Perry Robinson's Argument Regarding Divine Simplicity and Its Implications

[LouisIX]

Q: Do you recognize the distinction between a necessity of consequent and a necessity of consequence or do you reject it? I think that this is a central point of conflict.

[Quaremerepulisti]

What is willed is willed with a single act of will.  If it were more than one act of will, there would be multiplicity in God.  Granted.

This act of will is God's essence.  If God's will were distinct from His essence, there would again be multiplicity in God.  Granted.

And St. Thomas maintains both of the above.

But this forces the conclusion that God's willing everything that He wills (including X) is His essence.

St. Thomas doesn't like this, so he attempts to avoid the conclusion by arguing that it must be impossible.

I think St. Thomas deals with this problem most clearly here:

No, he doesn't.  He proves that multiplicity of things willed doesn't entail multiplicity in God.  That's already granted.

God only wills one thing with absolute necessity: His own goodness/being.

But if His being is distinct from His willing His being, then His being is metaphysically prior to His willing His being, which is a contradiction.  His Being is identical to is His willing His being.

All other things that He wills He wills without absolute necessity, and these many objects of His will are all contained under the single object of His own divine goodness/being.

And again, His goodness is identical to His being, and you can't say that He wills finite goods for the end of willing His being, for they do not and cannot contribute one iota to it.

So Him willing me to exist right now is physically the same act as His willing His own being, i.e. He wills me through His own essence. However, this does not mean that His willing my existence is absolutely identical to His essence, but it is only suppositionally identical to His essence, i.e. it so happens that His willing my existence right now is His essence (together with everything else that He has ever willed and will ever will in eternity), but God could have, hypothetically, chosen to will His goodness another way: by not willing my existence, or by not even willing the world's existence; and as such God's willing of my existence or the world's existence is not an absolute necessity, and not absolutely identical to His will/essence.

But then His essence would have been different.  And that's impossible, since His essence is identical to His existence.

Like I said earlier, the artists production of many paintings can be understood as a single act of the will to paint.

No, they can't, not for a finite creature.  God is different, granted.

Similarly, God's production of all things in the world is understood to be a single act of His willing His own essence/goodness/being, not that any particular thing necessarily must be produced by His willing His own essence, anymore than any particular painting must follow from the painter's general will to paint.

But again, His willing His own goodness/being is His being.

St. Thomas admits that God's willing of X is a suppositional necessity, so I imagine that the whole issue boils down to the distinction between absolute and suppositional necessity.

This doesn't help.  Suppositional necessity = it cannot change.  Absolute necessity = it could not be otherwise than it is.

[Quaremerepulisti]

1.  If God is simple, His existence (also identical to His essence) is identical to His will to create this world.
2.  God is simple.
3.  Therefore, His existence is identical to His will to create this world.
4.  His existence is necessary.
5.  Therefore, His will to create this world is necessary.
6.  Therefore, this world is necessary.  (IOW, modal collapse.)

So Robinson is using equivocal senses of "is", here:
1.  If God is simple, His existence is identical to His will to create this world.
and here
4.  His existence is necessary.

It should read:
God's existence is suppositionally identical to His will to create this world.
and
God's existence is absolutely necessary.

No, he is not.  He means absolutely identical and absolutely necessary.

[Quaremerepulisti]

Q: Do you recognize the distinction between a necessity of consequent and a necessity of consequence or do you reject it? I think that this is a central point of conflict.

I recognize the distinction, but it is a red herring here.

Perry Robinson's argument does not regard necessity of supposition, but absolute necessity. 

And it does not regard necessity of consequence, but necessity of consequent.

I repeat:

1.  God's willing everything that He wills is identical to a single act of will with an absolute necessity.
2.  God's act of will is identical to His essence with an absolute necessity.
3.  God's essence is identical to His existence with an absolute necessity.
4.  God's existence is necessary with an absolute necessity.
5.  Therefore, God wills everything that He wills with an absolute necessity.

The argument is valid.  4 follows from God being ipsum esse subsistens.  3 follows from Divine simplicity.  1 follows from Divine simplicity, since multiple acts of will would be a multiplicity in God.  2 also follows from Divine simplicity.

[John Lamb]

1.  God's willing everything that He wills is identical to a single act of will with an absolute necessity.
2.  God's act of will is identical to His essence with an absolute necessity.
3.  God's essence is identical to His existence with an absolute necessity.
4.  God's existence is necessary with an absolute necessity.
5.  Therefore, God wills everything that He wills with an absolute necessity.

The argument is valid.

How does 5 follow from 1,2,3,4?

1. If God wills everything that He wills with a single act of will with an absolute necessity, then God wills everything that He wills with an absolute necessity.
2. God wills everything that He wills with a single act of will with an absolute necessity.
3. Therefore, God wills everything that He wills with an absolute necessity.

Is this your argument?

[Quaremerepulisti]

1.  God's willing everything that He wills is identical to a single act of will with an absolute necessity.
2.  God's act of will is identical to His essence with an absolute necessity.
3.  God's essence is identical to His existence with an absolute necessity.
4.  God's existence is necessary with an absolute necessity.
5.  Therefore, God wills everything that He wills with an absolute necessity.

The argument is valid.

How does 5 follow from 1,2,3,4?

It is of the form: A is identical to B.  B is identical to C.  C is identical to D.  D is absolutely necessary.  Therefore, A is absolutely necessary.

[LouisIX]

1.  God's willing everything that He wills is identical to a single act of will with an absolute necessity.
2.  God's act of will is identical to His essence with an absolute necessity.
3.  God's essence is identical to His existence with an absolute necessity.
4.  God's existence is necessary with an absolute necessity.
5.  Therefore, God wills everything that He wills with an absolute necessity.

The argument is valid.

How does 5 follow from 1,2,3,4?

1. If God wills everything that He wills with a single act of will with an absolute necessity, then God wills everything that He wills with an absolute necessity.
2. God wills everything that He wills with a single act of will with an absolute necessity.
3. Therefore, God wills everything that He wills with an absolute necessity.

Is this your argument?

Q, isn't your first premise begging the question? It seems to state the same thing as the conclusion in line 5.

What is the necessity that you speak of in that first premise? A necessity of execution or a necessity of being willed? The latter would certainly be rejected by a Thomist given the divine transcendence.

[John Lamb]

It is of the form: A is identical to B.  B is identical to C.  C is identical to D.  D is absolutely necessary.  Therefore, A is absolutely necessary.

Yes, but nobody disputes that A is absolutely necessary. Your A is precisely what St. Thomas says.

[Quaremerepulisti]

Q, isn't your first premise begging the question? It seems to state the same thing as the conclusion in line 5.

No, it states God's willing is a single act, even if multiple things are willed.

What is the necessity that you speak of in that first premise? A necessity of execution or a necessity of being willed? The latter would certainly be rejected by a Thomist given the divine transcendence.

It is a metaphysical necessity derived from Divine simplicity.  (If there are multiple acts of will, there would be multiplicity in God.)

[Quaremerepulisti]

It is of the form: A is identical to B.  B is identical to C.  C is identical to D.  D is absolutely necessary.  Therefore, A is absolutely necessary.

Yes, but nobody disputes that A is absolutely necessary. Your A is precisely what St. Thomas says.

No, St. Thomas denies that God wills everything He wills with absolute necessity.

But,

A = God's willing everything that He wills.
B = Single act of God.
C = God's essence.
D = God's existence.

Since D is necessary, and A, B, C, and D are identical, A is likewise necessary.

[LouisIX]

Q, isn't your first premise begging the question? It seems to state the same thing as the conclusion in line 5.

No, it states God's willing is a single act, even if multiple things are willed.

What is the necessity that you speak of in that first premise? A necessity of execution or a necessity of being willed? The latter would certainly be rejected by a Thomist given the divine transcendence.

It is a metaphysical necessity derived from Divine simplicity.  (If there are multiple acts of will, there would be multiplicity in God.)

But there aren't multiple acts of will, as St. Thomas states. However, that is the case under the condition that God wills this created order. That He wills this created order does not necessitate that He had to, however, nor does it change the fact that He might have willed a different order. That's why I'm not understanding your claim that God willing this created order makes it necessary and part of the divine will as such. That's a leap that I don't think has been fully unpacked.

[John Lamb]

No, St. Thomas denies that God wills everything He wills with absolute necessity.

A isn't "God wills everything He wills with absolute necessity", A is:

God's willing everything that He wills is identical to a single act of will with an absolute necessity.

St. Thomas affirms that "God willing everything that He wills is identical to a single act of will (with absolute necessity)."
He denies "God wills everything He wills with absolute necessity."
Just because God wills everything with a single act of His will with absolute necessity, does not mean that every individual object of that single act of will is willed with absolute necessity, at least according to St. Thomas. The only absolutely necessary object of this single act of the will is God's own goodness; objects X, Y, Z, etc., are all contained under this single act of willing His own goodness, and are only necessary with a necessity of supposition. Precisely because X, Y, Z, etc., are not absolutely necessary for God's own goodness/being, is why they are not absolutely necessary objects of God's will; X, Y, Z, etc., are simply how God has happened to chose to communicate His absolutely necessary goodness to creatures, and seeing as God is an eternal & immutable Being, X, Y, Z, etc., become necessary by supposition.

[Quaremerepulisti]

A isn't "God wills everything He wills with absolute necessity", A is:

God's willing everything that He wills is identical to a single act of will with an absolute necessity.

No, it isn't.  The form of the argument is:

A (God's willing everything that He wills) is identical to B (God's single act of will).
B (God's single act of will) is identical to C (God's essence).
C (God's essence) is identical to D (God's existence)
D (God's existence) is absolutely necessary.
Therefore, since D (God's existence) is identical to A (God's willing everything that He wills), and since D (God's existence) is absolutely necessary, A (God's willing everything that He wills) is absolutely necessary.

This argument is valid.  If you deny the conclusion you must deny one of the premises.

St. Thomas affirms that "God willing everything that He wills is identical to a single act of will (with absolute necessity)."
He denies "God wills everything He wills with absolute necessity."

Yes, I know he denies that, but it logically follows from his affirmation, as I have shown, as that single act of will is itself identical to God's existence, which St. Thomas himself admits.  He is therefore contradicting himself.

Just because God wills everything with a single act of His will with absolute necessity, does not mean that every individual object of that single act of will is willed with absolute necessity, at least according to St. Thomas. The only absolutely necessary object of this single act of the will is God's own goodness; objects X, Y, Z, etc., are all contained under this single act of willing His own goodness, and are only necessary with a necessity of supposition. Precisely because X, Y, Z, etc., are not absolutely necessary for God's own goodness/being, is why they are not absolutely necessary objects of God's will; X, Y, Z, etc., are simply how God has happened to chose to communicate His absolutely necessary goodness to creatures, and seeing as God is an eternal & immutable Being, X, Y, Z, etc., become necessary by supposition.

Yes, I know he argues this, but this is easily refuted.  God's essential goodness is identical to God's being, which is identical to His willing his being.  Clearly, objects X, Y, and Z have nothing whatsoever to do with God's being, as He is absolutely not ontologically dependent on them or anything else.  They can absolutely not be contained in His act of willing His being (granted that this is absolutely necessary), because they have absolutely nothing to do with it. 

If we mean God's "accidental goodness" (which means creaturely goodness, a goodness analogous to God's essential goodness, and one which reflects God's essential goodness) then sure, obviously willing good in creatures is a means for willing this end, but this good is nevertheless in itself outside of God.

And God can will something necessarily without being ontologically dependent on it.  God necessarily wills the truth that 2 + 2 = 4.  There are no possible worlds in which 2 + 2 = 5.  2 + 2 = 4 is a necessary truth.  Yet it is not the case that God is "bound" not to create any world in which 2 + 2 = 5, as though this truth were independent of Himself.  It is God's nature to will that 2 + 2 = 4, for He is Truth itself.

[Quaremerepulisti]

But there aren't multiple acts of will, as St. Thomas states. However, that is the case under the condition that God wills this created order. That He wills this created order does not necessitate that He had to, however, nor does it change the fact that He might have willed a different order. That's why I'm not understanding your claim that God willing this created order makes it necessary and part of the divine will as such. That's a leap that I don't think has been fully unpacked.

Fine, but first please admit that the argument is valid and all the premises are mandated by Divine simplicity.  Or, if you deny one of the premises, please explain which one and why.

I could put the problem another way: what do the First and Second Ways actually prove, when they end with "and this all men call God."  If God's existence is (or is a sufficient condition for Him being) the First Mover or First Cause (of X, Y, or Z), then the motion and causation are necessary.  But if God's existence is only a necessary condition for Him being First Mover or First Cause, then what in fact makes Him so?  It can't be something outside of Himself, for then He would not be unmoved or uncaused, and would be ontologically dependent.  But if something else in Himself constitutes a sufficient condition for Him being First Mover or First Cause, what makes that something else that way (and on to infinity)?

[John Lamb]

A (God's willing everything that He wills) is identical to B (God's single act of will).

False premise. Nothing that God wills is identical to His will, except His own goodness. God's willing X is not identical to His will/essence/existence. God wills many objects with a single will, and only that single will itself is His essence. It would lead to pantheism if it were true that the many objects of God's will were His essence, or that His willing them were identical to His essence. If it were not true that God willed many objects with a single act of will, He would have many acts and no longer be simple; He would also be changeable. Palamism says that God's essence is simple and unchangeable, but that His acts or energies are multiple and changeable. Thomism says that God is one immutable act/energy and that this one act/energy is identical to His essence; Palamism that there are multiple divine & mutable energies distinct from the divine & immutable essence. It's strange in that Palamism leads to an exaggerated immanentism in regards to the divine energy (Palamas thought that He could see the light of God's divine energies with his own eyes), and an exaggerated transcendentalism in regards to the divine essence (Palamas denied the beatific vision, saying that the vision of the essence of God is impossible). I think that God is neither as close or as far away as Palamas would have Him.