Theory about The Crisis and the chaos

[james03]

It's a question of God infallibly causing rational creatures to voluntarily follow him - which, in the case of sinners, means Him infallibly causing their voluntary repentance. 

Can God do this, yes or no?  Again, if you answer "no", time to turn in your traditionalist card.

CAN He?  Yes He can.  But you leave out some things:

1.  An outcome.
2.  Greek Realism vs. Dualism.

Can God change things and expect the same outcome?  No, because He is Truth.

[Non Nobis]

In fact, the will lacks efficacious grace because it resists sufficient grace; but if its resists sufficient grace, this is not because it lacks efficacious grace; its own deficiency suffices as a cause of such resistance. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 3 ad 2: "The first cause of this deficiency of grace is on our part, but the first cause of the conferring of grace is on the part of God, according to the words: 'Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me."' There would indeed be a vicious circle in Thomism if of the two following propositions the second were true: Man is deprived of efficacious grace because he resists sufficient grace, and man resists sufficient grace because he lacks efficacious grace. Of course, the second statement is false; if it were true, man would sin from the insufficiency of divine help, sin would then be inevitable and would therefore no longer be sin. In truth, man does not sin on account of insufficient help or of any divine neglect, but because of his own deficiency.

https://www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/grace7.htm

Thinking aloud..

It seems some would say to God: "God, well yes it is my fault that I resisted, but You COULD have stopped me with Your efficacious grace.  It is just not FAIR or loving for you to leave me to the evil I myself will".  If God gave enough efficacious (= never failing) grace to all nobody would ever sin (sufficient grace would never be resisted).  But God does permit sin, allowing some to truly resist, showing they have free will that is not fixed in God in this life.

[John Lamb]

It seems some would say to God: "God, well yes it is my fault that I resisted, but You COULD have stopped me with Your efficacious grace.  It is just not FAIR or loving for you to leave me to the evil I myself will".  If God gave enough efficacious (= never failing) grace to all nobody would ever sin (sufficient grace would never be resisted).

St. Paul anticipates this response:

Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth. Thou wilt say therefore to me: Why doth he then find fault? for who resisteth his will? O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, That he might shew the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory?

Yes, the damned souls might complain that if God had given them additional grace, they might have been saved; but this is a sort of hypocritical objection, because (1) God's grace is gratuitous, and He is not in strict justice bound to give it (it comes from mercy), (2) in withdrawing grace, God is only allowing the sinner to freely continue as he pleases, (3) if the sinner had asked for the grace at the time, God would doubtless have given it.

In fact, if after you've sinned your first response is, "God, if only you had given me more grace" – as long as this is said through hope rather than through despair, you're already on the way to being converted and it's only a matter of time before God does provide the grace. The point with damned souls is that not only do they fail to ask for God's grace after they've sinned, rather they harden their hearts against Him even further.




https://archive.org/stream/Garrigou-LagrangeEnglish/Predestination%20-%20Garrigou-Lagrange%2C%20Reginald%2C%20O.P_#page/n174/mode/1up/search/penalty

[John Lamb]

CHAPTER TWO:  DISTRUST OF SELF

DISTRUST OF SELF is so absolutely requisite in the spiritual combat, that without this virtue we cannot expect to defeat our weakest passions, much less gain a complete victory.  This important truth should be deeply imbedded in our hearts; for, although in ourselves we are nothing, we are too apt to overestimate our own abilities and to conclude falsely that we are of some importance. This vice springs from the corruption of our nature. But the more natural a thing is, the more difficult it is to be discovered.

But God, to Whom nothing is secret, looks upon this with horror, because it is His Will that we should be convinced we possess only that virtue and grace which comes from Him alone, and that without Him we are incapable of one meritorious thought. This distrust of our own strength is a gift from Heaven, bestowed by God on those He loves. It is granted sometimes through His holy inspiration, sometimes through severe afflictions, or almost insurmountable temptations and other ways which are unknown to us. Yet He expects that we will do everything within our power to obtain it.

[...]

Whoever seeks to approach the eternal truth and fountain of all light must know himself thoroughly. He must not imitate the pride of those who obtain no other knowledge than what their sins provide, and who begin to open their eyes only when they are plunged into some disgraceful and unforeseen debacle. This happens through God's permission that they may know their own weakness, and, by sad experience, learn not to rely on their own strength. God seldom supplies so severe a remedy against their presumption unless other means have failed.

Briefly, He permits persons to sin more or less grievously in proportion to their pride, and, if there were any as free from pride as the Blessed Virgin, I dare say, they would never fall. As often as you commit a fault, therefore, immediately strive to probe your inner consciousness; earnestly beg our Lord to enlighten you, that you may see yourself as you are in His sight, and presume no more on your strength, otherwise you will fall again into the same faults, or perhaps much greater ones to the eternal ruin of your soul.

http://www.catholictradition.org/Classics/combat2.htm

CHAPTER THREE: OF TRUST IN GOD

ALTHOUGH DISTRUST of self is absolutely necessary as we have shown it to be in the spiritual combat, nevertheless, if this is all we have to rely on, we will soon be routed, plundered, and subdued by the enemy. Unless we would be put to flight, or remain helpless and vanquished in the hands of our enemies, we must add to it perfect trust in God, and expect from Him alone succor and victory. For as we, who are nothing, can look for nothing from ourselves but falls, and therefore should utterly distrust ourselves; so from our Lord may we assuredly expect complete victory in every conflict. To obtain His help, let us therefore arm ourselves with a lively confidence in Him.

[...]

. . . Presumption is so natural to man that, without notice, it insinuates itself into the confidence he imagines he has in God and the distrust he fancies he has of himself. Consequently, in order to destroy all presumption and to sanctify every action and the two virtues opposite to this vice, the consideration of one's own weakness must precede that of the Divine Power. Both of these must precede all undertakings.

http://www.catholictradition.org/Classics/combat3.htm

2. EFFICACIOUS GRACE IN RELATION TO SPIRITUALITY

The teaching of St. Thomas on efficacious grace is generally not well understood except by speculative theologians who judge everything in relation to God, the universal first cause and author of salvation, or by souls that are advancing along the ways of passive purgation. These souls, as it were, experience within themselves that in the affair of salvation everything comes from God; that is, in a salutary, meritorious act, its free determination cannot derive exclusively from us. This is so because man has nothing which is exclusively his own except sin and lying, as declared by the Second Council of Orange (Denz., no. 195).

As we have seen, according to St. Thomas efficacious grace is not rendered efficacious by our consent foreseen by God in such a way that the free, meritorious determination would be, as determination, exclusively our own work. Rather is efficacious grace intrinsically efficacious; that is, it moves us gently and forcibly to consent to the good, so that this consent is entirely from God's premotion, as first cause, and entirely ours as secondary, premoved cause. In other words, God produces in us and with us even the free mode of our choices.

Herein lies no contradiction, but a sublime mystery, namely, that God is more intimately present to our liberty than it is to itself. And in this it appears that "the will of God is eminently efficacious, since it follows not only that those things are done which God wills should be done, but also that they are done in the manner in which He wills them to be done. But He wills that certain things should be necessary and others contingent (and free, as well) that there may be order among things for the completion of the universe." (Ia, q. 19, a. 8). "It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will" (Phil. 2:13). The only thing that cannot derive from God is moral evil, which, however, He permits that from it greater good may proceed by the manifestation of His mercy and justice. Moral evil does not require an efficient cause, but rather a deficient cause. Every good thing is from God.

That it may be evident, then, how this doctrine of St. Thomas raises the mind to lofty contemplation of the action of God in the depths of our hearts, it suffices to show that this doctrine should lead to profound humility, to continual interior prayer, to the perfection of the theological virtues, and that, in point of fact, illustrious spiritual writers have accepted it. In the present excursus we shall develop by way of synthesis what we have already presented in the form of spiritual corollaries.

1. This doctrine leads to profound humility, since it follows that man has nothing exclusively his own except sin. He does no natural good without the natural help of God, no supernatural good without supernatural grace, which not only urges and attracts but also moves him efficaciously to the performance of good. Thus the word of God is given a profound significance: "Without Me you can do nothing"; and likewise St. Paul's: "Not that we are sufficient to do anything ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God."

[...]

2. This doctrine leads to continual interior prayer, to a profound spirit of gratitude and, in fact, to contemplative prayer. To interior prayer, for that prayer of petition is more interior which asks of God the greater interior grace. But according to the opinion of St. Thomas, we should ask of God not only grace which will urge us to do good, but also that grace which actually moves us efficaciously toward right action and perseverance in good. We must ask for grace which will reach even unto the depths of our heart and free will, moving us, so that we may really be freed from perverse inclinations, from the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; for only God our Savior can deliver our souls from all of these. Nor does He injure our liberty in so acting, but rather causes it, actualizes it, and raises it above the thralldom of lower creatures. Whatever actualizes our freedom cannot injure or destroy it.

[...]

3. This teaching of St. Thomas on grace raises the theological virtues to a higher level, because it is closely connected with the very sublime mystery of predestination, in the words of St. Paul (Rom. 8:28-30): "And we know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to His purpose, are called to be saints. For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born among many brethren. [St. Thomas understands this as referring to gratuitous predestination unto glory.] And whom He predestinated, them He also called. And whom He called, them He also justified. And whom He justified, them He also glorified." Such is the process of predestination.

[...]

But these truths are not fully grasped except in the mystical life. Therefore it must be said that St. Thomas' sublime doctrine of grace is rejected by many precisely on account of its exceeding sublimity, but because, by really preserving the deep sense of Holy Scripture, it leads us to the highest contemplation of God, the author of salvation.

Confirmation. This doctrine of efficacious grace is accepted by great mystics and eminent spiritual writers. It is found in St. Paul, as we have already shown, and in St. Augustine, whose teaching abides in the decrees of the Second Council of Orange which defined that "no man has anything of his own but sin and lying" (chaps. 20, 22; Denz., nos. 193, 195). St. Augustine says (De praedestin. sanct., chap. 5 ): "A haughty man may indeed say to another: 'My faith, my justice, or some other thing distinguishes me.'" To one to whom such thoughts occur, the good Doctor puts the question: "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And from whom, unless it be from Him who distinguishes thee from another, to whom He did not give what He gave to thee? But if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received? Can that be glorying in the Lord? But nothing is so contrary to this disposition as to glory in one's own merits as if in something which one was responsible for effecting, rather than the grace of God; for it is grace which distinguishes the good from the bad, not what is common to the good and the bad." "Therefore, although it might be believed that Cornelius has done something well, the whole must be attributed to God, lest anyone should be exalted" (ibid., chap. 6). "This grace is exceedingly hidden; but who doubts that grace really exists? And so it is this grace, which is secretly imparted by the divine bounty to human hearts, that it may remove their hardness of heart for the first time" (ibid., chap. 8). "God, in fact, does what He wills in the hearts of men" (ibid., chap. 20). "We therefore assert that perseverance is a gift of God whereby one perseveres in Christ unto the end" (De dono. persever., chap. I). "Hence we ask that we may not be lead into temptation, that this may not occur. For nothing is done except what He Himself does or permits to be done. He is therefore powerful both to bend wills from evil unto good and to convert those inclined to fall, as well as to direct toward Himself an agreeable course" (ibid., chap. 6).

St. Prosper and St. Fulgentius spoke in terms similar to those quoted above. With respect to the Fathers who wrote before St. Augustine on grace and predestination, consult Bossuet's Défense de la tradition et des saints Pères, Bk. XII, chap. 39. Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism had not yet arisen, and consequently the question had not yet been explicitly posed.

Together with Augustine, St. Bernard demonstrates (De grat. et lib. arbitr., c. I, no. 2) that grace saves while free will is safeguarded: "Free will enables us to will, grace enables us to will well" (ibid.,chap. 6, no. 16). How do grace and free will operate? "Together, not singly; simultaneously, not in turn; not partly grace and partly free will, but they perform the whole by a single, undivided act" (ibid., chap. 14, nos. 46 f.). Consequently, when God crowns our merits in heaven, He crowns His own gifts: "His gifts, which He gave to men, He divided unto merits and rewards" (ibid., chap. 13, no. 43). Cf.  Dict. de théol. cath., article "St. Bernard" by Vacandard, col. 776 ff.  St. Bonaventure speaks in similar terms (II Sent., dist. 26, q. 2): "This is also the disposition of the pious, that they attribute nothing to themselves, but all to the grace of God."

In the Following of Christ, Bk. III, chap. 4, no. 2, we read: "Never esteem thyself to be anything on account of thy good works . . . Of thyself thou always tendest to nothing, speedily dost thou fail, speedily art thou overcome, speedily disturbed, speedily dissolved.  Thou hast not anything in which thou canst glory, but many things for which thou oughtest to abase thyself; for thou art much weaker than thou canst comprehend." Ibid., chap. 8, no. I: "I am nothing, and I knew it not. If  I am left to myself, behold, I am nothing, and all weakness; but if Thou suddenly look upon me, I presently become strong, and am replenished with new joy. And truly wonderful it is that I am so quickly raised up and so graciously embraced by Thee; I who, by my own weight, am always sinking down to the lowest depths." Ibid., chap. 9, nos. 2-3: "Out of Me both little and great, poor and rich, as out of a living fountain, draw living water . . .Therefore thou must not ascribe any good to thyself, nor attribute virtue to any man; but give all to God, without whom man has nothing. I have given all, I will also have all again; and with great strictness do I require a return of thanks. This is that truth by which all vainglory is put to flight. And if heavenly grace and true charity come in, there shall be no envy nor narrowness of heart, nor shall self-love keep possession. For divine charity overcometh all, and enlargeth all the powers of the soul, If thou art truly wise, thou wilt rejoice in Me alone, thou wilt hope in Me alone; for none is good but God alone, who is to be praised above all, and to be blessed in all." Ibid., chap. 55, nos. 4-5: "Without it [grace] I can do nothing; but I can do all things . . . come, descend upon me, replenish me early with thy consolation, lest my soul faint through weariness and dryness of mind. . . . in Thee, when grace strengtheneth me. . . . Oh, most blessed grace, This alone is my strength, this alone giveth counsel and help. This is more mighty than all my enemies, and wiser than all the wise." Ibid., chap. 58: "I am to be praised in all My saints; I am to be blessed above all and to be honored in each, whom I have so gloriously magnified and predestinated, without any foregoing merits of their own."

St. John of the Cross, Spiritual Canticle, stanza 38, no. 10: "In that day of eternity, that is, before the creation and according to His good pleasure God predestined the soul unto glory and determined the degree of glory that He would give it. From that moment this glory became a property of the soul and this in a manner so absolute that no event or accident, temporal or spiritual, can ever take it away radically, for what God has given it gratuitously will always remain its property." Ascent of Mount Carmel, Bk. II, chap. 5: "God determines the degree of union freely as He determines the degree of the beatific vision to each one."

St. John of the Cross declares that it depends on the good pleasure of God alone that this particular soul should be predestined to such and such a degree of glory; in other words, predestination to glory is prior to any foreseen merits. Prière de l'âme embrasée (Carmelite ed., I, 475): "If Thou awaitest my works, O Lord, to grant me what I ask, give them to me, effect them in me, and join thereto the sufferings Thou deignest to accept from me."

Although St. Francis de Sales does not always follow St. Thomas in this matter, he holds in the Treatise on the Love of God, Bk. II, chap. 12; that "Grace . . . touches powerfully but yet so delicately the springs of our spirit that our free will suffers no violence from it.  . . . She acts strongly, yet so sweetly that our will is not overwhelmed by so powerful an action. . . . The consent to grace depends much more on grace than on the will, while the resistance to grace depends upon the will only. . . . If thou didst know the gift of God."

Indeed, almost all spiritual writers, dealing with souls that are being led along the passive ways are in accord with the Thomistic doctrine. (Cf. J. Grou, S.J., Spiritual Maxims, second maxim; L. Lallemant, S . J., Spiritual Doctrine, fourth principle: "Docility to the Holy Ghost," chaps. I and 2; J. P. de Caussade, S.J., Self-Abandonment to Divine Providence, Bk. III, chaps. I and 2.)

Let us conclude this application of the Thomist doctrine to spirituality with a quotation from Bossuet, Elévations sur les mystères (eighteenth week, fifteenth elevation, "Practical humility solves difficulties"): "Contradictions against Jesus Christ regarding the mystery of grace. Behold another terrible stumbling block for human pride. Man says in his heart: I have my free will; God has made me free, and I will to become a just man; I will that the stroke which decides my eternal salvation should come originally from me. Thus does he seek, on some pretext, to glorify himself. Whither are you bound, O fragile craft? You are about to strike against a reef and deprive yourself of the help of God, who assists only the humble, making them humble that He may help them. . . .

"I can. I wish to find something to cling to in my free will, that I cannot reconcile with this abandonment to grace. Proud contradictor, do you wish to reconcile these things yourself or are you willing to believe that God reconciles them? He reconciles them to such an extent that He wills, without releasing you from your action, that you should attribute the whole achievement of your salvation to Him. For He is the Savior who declares: 'there is no Savior beside Me' (Isa. 43:11). Believe firmly that Jesus Christ is the Savior, and all difficulties will vanish."2

This great doctrine of grace is wonderfully presented to the modern world by St. Theresa of the Child Jesus, in her way of spiritual childhood, which is suitable to all Christians, even the perfect, since they are all adopted children of God; see the last chapter of this book on the spirit of adoption of sons of God. Among the children of God, they are more truly His children who place greater trust, not in themselves, but in God and His help.3

https://www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/grace8.htm

[Michael Wilson]

Re. "Negative Reprobation": Here is Msgr. Pohle in the Catholic Encyclopedia:

The theory of the negative reprobation of the damned
What deters us most strongly from embracing the theory just discussed is not the fact that it cannot be dogmatically proved from Scripture or Tradition, but the logical necessity to which it binds us, of associating an absolute predestination to glory, with a reprobation just as absolute, even though it be but negative. The well-meant efforts of some theologians (e.g. Billot) to make a distinction between the two concepts, and so to escape the evil consequences of negative reprobation, cannot conceal from closer inspection the helplessness of such logical artifices. Hence the earlier partisans of absolute predestination never denied that their theory compelled them to assume for the wicked a parallel, negative reprobation — that is, to assume that, though not positively predestined to hell, yet they are absolutely predestined not to go to heaven (cf. above, I, B). While it was easy for the Thomists to bring this view into logical harmony with their præmotio physica, the few Molinists were put to straits to harmonize negative reprobation with their scientia media. In order to disguise the harshness and cruelty of such a Divine decree, the theologians invented more or less palliative expressions, saying that negative reprobation is the absolute will of God to "pass over" a priori those not predestined, to "overlook" them, "not to elect" them, "by no means to admit" them into heaven. Only Gonet had the courage to call the thing by its right name: "exclusion from heaven" (exclusio a gloria).

But the "the death blow" to this theory comes further on:

Whatever view one may take regarding the internal probability of negative reprobation, it cannot be harmonized with the dogmatically certain universality and sincerity of God's salvific will. For the absolute predestination of the blessed is at the same time the absolute will of God "not to elect" a priori the rest of mankind (Suarez), or which comes to the same, "to exclude them from heaven" (Gonet), in other words, not to save them. While certain Thomists (as Bañez, Alvarez, Gonet) accept this conclusion so far as to degrade the "voluntas salvifica" to an ineffectual "velleitas", which conflicts with evident doctrines of revelation, Francisco Suárez labours in the sweat of his brow to safeguard the sincerity of God's salvific will, even towards those who are reprobated negatively. But in vain. How can that will to save be called serious and sincere which has decreed from all eternity the metaphysical impossibility of salvation? He who has been reprobated negatively, may exhaust all his efforts to attain salvation: it avails him nothing. Moreover, in order to realize infallibly his decree, God is compelled to frustrate the eternal welfare of all excluded a priori from heaven, and to take care that they die in their sins. Is this the language in which Holy Writ speaks to us? No; there we meet an anxious, loving father, who wills not "that any should perish, but that all should return to penance" (2 Peter 3:9). Lessius rightly says that it would be indifferent to him whether he was numbered among those reprobated positively or negatively; for, in either case, his eternal damnation would be certain. The reason for this is that in the present economy exclusion from heaven means for adults practically the same thing as damnation. A middle state, a merely natural happiness, does not exist.

In other words the theory of "negative reprobation'' cannot be reconciled with the Catholic doctrine of the universality of God's salvific will.

[mikemac]

So you guys are saying that it was the devil that said the following.

"cease offending God"

"Say the Rosary every day, to bring peace to the world and the end of the war."

"Look, my daughter, at my Heart encircled by these thorns with which men pierce it at every moment by their blasphemies and ingratitude. You, at least, strive to console me, and so I announce: I promise to assist at the hour of death with the grace necessary for salvation all those who, with the intention of making reparation to me, will, on the first Saturday of five consecutive months, go to confession, receive Holy Communion, say five decades of the beads, and keep me company for fifteen minutes while meditating on the fifteen mysteries of the Rosary."

You actually believe that the devil would say these things?

You guys have lost your collective minds.  This is the most ridiculous thing I have read on any Catholic forum.  Even more ridiculous than Impy.

Kaesekopf it's time for you to put an end to this blasphemous nonsense once and for all.

If Kaesekopf is not going to do anything about it then there needs to be prayers of reparation said for the blasphemies committed against the Blessed Virgin Mary in this thread by some members of this forum.

From the Raccolta, prayer 84.

http://www.liturgialatina.org/raccolta/index.htm

84.  PRAYERS FOR EVERY DAY OF THE WEEK, WITH THREE "AVE MARIA'S" ETC.

Pope Pius VII., of holy memory, at the prayer of the Chapter of the Basilica of St. Mary in Cosmedin here in Rome, by a Rescript of the S. Congr. of Indulgences, dated June 21, 1808, kept in the Archivium of the said Basilica, granted -
i. An indulgence or 300 days, once a day, to all the faithful who, with contrite hearts, say the following prayers to our Blessed Lady, extracted from the spiritual works of the holy Bishop Alphonsus Maria de' Liguori, each on that day of the week to which it has been assigned, together with three Ave Maria's, with the intention of making some reparation to her for the many blasphemies which have been, and are daily uttered against her, not only by unbelievers, but even by bad Christians.
ii. A plenary indulgence, once a month, to all who say these prayers, with three Ave Maria's, daily for a whole month, with the intention above named, on any one day when, after Confession and Communion, they shall pray to God for the Holy Church, &c.

PRAYER FOR FRIDAY.

O Mary, thou art the noblest, highest, purest, fairest creation of Coil, the holiest of all creatures! O, that all men knew thee, loved thee, my Queen, as thou deservest to be loved!  Yet great is my consolation, Mary, that there are blessed souls in the courts of Heaven, and just souls still on earth, whose hearts thou leadest captive with thy beauty and thy goodness. But above all I rejoice in this, that our God himself loves thee alone more than all men and angels together. I too, O Queen most loveable, I, miserable sinner, dare to love thee, though my love is too little; I would I had a greater love, a more tender love: this thou must gain for me, since to love thee is a great mark of predestination, and a grace which God grants to those who shall be saved. Moreover, O my Mother, when I reflect upon the debt I owe thy Son, I see He deserves of me an immeasurable love. Do thou, then, who desirest nothing so much as to see Him loved, pray that I may have this grace - a great love for Jesus Christ. Obtain it, thou who obtainest what thou wilt. I covet not goods of earth, nor honours, nor riches, but I desire that which thine own heart desires most, - to love my God alone. O, can it be that thou wilt not aid me in a desire so acceptable to thee? No: it is impossible! even now I feel thy help, even now thou prayest for me. Pray for me, Mary, pray; nor ever cease to pray, till thou dost see me safe in Paradise, where I shall be certain of possessing and of loving my God and thee, my dearest Mother, for ever and for ever. Amen.

Then say three Ave Maria's to the Blessed Virgin Mary in reparation for the blasphemies uttered against her.

[Michael Wilson]

re. The Thomistic theory of 'sufficient grace': Fr. G.L.G. Denies that there is a problem of circular reasoning; the way out for him (and other holders of the theory), is the affirmation that a soul that is given sufficient grace has the potential to assent to this grace, and therefore the 'vicious circle' is only apparent. The problem however remains, because there is no possibility for the soul to assent to this grace in the Thomistic system, without the addition of efficacious grace. The "potential" will never be realized and can never be realized under any circumstance. The only riposte that I have seen from the Thomists posting here, is that one is denying the existence of 'potency'. But this also does not change the problem of inability to respond.

[Michael Wilson]

J.L. Lamb stated:

Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth. Thou wilt say therefore to me: Why doth he then find fault? for who resisteth his will? O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, That he might shew the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory?

Yes, the damned souls might complain that if God had given them additional grace, they might have been saved; but this is a sort of hypocritical objection, because (1) God's grace is gratuitous, and He is not in strict justice bound to give it (it comes from mercy), (2) in withdrawing grace, God is only allowing the sinner to freely continue as he pleases, (3) if the sinner had asked for the grace at the time, God would doubtless have given it.

The above passage as interpreted above is inevitably Calvinistic in signification; in other words God has created souls "vessels of wrath" i.e. Predestined for hell. But according to Fr. Most, this is a misinterpretation of this passage.
Here is Fr. Most:

11. Exegesis of Rom 8:28-31:1 The best exegetes of all schools within the Church, and also the best outside the Church, agree on many points of great importance in interpreting these verses.

First, all teach that St. Paul in these verses is speaking about all Christians, that is, all Christians are predestined in the Pauline sense. Hence they teach that St. Paul in these verses does not distinguish Christians into two classes, into the predestined and reprobate. The eminent Dominican exegete, Père Lagrange, notes that St. Augustine attempted to introduce that distinction into this passage, and comments:2 "That opinion, so full of consequences, isolated in ancient times, and rejected by modern authors (Cornely, Prat, Lipsius, Sanday-Headlam, Julicher, Zahn, Lietzmann), has no foundation in the text and is contrary to the whole context. St. Paul speaks to all Christians, and does not dream of distinguishing them into two classes: those who are called according to a design of predestination, and those who are called without being predestined. The distinction between those called and those chosen, such as it is given in the Gospel (Mt 20:16; 22:14), does not coincide with the terms used by Paul. In his mind, kletos, "one who is called," refers to one who has answered the call; he has been called effectively (Cornely, Prat). All Christians are called in that sense. He would not reassure them by saying: certain ones among you are predestined." Similarly, in his commentary on verse 30:3 "We have already noted that here Paul does not make two classes among Christians: those who are predestined, and those who are not. His purpose is to encourage all the faithful. On the part of God, the call to faith and justification are an assured pledge of salvation; it is not God who will fail the faithful. The chain of divine acts conducts them to salvation, because Paul supposes that a Christian will not divest himself of his goodness. . . . Or rather; Paul does not think of the particular destiny of each Christian in the designs of God, but of the designs of God for Christianity; those who are in his mind are the faithful as a group, those who have answered his call. . . . As far as individuals are concerned, it is for them to live according to the Spirit, etc., for Paul does not hide the fact that they can fall back under the regime of the flesh."

Precisely the same explanation is found in the excellent commentary of J. Huby, SJ.4

Therefore, since St. Paul is not here speaking of the place of the individual in the plans of God, nor of infallible predestination to Heaven, it does not make much difference for our question whether we say that St. Paul is speaking of predestination before or after prevision of merits. As Lagrange notes so well, if St. Paul really were speaking of the predestination of the individual to Heaven and said that some Christians, without any consideration of their dispositions whatsoever, were not predestined, he would not strengthen the hope of all by saying to them: Some of you are predestined. But, as Lagrange also says, St. Paul's purpose in this passage is to strengthen the hope of all the faithful. Huby, then, is quite right in saying:5 ". . . in an exhortation in which the Apostle wishes to arouse a firm hope in the hearts of all Christians, would he really encourage them if he said: 'All have confidence, because some among you are predestined?' As someone has said: 'It is impossible to argue with less logic.'"

As to men who do not enter into the Church in the full sense, St. Paul simply does not speak of them in the verses we are considering. Elsewhere in the same Epistle, especially in 2:12-16, he makes clear that at least some of them are actually saved.

12. Exegesis of Rom 9:11-23: According to St. Augustine, this passage teaches predestination to Heaven, or reprobation to hell, before any consideration of human merits and demerits. Out of his interpretation, St. Augustine formed the following theory: As a result of original sin, all men are part of the potter's clay (v. 21), that is, they form one "damned and damnable mass." If God rescues some, this is out of mere mercy. If He deserts others in the same damned mass, it is mere justice.

All exegetes today reject this interpretation. As Huby points out,6 it is altogether arbitrary to say that the "clay" in v. 21 stands for the human race, corrupted by original sin, because in the whole of chapter 9 there is not even a remote allusion to original sin. Lagrange makes a keen observation:7 "At least the potter does not blame the vessels which he has made for ignoble uses." Hence, if God really had made certain men for ignoble roles, He should not blame and condemn these men for being such.

Actually, St. Paul was only making a comparison, or, as Lagrange says,8 "a simple parable." St. Paul wishes to teach that God has the right to assign men to various places in the external order of this world-which is quite different and distinct from the internal order of eternal salvation or ruin! That is, God makes some to be kings, others physicians, others laborers, etc. And similarly, He brings some into the Church in the full sense, and not others. But these assignments by no means fix the eternal lot of a man. Later in this chapter we shall examine what relation does exist between a man's eternal lot and his place in the external order of this world.

Even St. Augustine himself, in many works, as we shall see later,9 says many things that at least seem to presuppose a view that differs from the massa damnata theory.

St. Thomas, in his commentary on Romans, followed the interpretation of St. Augustine. However, he seems to feel ill at ease with the harshness of that interpretation. For if he were simply following out the implication of that interpretation, he could and should say that Pharaoh and the other reprobates were first of all deserted10 by God in the "damned mass." He would say that God did this because of original sin, to display His justice. As a result of this desertion, the reprobate infallibly fall into personal sins. Because of original and personal sins, they will be damned.

But St. Thomas did not speak this way. Rather, over and over again he harps on personal sins:11 ". . . because of the sins which they have from themselves, not from God . . . because of the evil things which you did . . . because of their own merits they were worthy to be devoured at once . . . as far as He is concerned, [God] interiorly urges a man on to good . . . but the bad man perverts this divine motion according to the malice of his heart. . . ."

13. Today the best exegetes of all schools either openly reject the interpretation of St. Augustine or pass it by in silence and propose another instead. To quote Père Lagrange again:12 "And so the question which Paul treats directly is not at all that of predestination and reprobation [to eternal lots] but merely the call of the Gentiles to the grace of Christianity, in contrast to the infidelity of the Jews." And similarly:13 "Prat says quite well: The precise point of the question is not: 'Why is this particular man predestined to the glory of Heaven and another given over to damnation?' nor: 'Why, as a matter of fact, is this man saved and that man lost?' nor even: 'Why is this individual rather than another called to the faith?' I would add that it is not even this: 'Why [in general] are there elect and reprobates?'"

A. M. Dubarle, OP, the eminent Professor of Sacred Scripture at Le Saulchoir, says exactly the same:14 "When he exalts, as he does, divine grace acting without any consideration of works, the Apostle is not speaking of the sentence which will fix the lot of each man on the last day but of the call to a privileged condition, the possession of the Christian faith. . . . It is in this perspective that one must understand the election and the hardening spoken of in chapter 9 of Romans." Huby speaks similarly:15 "The question, then, is not about the predestination of individuals to eternal salvation, nor even to the faith that prepares for it but about the entry of a nation into the Church. And let us note also, to remain within the strict limits of the question proposed by St. Paul, that to enter into Christianity is not at all the same as being saved: in certain conditions, salvation is possible outside of explicit adherence to Christianity, and, on the other hand, not everyone who enters Christianity is necessarily saved."

In other words, there are two questions, which we must not confuse: (1) According to what principles does God predestine individuals to heaven? (2) According to what principles does God predestine nations to belong to the chosen people in the Old Testament, or to be in the Church in the full16 sense in the New Testament?

As to the first question, all exegetes agree that St. Paul does not really treat it in the entire Epistle to the Romans-or rather, in no Epistle does he treat it.

But in chapter 9 of Romans, St. Paul does give an answer to the second question. He says that God does not predestine nations to this privileged position according to merits: that the descendants of Jacob rather than those of Esau became the chosen people was "not because of works but because of his call."17 Only indirectly does St. Paul bring in individuals, such as Pharaoh, Esau, and Jacob insofar as they are related to the question of nations. Hence, God said to Moses: "I will have mercy on whom I have mercy." That is, I will do as I wish in the matter of the mercy shown in the call to membership in the chosen people.

When Scripture says to Pharaoh, "I have raised you up for the very purpose of showing my power in you," it does not mean that Pharaoh was created for damnation. As Lagrange points out,18 the word "raised up" in Scripture does not mean "brought into existence," but rather it means "to give a role in history, to send on the stage": for Pharaoh was evil by his own free will. God did not make him such. But God does bring good out of evil. Hence, He willed to make use of the evil quality which Pharaoh had of his own accord; in defeating Pharaoh, God displayed divine power in favor of the chosen people in Egypt. Hence, God is compared to a potter, who out of the same clay, that is, our common human nature, assigns various roles in the external order to various men. Not that God wants certain men to be evil and to act wickedly-but, since these men are by their own will going to be wicked anyway, God makes use of their malice for good purposes, and draws good out of evil.

St. Paul says these things in reply to the question he himself proposed: Why are not the Jews, as a nation, in the Church in the New Testament? The first answer he gives is this: God does not assign nations to the Church according to merits. But later St. Paul adds:19 "God has not rejected his people whom he foreknew. . . . For the gifts and the call of God are irrevocable." So it is not that God has rejected the Jews, but they have rejected Him:20 "they were broken off because of their unbelief." Yet, because, as St. Paul said, the call of God still remains for them, for it is "irrevocable":21 "if they do not persist in their unbelief, [they] will be grafted in, for God has the power to graft them in again" into the salutary tree from which they cut themselves off. It is clear that Père Lagrange is quite right, then, in saying of the Jews:22 ". . . nothing shows that their fall was the effect of reprobation." For the Jews rejected God: He did not reject them.

14. The two economies: It is obvious, then, that there are two economies, that is, spheres or orders: (1) The internal economy, in which there is the question of the eternal lot of individual men, that is, whether they will go to heaven or hell. (2) The external economy, in which there is the question of the position a nation or man has in the external order i.e., whether a nation will belong to the chosen people of the Old Testament, or to the Church of the New Testament (in the full sense).

In chapter 9 of Romans, St. Paul is not speaking of the internal economy, but of the assignment of nations in the external economy. He says that assignment is not made because of merits.

As we have already said, St. Paul is not speaking, in this passage, of individuals. However, if even nations cannot merit to be called into the Church, it seems that individuals cannot either. For if individuals could, then if all, or at least most, individuals in a certain nation merited to be called, by that very fact the nation would merit to be called. But this would contradict the teaching of St. Paul. Hence we must say that even individuals are not assigned to membership in the Church on account of merits.

The whole chapter is worth reading: https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/most/getchap.cfm?WorkNum=214&ChapNum=5

[John Lamb]

re. The Thomistic theory of 'sufficient grace': Fr. G.L.G. Denies that there is a problem of circular reasoning; the way out for him (and other holders of the theory), is the affirmation that a soul that is given sufficient grace has the potential to assent to this grace, and therefore the 'vicious circle' is only apparent. The problem however remains, because there is no possibility for the soul to assent to this grace in the Thomistic system, without the addition of efficacious grace. The "potential" will never be realized and can never be realized under any circumstance. The only riposte that I have seen from the Thomists posting here, is that one is denying the existence of 'potency'. But this also does not change the problem of inability to respond.

The problem however remains, because there is no possibility for the soul to assent to this grace in the Thomistic system, without the addition of efficacious grace. The "potential" will never be realized and can never be realized under any circumstance.

This is where everyone seems to fail in trying to understand the Thomist position, viz. understanding the distinction between act and potential. Sufficient grace gives the potential to do good, efficacious grace causes the good act itself. There is EVERY "possibility" of doing good with merely sufficient grace. So when you say – "there is no possibility for the soul to assent to this grace . . . ." – and – "the potential . . . can never be realized" – you are speaking nonsense. The very POINT of sufficient grace is that it makes the good act POSSIBLE to the soul, and that this potential can ALWAYS be realised. The reason that sufficient grace is merely sufficient, the reason why it does not produce the good act itself, is not that it CAN'T produce the good act or that it's IMPOSSIBLE, but because of the sinful RESISTANCE to it in the soul. Sufficient grace gives a real power to the soul to do good; so the sinner who falls and says, "I didn't have the power to avoid sin because God refused to give me efficacious grace" is talking nonsense, because SUFFICIENT grace gives the POWER to avoid sin, and God always provides (at least) sufficient grace. If someone falls it's because they have resisted the grace that God has given them, have refused to use the power to do good which God has conferred upon them. The deficiency is in man, not in sufficient grace; sufficient grace is not deficient grace.

[Apologise for the caps but it's necessary to show where language is being ignored / improperly glossed over]

Whatever view one may take regarding the internal probability of negative reprobation, it cannot be harmonized with the dogmatically certain universality and sincerity of God's salvific will.

God does not will salvation for everyone in the same manner or to the same degree. If some souls are saved and other aren't it's solely because God from all eternity has elected, or chosen, or preferred those souls to the others, for no other reason than His arbitrary will to save those particular souls in order to manifest His Mercy. If God absolutely willed all men to be saved, then all men in fact would be saved, because nothing can impede God's absolute will which is omnipotent. If some men are damned it is indeed because God has from all eternity permitted them to sin against Him and thus merit damnation for themselves. Nevertheless, God always calls the sinner to repentance (at least through providing sufficient grace to repent), and God does not desert souls arbitrarily, but as a punishment for their sins. Nobody is damned simply because God failed to elect or choose them, but principally because they resisted His grace, a resistance which God foreknew from all eternity and chose to permit (despite the repeated and grievous offences given to Him) in order to manifest His justice in them.

Lessius rightly says that it would be indifferent to him whether he was numbered among those reprobated positively or negatively; for, in either case, his eternal damnation would be certain. The reason for this is that in the present economy exclusion from heaven means for adults practically the same thing as damnation.

I think he ought to have considered it further then. There is an enormous difference between Calvinist positive reprobation – that God actively produces the evil act in the soul, so that He can later punish it – and Thomist negative reprobation – that God allows the soul to commit evil by resisting His grace, so that He can later punish it. In the first, the soul has no free-will, and God is actively causing it to do evil. In the second, the soul has free-will, and not only is God not causing it do evil, but God is even providing the soul the good grace necessary to avoid evil.

Lessius is right that whether it is positive or negative reprobation, the soul will certainly be reprobated either way. True. A soul that is negatively reprobated from all eternity will just as certainly be damned as one that is positively reprobated. However, it makes an enormous difference in the nature of the damnation itself. A soul that has been damned through negative reprobation will know that it has been so entirely by its own free-will, and is being justly punished for its own acts. A soul damned through positive reprobation is just one that is arbitrarily hated and tortured by God for no act of its own. This would indeed make God a monstrous tyrant, and hell would not be a manifestation of justice, but of the most abhorrent cruelty.

I think the one consolation that damned souls have, the only one – is that they know they've gotten exactly what they deserve, that they're the recipients of divine Justice. Positive reprobation would taken away even this from them, whereas negative reprobation conserves it.

[Quaremerepulisti]

This is just playing word games and dressing it up under the name "theology".  It's just like "poppies induce sleep because they have the sleep-inducing property" in philosophy.  There's zero critical thinking and just the magic rote repetition of phrases, and, often, fundamental intellectual dishonesty.  Thomism is simply a failure here.

What is relevant is that (under AP) God's failure to decree otherwise is a necessary and sufficient condition for man's death, wickedness, or lack of repentance and is ontologically antecedent to it.

Necessary but not sufficient. In addition to God's permissive will to allow the sinner to demerit, the sinner himself must have the will to commit sin, and it's this sinful will which is the effective cause of man's damnation. Of course God's will is ontologically antecedent, seeing as God is universal first cause and ontologically antecedent to everything.

Under your scenario, in every case when God's permissive will allows him to demerit, the person in question will commit sin - it is logically impossible that sin does not occur given such permissive will (since God has failed to decree that the person instead be virtuous).  Thus, God's permissive will is a sufficient condition.  That is the definition of the term "sufficient condition".

In the order of execution God reprobates the sinner after he has sinned, so the analogy stands.
Only in the order of intention does God first decree that the sinner shall be permitted to sin and thus be damned in order to manifest His justice (negative reprobation). This act belongs uniquely to God as existing from all eternity and being first cause of everything.

Thus, His intention to reprobate the sinner existed before he sinned, as you admit (even if it doesn't get executed until afterwards), so the analogy doesn't stand.  But a good God can hardly have punishment first in the order of intention.  That is a sadist and a psychopath.

If the sun illuminates one side of the earth and leaves the other side dark, it's not the sun which is causing the latter side to be dark but the intrinsic darkness of the earth itself. So if God gives efficacious grace to save one part of mankind but not to save the other side of mankind, it's not God that is the cause of the latter's darkness but the intrinsic darkness of sinful mankind.

But without a sun (or some light source) to light the earth, the earth cannot be other than dark.
And without God causing mankind not to be sinful, mankind cannot be anything other than sinful, for which then God turns around and punishes mankind for what it had to be.

The difference is that the earth puts up no resistance to the light of the sun, but the reason that the evil part of mankind is not illumined by God's grace is not that God fails to offer sufficient grace, but that they resist: "And this is the judgment: because the light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light: for their works were evil."

But again, you fail to answer whether lack of resistance to sufficient grace is ontologically prior to efficacious grace or subsequent to it.  You want to have it both ways: pretend that it is prior to efficacious grace in order to be able to place blame on the reprobate; but then pretend that it is subsequent to efficacious grace in order to make God the sole author of salvation.

[Quaremerepulisti]

This is where everyone seems to fail in trying to understand the Thomist position, viz. understanding the distinction between act and potential. Sufficient grace gives the potential to do good, efficacious grace causes the good act itself. There is EVERY "possibility" of doing good with merely sufficient grace. So when you say – "there is no possibility for the soul to assent to this grace . . . ." – and – "the potential . . . can never be realized" – you are speaking nonsense. The very POINT of sufficient grace is that it makes the good act POSSIBLE to the soul, and that this potential can ALWAYS be realised. The reason that sufficient grace is merely sufficient, the reason why it does not produce the good act itself, is not that it CAN'T produce the good act or that it's IMPOSSIBLE, but because of the sinful RESISTANCE to it in the soul. Sufficient grace gives a real power to the soul to do good; so the sinner who falls and says, "I didn't have the power to avoid sin because God refused to give me efficacious grace" is talking nonsense, because SUFFICIENT grace gives the POWER to avoid sin, and God always provides (at least) sufficient grace. If someone falls it's because they have resisted the grace that God has given them, have refused to use the power to do good which God has conferred upon them. The deficiency is in man, not in sufficient grace; sufficient grace is not deficient grace.

No, actually, the non-Thomists understand the Thomist position quite well and why it fails - you are facilely equating "potency" with "possibility of actualization", ignoring that the two terms are not, in every way, the same, and ending in complete logical nonsense.  (The modal logician would say you are ignoring accessibility relations between possible worlds.)  Not every potency carries with it a real possibility of actualization at all times and places in the actual world; a cold object is potentially hot, but it won't become actually hot as long as it remains in the freezer.  But most importantly, since God is First Mover, it is a necessary and sufficient condition that He (as first in the chain) move the potency to act.  Without His moving it, it is impossible that it move from potency to act.  Thomists are thus arguing nonsensically that, despite God's failure to move the potency to act, such motion is still "possible", conflating (quite ridiculously) ALL possible worlds, in which case yes the motion is possible, and the ACCESSIBLE possible worlds given God's failure to move the potency to act, in which case the motion is NOT possible (it doesn't occur in any of those worlds).

To get around this, of course, they point to the soul's "resistance" to grace but never precisely define the term.  If non-resistance to grace is an act of the will, then that must first exist in potency, and then be moved by God from potency to act, so the same difficulty reappears.  Regardless, since the soul's resistance to grace is an evil, that must be a deprivation of a due good of some sort, which again must exist in potency and then moved from potency to act in order to exist, so the same problem reappears again.

The only answer is that not all evil is a deprivation of a due good.

God does not will salvation for everyone in the same manner or to the same degree. If some souls are saved and other aren't it's solely because God from all eternity has elected, or chosen, or preferred those souls to the others, for no other reason than His arbitrary will to save those particular souls in order to manifest His Mercy....  Nobody is damned simply because God failed to elect or choose them, but principally because they resisted His grace, a resistance which God foreknew from all eternity and chose to permit (despite the repeated and grievous offences given to Him) in order to manifest His justice in them.

Those two statements are directly contradictory if you substitute "not saved" for "damned".
All souls which are saved are saved solely because God from all eternity has chosen those souls (e.g. God's choice is the sole determinant factor).
Nobody is not saved solely because God failed to choose them, but other factors are involved (e.g. God's choice is not the sole determinant factor).

Again, your God is not a God of love but a vain, arbitrary egoist only concerned with what He can "manifest".

I think he ought to have considered it further then. There is an enormous difference between Calvinist positive reprobation – that God actively produces the evil act in the soul, so that He can later punish it – and Thomist negative reprobation – that God allows the soul to commit evil by resisting His grace, so that He can later punish it. In the first, the soul has no free-will, and God is actively causing it to do evil. In the second, the soul has free-will, and not only is God not causing it do evil, but God is even providing the soul the good grace necessary to avoid evil.

There is not much of a difference if God's "allowance" is determining of the evil act, and not merely a necessary condition, as would be the case under libertarian free will.

[John Lamb]

Under your scenario, in every case when God's permissive will allows him to demerit, the person in question will commit sin - it is logically impossible that sin does not occur given such permissive will (since God has failed to decree that the person instead be virtuous).  Thus, God's permissive will is a sufficient condition.  That is the definition of the term "sufficient condition".

it is logically impossible that sin does not occur given such permissive will . . .

Not at all. If the sinner's will was not deficient, if it did not resist sufficient grace, then it would not sin in the first place.

(since God has failed to decree that the person instead be virtuous)

A person is not virtuous primarily because God has "failed to decree" it, but because they resist the grace which would otherwise make them virtuous.

Thus, God's permissive will is a sufficient condition.

God's permissive will is not at all sufficient to make someone sin. In addition to His permission, there needs also be the sinful will itself in the first place. God's allowing people to sin does not magically create the will to sin in people. The sinful will is already there, and God merely permits it.

Thus, His intention to reprobate the sinner existed before he sinned, as you admit (even if it doesn't get executed until afterwards), so the analogy doesn't stand.  But a good God can hardly have punishment first in the order of intention.  That is a sadist and a psychopath.

The order of intention is like this:
God wishes to manifest His Justice in the universe –> God wills to create fallible creatures with the capacity for sin –> God foreknows that some of these creatures will indeed sin against Him, and He permits this from all eternity (negative reprobation) –> they die in unrepentant mortal sin –> God punishes them.

Punishment isn't first, it's last. First is justice, second is the desire to create beings dignified with free-will, third is the divine permission to allow these beings to act on their free-will in a deficient manner, then comes the sin, and finally the punishment. Negative reprobation isn't punishment; it's only a permission to allow someone to act in a way worthy of punishment. Yes, it would be monstrous if God created something firstly and primarily for the reason of punishing it. Again, in this order of intention you can see that the punishment itself is the least of God's concerns: first He is concerned with justice, and second He is concerned with preserving free-will. These are both very good things in themselves, whereas punishment is only a relative good. Even less does God desire to see His own creatures suffer; seeing as the suffering is only a consequence of their being punished. God certainly did not create the damned because He wished them to suffer; He permits the evil of their suffering only for the sake of a great good (divine Justice). The suffering in and of itself is something detestable to God.

And without God causing mankind not to be sinful, mankind cannot be anything other than sinful, for which then God turns around and punishes mankind for what it had to be.

Of course mankind can be something other than sinful. All men need to do is stop resisting sufficient grace. If you respond, "they can't stop resisting sufficient grace without an additional efficacious grace." My response is: it's not that they can't, it's that they won't.

Sufficient grace is sufficient – to make a man a saint. It's just that it won't in fact make a man a saint, because the sinner will not co-operate with it.

But again, you fail to answer whether lack of resistance to sufficient grace is ontologically prior to efficacious grace or subsequent to it.  You want to have it both ways: pretend that it is prior to efficacious grace in order to be able to place blame on the reprobate; but then pretend that it is subsequent to efficacious grace in order to make God the sole author of salvation.

Efficacious grace removes man's resistance and makes Him actively co-operate with grace; so it's neither prior nor subsequent, it's one and the same thing.

[John Lamb]

Not every potency carries with it a real possibility of actualization at all times and places in the actual world; a cold object is potentially hot, but it won't become actually hot as long as it remains in the freezer.  But most importantly, since God is First Mover, it is a necessary and sufficient condition that He (as first in the chain) move the potency to act.  Without His moving it, it is impossible that it move from potency to act.  Thomists are thus arguing nonsensically that, despite God's failure to move the potency to act, such motion is still "possible", conflating (quite ridiculously) ALL possible worlds, in which case yes the motion is possible, and the ACCESSIBLE possible worlds given God's failure to move the potency to act, in which case the motion is NOT possible (it doesn't occur in any of those worlds).

Not every potency carries with it a real possibility of actualization at all times and places in the actual world; a cold object is potentially hot, but it won't become actually hot as long as it remains in the freezer.

Yet we're not dealing with material objects here which are limited by whatever materials conditions they happen to be placed in; but with spiritual creatures which have free-will, and with a spiritual potency (to do good) which sufficient grace really endows them with whenever their free-will is active.

But most importantly, since God is First Mover, it is a necessary and sufficient condition that He (as first in the chain) move the potency to act.  Without His moving it, it is impossible that it move from potency to act.  Thomists are thus arguing nonsensically that, despite God's failure to move the potency to act, such motion is still "possible" . . .

God would move the potency to act if not for man's sinful resistance. Following such sinful resistance, God permits it to remain a mere inactive potency.

To get around this, of course, they point to the soul's "resistance" to grace but never precisely define the term.  If non-resistance to grace is an act of the will, then that must first exist in potency, and then be moved by God from potency to act, so the same difficulty reappears.

"Non-resistance to grace" – I think you're inventing something here. Non-resistance to grace is nothing. Even rocks have a non-resistance to grace . . . I think you mean an active co-operation with grace, which is what efficacious grace provides.

Those two statements are directly contradictory if you substitute "not saved" for "damned".
All souls which are saved are saved solely because God from all eternity has chosen those souls (e.g. God's choice is the sole determinant factor).
Nobody is not saved solely because God failed to choose them, but other factors are involved (e.g. God's choice is not the sole determinant factor).

The reason is that the state of glory is beyond man's power and requires an infused supernatural virtue which is given gratuitously by God. The state of damnation, however, is within man's natural capacity to sin. So to be saved belongs primarily to God, and to be damned belongs primarily to man. Both, however, are foreknown by God from all eternity.

Again, your God is not a God of love but a vain, arbitrary egoist only concerned with what He can "manifest".

No, because in manifesting His mercy on the blessed He is giving them a quality which is really their own, and which they will eternally delight in though it has God for its source. He loves and blesses His creatures for their sake, and not just for His own. Hence, His willingness to die on the Cross. And even in the souls which God permits to fall into damnation in order to manifest His justice, He is willing to grant them various goods in this life, is willing to reveal Himself to them as much as they are ready to hear Him, etc. Really, He gives His creatures whatever they ask for. God gains nothing for Himself by creating the universe, because His glory and happiness are infinitely perfect before He creates anything. His creating the universe is a pouring out of His love for creatures. The manifestation of His mercy and His justice in the world are for His creatures' sake, and even if "all glory belongs to God" ultimately, God also wishes His creatures to participate in His glory. If some creatures fall short of that glory through sin, and end up on the receiving-end of divine Justice, that is not because God delights in punishing them or seeing them suffer, but for the greater building-up of the universe. True, God could make a universe in which everyone went to heaven, but without the sinners there to test the saints, the saints would never have had the opportunity to prove themselves and earn that degree of glory which God had predestined them to.

There are three kinds of people who serve me in this world. The first are the ones who believe me to be God and the giver of all things who has power over everything. They serve me with the intention of obtaining temporal goods and honor, but the things of heaven are as nothing to them, and they would just as soon lose them so that they can obtain present goods. Worldly success in everything falls to their share, according to their wishes. Since they have lost the eternal goods, I recompense them with temporal comforts for whatever good service they do for me, right down to the last farthing and their very last moment. The second are the ones who believe me to be God almighty and a strict judge, but who serve me out of fear of punishment and not out of love of heavenly glory. If they did not fear me, they would not serve me. The third are the ones who believe me to be the Creator of all things and true God and who believe me to be just and merciful. They do not serve me out of any fear of punishment but out of divine love and charity. They would prefer any punishment, if they could bear it, rather than once provoke me to anger. They truly deserve to be heard when they pray, since their will accords with my will. The first kind of servant will never depart from punishment or get to see my face. The second will not be punished as much but will still not get to see my face, unless he corrects his fear through penitence.

I am the Creator of heaven and earth. You were wondering, my bride, why I am so forbearing with the wicked. That is because I am merciful. My justice bears with them for a threefold reason and for a threefold reason my mercy spares them. 2 First, my justice bears with them so that their time may be fully completed. Just as you might ask a righteous king who has some prisoners why he does not put them to death, and his answer is: 'Because it is not yet time for the general session of the court where they can be heard and where those who hear can take greater warning.' In a similar way I tolerate the wicked until their time comes, so that their wickedness can be made known to others as well. 3 Did I not foretell the rejection of Saul long before it was known to men? I tolerated him for a long time in order that his wickedness might be shown to others. The second reason is that the wicked do perform some good works for which they ought to be rewarded down to the last particular. In this way, not the least little good they have done for me will go unrewarded, and they will accordingly receive their wages here on earth. 4 In the third place, it is in order to manifest God's glory and patience. It was for this reason that I tolerated Pilate, Herod, and Judas, although they were going to be damned. And if anyone asks why I tolerate this or that person, let him call to mind Judas and Pilate.

5 My mercy spares the wicked for a threefold reason as well. First of all, it is because of my enormous love, inasmuch as eternal punishment is long. For that reason, because of my great love, I tolerate them until the last moment in order that their punishment may be delayed by the extended prolongation of time. 6 In the second place, it is in order to allow their nature to be consumed by vices. Insofar as human nature gets consumed by sin, they would experience temporal death more bitterly if they had a younger constitution. A young constitution dies a more protracted and bitter death. 7 In the third place, it is for the betterment of good people and the conversion of some of the wicked. When good and righteous people are tormented by the wicked, it benefits the good and righteous since it leads them to refrain from sin or to gain greater merit. 8 Likewise, the wicked sometimes have a good effect on certain other wicked persons. When the latter reflect on the fate and evilness of the former, they think to themselves and say: 'What good does it do us to follow them?' And: 'Since the Lord is so patient it is better for us to repent.' 9 In this way they sometimes return to me, because they shudder to do the kinds of things those others do and, moreover, their conscience tells them they should not do those kinds of things. It is said that if a person has been stung by a scorpion, he can be cured by being anointed with the oil in which another reptile has died. 10 In like manner, sometimes a wicked person who sees someone else fall may be stung by remorse and be cured by reflecting on the evilness and vanity of the other.

There is not much of a difference if God's "allowance" is determining of the evil act, and not merely a necessary condition, as would be the case under libertarian free will.

Read the "Catechism on Motion" I posted above (several long screen captures).

[Quaremerepulisti]

it is logically impossible that sin does not occur given such permissive will . . .

Not at all. If the sinner's will was not deficient, if it did not resist sufficient grace, then it would not sin in the first place.

It is logically impossible given the permissive will that sinner's will not be deficient and not resist sufficient grace, because these are also things that God permits and must permit for the sin to occur.

In fact, WHATEVER defect you want to point to in the sinner, God had to permit that, otherwise it wouldn't be there; and such permission is ontologically primary to its presence.

So yes, God had to permit EVERYTHING logically associated with the sin (otherwise the sin wouldn't occur), and so yes, it is logically impossible that sin does not occur given the totality of God's permissive will.

God's permissive will is not at all sufficient to make someone sin. In addition to His permission, there needs also be the sinful will itself in the first place. God's allowing people to sin does not magically create the will to sin in people. The sinful will is already there, and God merely permits it.

So, you admit the "sinful will" must also be something permitted by God.

Also, if a "sinful will" exists (a determination to sin), a sin has already been committed.

The order of intention is like this:
God wishes to manifest His Justice in the universe –> God wills to create fallible creatures with the capacity for sin –> God foreknows that some of these creatures will indeed sin against Him, and He permits this from all eternity (negative reprobation) –> they die in unrepentant mortal sin –> God punishes them.

This would be fine if "foreknow" didn't mean "predetermine"; but that is what it means for you.  So why didn't God manifest His justice instead by causing all creatures to be good and rewarding them?  Because, you must answer, He wishes to manifest His Justice in the universe by the particular means of punishment. 

Negative reprobation isn't punishment; it's only a permission to allow someone to act in a way worthy of punishment. Yes, it would be monstrous if God created something firstly and primarily for the reason of punishing it.

And it is monstrous, since such permission entails that someone act in a way worthy of punishment.  Why did he create the reprobate?  To manifest His justice - knowing full well the only way that could possibly happen is by eternal torment given His prior choice not to save them.

Of course mankind can be something other than sinful. All men need to do is stop resisting sufficient grace. If you respond, "they can't stop resisting sufficient grace without an additional efficacious grace." My response is: it's not that they can't, it's that they won't.

Sufficient grace is sufficient – to make a man a saint. It's just that it won't in fact make a man a saint, because the sinner will not co-operate with it.

It is logically impossible for sufficient grace not to be resisted if God permits such resistance, as said earlier.

And again, define "resistance" vs. "non-resistance".  If resistance to grace is an evil, then non-resistance must be a good, if all evils are deprivations of due goods.  But then non-resistance to grace is also something which must be moved from potency to act by God.

Efficacious grace removes man's resistance and makes Him actively co-operate with grace; so it's neither prior nor subsequent, it's one and the same thing.

If efficacious grace removes man's resistance, then it is prior to it, obviously.

[Quaremerepulisti]

God would move the potency to act if not for man's sinful resistance. Following such sinful resistance, God permits it to remain a mere inactive potency...

"Non-resistance to grace" – I think you're inventing something here. Non-resistance to grace is nothing. Even rocks have a non-resistance to grace . . . I think you mean an active co-operation with grace, which is what efficacious grace provides.

No, that's not what I mean.  You need to define what "resistance to grace" actually is and how its opposite isn't something that can only be produced by efficacious grace.

If John doesn't resist the grace... that describes nothing about John?  That's not an accident, or any kind of attribute at all?
OK, but now if John does resist the grace, it has to describe something about him, otherwise he can't be charged with any kind of evil.  So it is something evil, but that particular evil is not the privation of a due good, but the privation of a nothing.  Do you agree with this?

Those two statements are directly contradictory if you substitute "not saved" for "damned".
All souls which are saved are saved solely because God from all eternity has chosen those souls (e.g. God's choice is the sole determinant factor).
Nobody is not saved solely because God failed to choose them, but other factors are involved (e.g. God's choice is not the sole determinant factor).

The reason is that the state of glory is beyond man's power and requires an infused supernatural virtue which is given gratuitously by God. The state of damnation, however, is within man's natural capacity to sin. So to be saved belongs primarily to God, and to be damned belongs primarily to man. Both, however, are foreknown by God from all eternity.

Typical Thomist evasion.  We are talking about what is the sole determining factor or not. 

No, because in manifesting His mercy on the blessed He is giving them a quality which is really their own, and which they will eternally delight in though it has God for its source. He loves and blesses His creatures for their sake...

Really?  All His creatures?

The St. Bridget revelations would actually prove my point, if true.  Christ bemoaning the wicked makes no sense if He has to convert them for them not to be wicked and refuses to do so.