in Sacred Scripture: 1. When David who was fleeing from Saul, consulted God on whether Saul would come down and besiege the town of Ceila and whether the inhabitants of the town would hand him over to Saul: (I Kg. 23)

.  10 And David said: O Lord God of Israel, thy servant hath heard a report, that Saul designeth to come to Ceila, to destroy the city for my sake:
11 Will the men of Ceila deliver me into his hands? and will Saul come down, as thy servant hath heard? O Lord God of Israel, tell thy servant. And the Lord said: He will come down.  12 And David said: Will the men of Ceila deliver me, and my men, into the hands of Saul? And the Lord said: They will deliver thee up.

David and his men then fled from the town, so that neither the besieging of the town nor the handing over of David happened.
2.In the New Testament the example of Our Lord upbraiding the cities of Galilee for their hard-hardness in not converting because of the miracles He worked there and His preaching: [Matt. 11]

20 Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein were done the most of his miracles, for that they had not done penance.
21 Woe to thee, Corozain, woe to thee, Bethsaida: for if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes  [Matthew 11:21]  22 But I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment, than for you.  23 And thou Capharnaum, shalt thou be exalted up to heaven? thou shalt go down even unto hell. For if in Sodom had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in thee, perhaps it had remained unto this day.

Our Lord tells us that He knows not only the events that happened, but even the events that would have happened under different circumstances.

[Michael]

Our Lord tells us that He knows not only the events that happened, but even the events that would have happened under different circumstances.

The Thomist and Molinist agree that God has knowledge of creaturely counterfactuals. The Molinist believes that this knowledge is prevolitional (prior to God's decree): middle knowledge.

[Melkite]

How similar is Molinism to Arminianism?  In what ways do they differ?

[james03]

The Arminians were part of an internal Prot dispute, so I'm not up on all the ins-and-outs.

I suspect that the difference is that the Molinists accept Predestination, and the Arminians do not.

[Melkite]

The Arminians were part of an internal Prot dispute, so I'm not up on all the ins-and-outs.

I suspect that the difference is that the Molinists accept Predestination, and the Arminians do not.

Can Molinist acceptance of predestination be defined simply?  If so, do Molinists believe that predestination is nothing more than God's foreknowledge?  If not, is that an acceptable view?  Not what Thomists think is true, but actually acceptable or condemned by the Church?  What is required of a Catholic to believe about predestination?

In previous discussions with people about Thomistic predestination, I'm left with the sense that singular predestination cannot be anything other than effective double predestination.  And this is very upsetting to me.  But I don't know that I am understanding it correctly, or that it even was explained to me correctly (partially because I've heard from different people, both that efficient grace is successful sufficient grace and that efficient grace is an entirely different grace from sufficient grace).

[james03]

Thomistic predestination:

Thus he is his own cause not only in moving but also in judging. He is therefore endowed with free choice—that is to say, with a free judgment about acting or not acting.

Can Molinist acceptance of predestination be defined simply?

Molinists would say that God incorporates Man's free will choice in His Sovereign Plan. 

[Melkite]

Thomistic predestination:

Thus he is his own cause not only in moving but also in judging. He is therefore endowed with free choice—that is to say, with a free judgment about acting or not acting.

This is where I think Thomism runs into a double predestination problem.  The choice not to act is itself an act.  If God chooses not to give someone efficient grace, and it is only with efficient grace that one can choose to follow God, then God is effectively predestining to hell.

[james03]

God gives graces to all men.  Those who freely choose not to cooperate, reject His Grace.  For some, God can give even more graces, even a miracle, like give them a vision, and bring them to repent and be saved.

Here's something to consider.  Assuming Hitler is in hell, Hitler was baptized as a Catholic and would have gone straight to heaven if he died of a childhood illness, which weren't uncommon.  But God didn't kill him, and later Hitler rejected Grace and even rejected Faith itself.

Those who are saved are saved according to Divine Providence, and those who are left in their sin are also according to Divine Providence.  But all who are lost freely chose to reject God's Grace.

[Melkite]

Those who are saved are saved according to Divine Providence, and those who are left in their sin are also according to Divine Providence.  But all who are lost freely chose to reject God's Grace.

I don't see how those who are lost could have freely chosen to reject God's grace if it was also according to his providence that they were left in sin, since God's Providence is infallible.  Unless that providential choice didn't take place (at least, logically) until the person committed their first mortal sin?

[james03]

I don't see how those who are lost could have freely chosen to reject God's grace

The have free will.  They choose not to cooperate.  There is no coercion on them.  And by Divine Providence, God leaves them in this state.

Didn't Hitler have free will, even though God chose to allow him to survive childhood, knowing that he would later reject Grace and reject the Faith?