Competing Definitions of Free Will

[INPEFESS]

The more I study the difference between the Thomistic approach to predestination and the Molinistic approach to predestination the more I am convinced that the entire dispute (between the Dominicans and the Jesuits) may be reduced to their mutual disagreement on the very definition of free will; all other disagreements seem to proceed from this. This thread is intended to analyze only the specific disagreement between these two schools and not to analyze those disagreements that exist between these schools and any other school.

In this poll, I ask voters to choose (with their free will!), after careful thought and analysis, the definition which is closer to their own understanding of free will, whether gleaned from their Catholic education and upbringing or from their own personal theological study up until this time.

For those who, realizing there might be more to these definitions than meets the eye, are reluctant to answer, I will provide a brief explanation of these definitions as well as these definitions' consequent relationship to the question of the intrinsic efficacy of grace. Both of these definitions (and their brief explanations) are taken from a noteworthy theological work that contrasts them.

An explanation of the first definition is as follows:

Let us dwell on this definition. Reason proposes an object which, here and now, is in one way good but in some other way not good. Faced with such an object the will can choose it or refuse it. The will, as faculty, has potential indifference; as act, it has actual indifference. Even when the will actually chooses such an object, even when it is already determined to will it, it still goes freely toward it, with its dominating indifference no longer potential but actual. Indeed, in God, who is supremely free, there is no potential indifference, but only an actual and active indifference. Freedom arises from the disproportion which exists between the will, specifically distinguished and necessitated by universal good, and this or that limited and particular good, good in one way, not good in another way.

An explanation of the second definition is as follows:

What ... [is meant] by the phrase "granting all prerequisites for acting"? ... [T]he phrase includes, not merely what is prerequired by priority of time, but also what is prerequired by priority of nature and causality. It includes therefore the actual grace received at the very moment of performing a salutary act. Hence this definition ... does not mean that the free will, under efficacious grace, preserves the power of resisting even while, in fact, it never does resist. What it does mean is this: Grace is not of itself efficacious, it is efficacious only by our own consent, pre-known by God (pre-known by God's scientia media of future conditional things).

For those who are already familiar with these positions, I do not expect you to vote as though you do not know which definition belongs to which school; however, for those who are not familiar with these positions, I ask you kindly to vote according to your own understanding and catechesis before researching which definition belongs to which school and before reading any comments on this thread, so as to eliminate as much bias as possible.

Once you have voted, please feel free to debate which definition is the truer!

[Penelope]

Can you elaborate on the use of the word 'indifference' in the first definition?

[ts aquinas]

Once you have voted, please feel free to debate which definition is the truer!

May we assert our school's definition to the debate and discuss it or is this restrictive to the two options?

[INPEFESS]

Once you have voted, please feel free to debate which definition is the truer!

May we assert our school's definition to the debate and discuss it or is this restrictive to the two options?

Do you mean one of the two definitions above or do you mean a different definition from a different school?

[INPEFESS]

Can you elaborate on the use of the word 'indifference' in the first definition?

Yes, that is the key word, isn't it? I have struggled to understand this use of the word for a while.

I think the closest way to define it in this context (being familiar with this particular theologian's proposition) is "non-necessitating" or rather "non-necessitation."

Using the paragraph provided as part of his own definition of what this means in reference to the will's faculty of choice, a more complete definition of the indifference of the will is the "disproportion which exists between the will, specifically distinguished and necessitated by universal good, and this or that limited and particular good, good in one way, not good in another way." It is by because of this disproportion that the will is said be be indifferent; it is from this disproportion that freedom arises.

[Penelope]

Can you elaborate on the use of the word 'indifference' in the first definition?

Yes, that is the key word, isn't it? I have struggled to understand this use of the word for a while.

I think the closest way to define it in this context (being familiar with this particular theologian's proposition) is "non-necessitating" or rather "non-necessitation."

Using the paragraph provided as part of his own definition of what this means in reference to the will's faculty of choice, a more complete definition of the indifference of the will is the "disproportion which exists between the will, specifically distinguished and necessitated by universal good, and this or that limited and particular good, good in one way, not good in another way." It is by because of this disproportion that the will is said be be indifferent; it is from this disproportion that freedom arises.

Thanks. Both of these definitions are really stretching my ability to even comprehend the use of the words in the sentences, let alone understand what they mean all together. This may well be above my capacity for philosophical thinking. If I could be permitted to dumb it down a bit, is the first one saying that when faced with a choice, X, we are free to either choose X or to not choose X and that there is nothing forcing us to choose X even though God already knows what our choice is?

[ts aquinas]

Once you have voted, please feel free to debate which definition is the truer!

May we assert our school's definition to the debate and discuss it or is this restrictive to the two options?

Do you mean one of the two definitions above or do you mean a different definition from a different school?

Never-mind, the explanation of "indifference" cleared the air. Though it might be better, in my opinion, if the theologian considered explaining it as a second potentiality. I'll refrain from voting.

[INPEFESS]

Once you have voted, please feel free to debate which definition is the truer!

May we assert our school's definition to the debate and discuss it or is this restrictive to the two options?

Do you mean one of the two definitions above or do you mean a different definition from a different school?

Never-mind, the explanation of "indifference" cleared the air. Though it might be better, in my opinion, if the theologian considered explaining it as a second potentiality.

Interestingly enough, the theologian actually never explains his use of the word; it is assumed the reader understands his application of the word based on a conceptual grasp of this particular theological position. Indifference in this context simply refers to the property of the will whereby it is not necessitated by the object proposed by the reason, since the good object proposed is not good in every respect and thus does not completely satisfy the will's capacity for universal good, which is the will's adequate object and principle of action.

I'll refrain from voting.

Why? I was truly hoping you would vote. This thread is not only for the learned and theologically astute; this thread is for everyone who has an opinion to give on the matter, even if they don't quite understand all the theological nuances. This thread is to get an understanding of what we were taught free will is and how that definition affects our approach to other teachings of the Church.

[OCLittleFlower]

I would say that the second definition is closer to how I understand free will, though I'm not saying I'm right.  The first one is hard to wrap my head around for the reasons Penelope stated.

[ts aquinas]

Once you have voted, please feel free to debate which definition is the truer!

May we assert our school's definition to the debate and discuss it or is this restrictive to the two options?

Do you mean one of the two definitions above or do you mean a different definition from a different school?

Never-mind, the explanation of "indifference" cleared the air. Though it might be better, in my opinion, if the theologian considered explaining it as a second potentiality.

Interestingly enough, the theologian actually never explains his use of the word; it is assumed the reader understands his application of the word based on a conceptual grasp of this particular theological position. Indifference in this context simply refers to the property of the will whereby it is not necessitated by the object proposed by the reason, since the good object proposed is not good in every respect and thus does not completely satisfy the will's capacity for universal good, which is the will's adequate object and principle of action.

I'll refrain from voting.

Why? I was truly hoping you would vote. This thread is not only for the learned and theologically astute; this thread is for everyone who has an opinion to give on the matter, even if they don't quite understand all the theological nuances. This thread is to get an understanding of what we were taught free will is and how that definition affects our approach to other teachings of the Church.

I was just keeping this in mind, "For those who are already familiar with these positions, I do not expect you to vote as though you do not know which definition belongs to which school." But I'll vote now.


ps. Did you get my PM?

[Penelope]

I would say that the second definition is closer to how I understand free will, though I'm not saying I'm right.  The first one is hard to wrap my head around for the reasons Penelope stated.

Likewise, so that's how I voted. But really, my grasp of this entire concept is less than tenuous.

[Pheo]

Man's freedom and his free will allow him to choose the good.  Evil choices are not free in any proper sense since they make us slaves to sin...or at least that's my (limited) understanding of it.  So I went with the first choice.

[Penelope]

Man's freedom and his free will allow him to choose the good.  Evil choices are not free in any proper sense since they make us slaves to sin...or at least that's my (limited) understanding of it.  So I went with the first choice.

This is probably a basic question, but how is that true freedom of the will, then?

[INPEFESS]

ps. Did you get my PM?

Thanks for voting!

Yes, I got your PM; I apologize for not responding. I am thinking about it more before I choose how to reply.

[INPEFESS]

Assuming that those who read this thread voted before reading the thread, I think it it is safe to disclose which definition belongs to which school, for those who are not aware.

The first definition belongs to the Thomistic school, while the latter definition belongs to the Molinistic school. Here is the text from which the explanations were cited, as well as the simplified Thomistic perspective of both of them:

CH29: THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL

[...]

This teaching on the nature of human intelligence leads us to the nature of human freedom. [665] Of this freedom there are two opposed definitions, one Thomistic, the other, Molinistic. Molina [666] gives this definition: That agent is free, who, granting all prerequisites for acting, can either act or not act. Now this definition, standard among Molinists, however simple and satisfactory it seems at first sight, is in reality linked necessarily with Molina's theory of scientia media. [667].

What does Molina mean by the phrase "granting all prerequisites for acting"? His explanations show that the phrase includes, not merely what is prerequired by priority of time, but also what is prerequired by priority of nature and causality. It includes therefore the actual grace received at the very moment of performing a salutary act. Hence this definition, Molina explains, does not mean that the free will, under efficacious grace, preserves the power of resisting even while, in fact, it never does resist. What it does mean is this: Grace is not of itself efficacious, it is efficacious only by our own consent, pre-known by God (pre-known by God's scientia media of future conditional things).

Molina's definition, in the eyes of Thomists, is defective because it leaves out of consideration the object which specifically distinguishes the free act. It neglects the fundamental principle, that all faculties, habits,and acts are what they are by their specific relation to their respective object.

Now if, on the contrary, we consider the specific object of free will, we will recall the words of St. Thomas: "If we set before the will an object, which from any point of view is not good, the will is not drawn to it by necessity." [668] These words contain, equivalently, the Thomistic definition of free will which runs thus: [669] Freedom is the will's dominative indifference in relation to any object which reason proposes as in any way lacking in good.

Let us dwell on this definition. Reason proposes an object which, here and now, is in one way good but in some other way not good. Faced with such an object the will can choose it or refuse it. The will, as faculty, has potential indifference; as act, it has actual indifference. Even when the will actually chooses such an object, even when it is already determined to will it, it still goes freely toward it, with its dominating indifference no longer potential but actual. Indeed, in God, who is supremely free, there is no potential indifference, but only an actual and active indifference. Freedom arises from the disproportion which exists between the will, specifically distinguished and necessitated by universal good, and this or that limited and particular good, good in one way, not good in another way.

Against Suarez, Thomists pronounce thus: It is impossible that God, even by His absolute power, could necessitate the will to choose an object which reason proposes as indifferent. Why? Because it is self-contradictory, that the will should necessarily will an object which reason says is in some way not good, and which therefore is absolutely disproportioned to the only object which can necessitate the will. [670].

Here enters the twenty-first of the twenty-four theses. [671] "The will follows, it does not precede the intellect. And the will necessarily wills only that object which is presented to it as good from every angle, leaving nothing to be desired. But the will chooses freely between good things presented by mutable judgment. Hence choice follows indeed the last practical judgment,but it is the will which makes that judgment to be the last."

How does the will make the last practical judgment to be the last? It does this by accepting it as last, instead of turning to a new consideration which would result in an opposed practical judgment. Intellect and will are thus reciprocally related, with a kind of matrimonial relation, since voluntary consent, ending deliberation, accepts the judgment here and now present as last. Intellectual direction is indispensable, since the will is of itself blind: nothing can be willed unless foreknown as good.

Suarez, [672] on the contrary, following Scotus, maintains that voluntary choice is not necessarily preceded by a practical judgment immediately directive. The will, when faced with two good objects, equally or unequally good, can, he says, freely choose either of them, even though the intellect does not propose that one as here and now the better. Using their principle as measuring-stick, Thomists reply: Nothing can be preferred here and now, unless foreknown as here and now better. That something not really better can here and now be judged better depends, of course, on the evil disposition of man's appetites,intellectual and sensitive. [673].

We have elsewhere examined at great length this problem: [674] the special antinomies relative to freedom; the reciprocal influence of the last practical judgment and free choice; comparison of Thomist doctrine with the psychological determinism of Leibnitz, on the one hand, and on the other, with the voluntarism of Scotus, followed partly by Suarez.

In a brief word, the essential thing for St. Thomas is that the intellect and will are not coordinated, but mutually subordinated. The last practical judgment is free when its object (good from one viewpoint, not good from another) does not necessitate it. Freedom of will, to speak properly, is to be found in the indifference of judgment.

I hope this explanation helps elucidate the use of the word "indifference" (which, I admit, is somewhat obscure) in this context.

This thread is not meant to be a theological "pop quiz," as it were; rather, it is meant as a sort of impromptu survey of how we understand free will.

My contention (and suspicion) is that most Catholics of the 20th and 21st centuries (traditionalists, conservatives, and liberals alike) were raised thoroughly Molinistic in our thought, which tends toward a Pelagianistic view of salvation (thus tending toward a deep-rooted and almost insurmountable and undetectable spiritual pride).

I, too, was catechized with a thoroughly Molinistic view of free will, which is one of the reasons I am curious  to see how others were catechized in this regard.