Tobacco & Temperance

[TerrorDæmonum]

Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh. For if you live according to the flesh, you shall die: but if by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.

Therefore, if you be risen with Christ, seek the things that are above; where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God: Mind the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth. For you are dead; and your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ shall appear, who is your life, then you also shall appear with him in glory. Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, lust, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is the service of idols.

Article 1. Whether human virtue is a habit?

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits.

I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.

Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above (I-II:49:4). Therefore human virtues are habits.

Article 3. Whether human virtue is a good habit?

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise."

I answer that, As we have said above (Article 1), virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works.

Article 1. Whether vice is contrary to virtue?

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality which makes its subject good," as was shown above (Question 55, Articles 3 and 4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue—the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its nature." That which virtue implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above (I-II:56:3).

Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is "vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice."

Article 2. Whether vice is contrary to nature?

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above (Article 1). Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing "vituperated," which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14).

But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.

Article 3. Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?

On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious habit.

I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since "the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so."

On The Cardinal Virtues

56 Q. Name the Cardinal Virtues.
A. The Cardinal Virtues are Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance.

57 Q. Why are Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance called Cardinal virtues?
A. Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance are called cardinal virtues because all the moral virtues are founded and hinged around them.

61 Q. What is temperance?
A. Temperance disposes us to control the inordinate desires that please the senses and makes us use temporal goods with moderation.

Article 1. Whether temperance is a virtue?

On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the name of a virtue."

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:55:3), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance is a virtue.

Article 3. Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.) that "it is temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under control."

I answer that, As stated above (123, 12; II-II:136:1), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's passions is twofold, as stated above (I-II:23:2), when we were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils.

The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.

On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.

Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the aforesaid pleasures.

Article 1. Whether gluttony is a sin?

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat." But man's inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.

I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.

Article 4. Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), gluttony denotes inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"—i.e. costly food; as regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely—i.e. "daintily"; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much."

Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating "greedily."

Isidore [De Summo Bon. ii, 42 comprises the first and second under one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in "what" he eats, or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats."

Article 9. Whether an individual action can be indifferent?

On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of judgment" (Matthew 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good or bad. For the same reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.

I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (Article 3), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.

[AlNg]

I have seen many priests smoking tobacco. Further i have not heard a sermon saying that cigaret smoking is sinful. Although it seems to me that cigaret smoking, inasmuch as it can cause cancer, would be a sin since you are harming your body and we are supposed to take care of our health?

[Melkor]

As someone who enjoys tobacco (I don't ever smoke cigarettes) quite frequently, and in different forms, I feel that I can speak on this with some experience.

Smoking cigarettes hardly classifies as tobacco usage. The amount of chemicals that they have, combined with inhaling the smoke, makes it a very bad habit, health wise. I'd assume that smoking cigarettes without moderation is a sin, simply because of how bad they are for you.

Cigars and pipes are different in that the smoke is not inhaled, and consequently the amount of nicotine absorbed is less. There's not much evidence to suggest that cigar and pipe smoking is harmful to your health. Provided that you're not spending outside of your means to acquire said cigars, I truly think that there is no sin in moderate cigars and pipe usage.

Smokeless tobacco, also know as dip, chew, snus etc is a little more interesting. One dip has roughly the same amount of nicotine as 6ish cigarettes. (Oh yeah, pack a bomb and your head will explode 😁)So if you have an addictive personality, it's probably best to be a little cautious when it comes to the stuff. It is, however, relatively inexpensive compared to cigarettes. I dip roughly a tin a week, which is about 8 bucks CAD. It's even cheaper in the States. Well within most peoples' means. Another plus is that there are few reports of actual oral cancer, despite what the media and FDA will tell you. It's just not that bad for you, period. I never feel like I 'need' a dip, and have gone periods without it quite comfortably. YMMV

I posted this because the poll options were limited in scope and vague.

Edit: and yeah, proper usage seems to me to be a virtue, the virtue of moderation and gratitude. Who doesn't throw in a fat hog and thank God for the wonderful gift of tobacco at the same time?

[Heinrich]

The only reason the OP is making this post is because his (effective) bete noir talked recently about chewing the chaw. That's why he spoke from the catheter about Realpolitik since another one of his justified critics used the term to delineate a legitimate reference. There have been other instances. The guy really believes he is right 100% of forever.

[Jmartyr]

I am sure the majority of us have bibles, catechisms, etc. My priest does a good job of preaching and teaching. Don't need another.

[andy]

I absolutely love my pipe which I smoke daily.

[red solo cup]

I absolutely love my pipe which I smoke daily.

Are you addicted?

[Jmartyr]

I could use a cig right now.

[andy]

I absolutely love my pipe which I smoke daily.

Are you addicted?

Wait an hour, I need to finish my bowl

[Heinrich]

Copenhagen fine cut was great.

[andy]

I absolutely love my pipe which I smoke daily.

Are you addicted?

Wait an hour, I need to finish my bowl

So what is your concern? Do you doubt the judgment of my confessor?

[Jmartyr]

We all do. 

[Melkor]

Copenhagen fine cut was great.

Fine cut? That tiny-cut stuff with the texture of sand? Nah, long cut is where it's at. 

[Jmartyr]

Copenhagen fine cut was great.

Fine cut? That tiny-cut stuff with the texture of sand? Nah, long cut is where it's at. 

I would throw up with either one, lol.

[Heinrich]

Copenhagen fine cut was great.

Fine cut? That tiny-cut stuff with the texture of sand? Nah, long cut is where it's at. 

Millenial.