Is a sin to lie in a game where it is allowed?

[GMC]

For example: A soccer player shooting a penalty, he'll try to deceive the goalkeeper to score a goal.

Or the card game: "The Werewolves of Millers Hollow":

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Werewolves_of_Millers_Hollow

In which if you are a wolf  you have to deceive the other team to win.

Etc. In these cases, in which lying is part of the game. Is it a sin?

[Kent]

I've wondered this too. On the one hand, I think that most games (whether a team sport or a board game) provide ample opportunity for mental reservations, which are allowed. For instance, I see most 'lying' in sports as a kind of mental reservation--its deceptive for a receiver in football to celebrate a spurious catch, but it isn't lying.

On the other hand, if the point of a certain game mechanic is to deceive (and lying is the most effective form of deception usually), and everyone knows that, then in those situations lying might be the same as sarcasm. Sarcasm is not a noble form or communication, but it isn't necessarily sinful, either.

It's a good question.

[TerrorDæmonum]

The Eighth Commandment

1 Q. What does the Eighth Commandment, Thou shalt not bear false witness, forbid?
A. The Eighth Commandment, Thou shalt not bear false witness, forbids false testimony in a court of justice, and it also forbids backbiting, detraction, calumny, adulation, rash judgement and rash suspicion and every sort of lying.

6 Q. What is a lie?
A. A lie is a sin which consists in asserting as true or false by word or act that which one does not believe to be really the case.

7 Q. How many kinds of lies are there?
A. There are three kinds: The jocose lie, the officious lie, and the malicious lie.

8 Q. What is a jocose lie?
A. A jocose lie is that which is told in jest and without injury to anyone.

9 Q. What is an officious lie?
A. An officious lie is a false statement to benefit oneself or another without injuring anyone else.

10 Q. What is a malicious lie?
A. A malicious lie is a false statement made to the injury of another.

11 Q. Is it ever lawful to tell a lie?
A. It is never lawful to tell a lie, neither in joke, nor for one's own benefit, nor for the benefit of another, because a lie is always bad in itself.

12 Q. What kind of sin is a lie?
A. A lie when jocose or officious is a venial sin; but when malicious it is a mortal sin if the harm done is grave.

The Main Kinds of Sins

11 Q. What is venial sin?
A. Venial sin is a lesser transgression of the divine Law, by which we slightly fail in some duty towards God, towards our neighbour, or towards ourselves.

12 Q. Why is it called venial?
A. It is called venial Because it is light compared with mortal sin; because it does not deprive us of divine grace; and because God more readily pardons us.

13 Q. Then little account need be made of venial sin?
A. That would be a very great mistake, not only because venial sin is always an offence against God; but also because it does no little harm to the soul.

14 Q. What harm does venial sin do the soul?
A. Venial sin: (1) Weakens and chills charity in us; (2) Disposes us to mortal sin; (3) Renders us deserving of great temporal punishments both in this world and in the next.

Article 1. Whether lying is always opposed to truth?

I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above (I-II:18:6; I-II:18:7).

Now it has been said above (II-II:109:1 ad 3) that the virtue of truth—and consequently the opposite vices—regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.

Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood—materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.

However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the "mind." Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.

That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of truth.

Article 3. Whether every lie is a sin?

On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 7:14): "Be not willing to make any manner of lie."

I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).

Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).

Reply to Objection 6. An action may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify."

Article 4. Whether every lie is a mortal sin?

On the contrary, Augustine says on Psalm 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy," etc.: "There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.

2390 Statements Liable to Misunderstanding or Misinterpretation.

(b) Misinterpretation to which a statement is open on account of its wording does not make the statement untruthful, if the context or circumstances sufficiently disclose the true meaning of the words. Examples: hyperbolical, ironical or other metaphorical speech; words spoken in jest or in terms of customary politeness, such as "your most obedient servant", statements made inquiringly or hypothetically (e.g., when a judge or prosecutor accuses a defendant of crime in order to discover the truth; cfr. Gen., xiii. 9), or by way of mere quotation or of fictitious narrative (e.g., fairy tales, stories, reveries), or of disputation as in school debates exercised for the sake of practice in argumentation. It is not a lie to write under a pen-name, to speak according to the personality one represents (Gen., xxxi. 13; Tob., v. 18), to answer according to the mind of a questioner, as when A says to B: "Have you seen your father?" meaning, "Do you know where he is?" and B replies: "I have not seen him," meaning "I do not know where he is." Lying contests, in which fishermen, sportsmen, etc., vie with one another to see who can tell the most incredible yarn or tall tale, are not in themselves sinful, but there may be circumstances (for example,scandal, deception, danger) that make them reprehensible.

[GMC]

Understood, venial sin.

Good distinction between lying and mental reservations.

[Melkor]

Uh, it's a game. Go for it.

[TerrorDæmonum]

Uh, it's a game. Go for it.

Decline from evil and do good, and dwell for ever and ever.

On the Commandments of God and of the Church

6 Q. Are we bound to observe the Commandments?
A. Yes, we are bound to observe the Commandments, because we are all bound to live according to the will of God who created us, and because a serious transgression against even one of them is enough to merit hell.

7 Q. Are we able to observe the Commandments?
A. Yes, without doubt we are able to observe God's Commandments, because God never commands anything that is impossible, and because He gives grace to observe them to those who ask it as they should.

8 Q. What, in a general way, should we consider in each of the Commandments?
A. In each of the Commandments we should consider its positive part and its negative part, that is, what it commands and what it forbids.

Article 9. Whether an individual action can be indifferent?

On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of judgment" (Matthew 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good or bad. For the same reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.

I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (Article 3), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.

The Eighth Commandment

6 Q. What is a lie?
A. A lie is a sin which consists in asserting as true or false by word or act that which one does not believe to be really the case.

11 Q. Is it ever lawful to tell a lie?
A. It is never lawful to tell a lie, neither in joke, nor for one's own benefit, nor for the benefit of another, because a lie is always bad in itself.

Article 1. Whether truth is a virtue?

On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.

I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in I:16:1; I:21:2. Secondly, truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is "that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good."

Article 1. Whether lying is always opposed to truth?

I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above (I-II:18:6; I-II:18:7).

Now it has been said above (II-II:109:1 ad 3) that the virtue of truth—and consequently the opposite vices—regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.

Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood—materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.

However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the "mind." Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.

That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of truth.

Article 3. Whether every lie is a sin?

On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 7:14): "Be not willing to make any manner of lie."

I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).

Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).

Reply to Objection 6. An action may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify."

A fool worketh mischief as it were for sport: but wisdom is prudence to a man.

[Melkor]

Damn, you're fast.

[TerrorDæmonum]

Damn, you're fast.

And if any man think himself to be religious, not bridling his tongue, but deceiving his own heart, this man's religion is vain.

Even so the tongue is indeed a little member, and boasteth great things. Behold how small a fire kindleth a great wood.

And the tongue is a fire, a world of iniquity. The tongue is placed among our members, which defileth the whole body, and inflameth the wheel of our nativity, being set on fire by hell. For every nature of beasts, and of birds, and of serpents, and of the rest, is tamed, and hath been tamed, by the nature of man:  But the tongue no man can tame, an unquiet evil, full of deadly poison.  By it we bless God and the Father: and by it we curse men, who are made after the likeness of God. Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing. My brethren, these things ought not so to be.

And in fine, be ye all of one mind, having compassion one of another, being lovers of the brotherhood, merciful, modest, humble: Not rendering evil for evil, nor railing for railing, but contrariwise, blessing: for unto this are you called, that you may inherit a blessing. For he that will love life, and see good days, let him refrain his tongue from evil, and his lips that they speak no guile.

Let him decline from evil, and do good: let him seek after peace and pursue it: Because the eyes of the Lord are upon the just, and his ears unto their prayers: but the countenance of the Lord upon them that do evil things.

[Melkor]

"By it we bless God and the Father: and by it we curse men, who are made after the likeness of God. Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing."

Sounds like me on a Monday morning at work.

[OCLittleFlower]

If the "fake out" directed at the goalkeeper is an expected part of the game, it's almost certainly fine.

If a game such as the one with the wolf involves "lying" as part of it, that seems to me like a form of roleplay or play acting. There is no sin against the other players.

[The Curt Jester]

If you can't fool a goalkeeper into thinking the kick will go elsewhere, you might as well just say all sports are immoral.  The pump fake in basketball?  Venial sin.  The fake hand-off in football?  Venial sin.  Unexpected spin on a ping-pong serve?  Venial sin. 

Sometimes you just have to use some common sense.

[TerrorDæmonum]

Sometimes you just have to use some common sense.

Article 3. Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of singulars also."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3), to prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.

Article 15. Whether prudence is in us by nature?

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Article 4). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.

The Main Kinds of Sins

3 Q. What evil effects has the sin of Adam brought upon us?
A. The evil effects of the sin of Adam are: The privation of grace, the loss of Paradise, together with ignorance, inclination to evil, death, and all our other miseries.

The Eighth Commandment

6 Q. What is a lie?
A. A lie is a sin which consists in asserting as true or false by word or act that which one does not believe to be really the case.

On The Cardinal Virtues

58 Q. What is Prudence?
A. Prudence is the virtue that directs each action towards its lawful end and consequently seeks the proper means in order that the action be well accomplished in all points of view and thereby pleasing to Our Lord.

The Eighth Commandment

Excuses for Lying Refuted

The Pleas Of Convenience, Amusement, And Advantage

With regard to those who defend their conduct by saying that to speak the truth is often attended with inconvenience, priests should answer that (such an excuse) is an accusation, not a defence, since it is the duty of a Christian to suffer any inconvenience rather than utter a falsehood.

There remain two other classes of persons who seek to justify lying: those who say that they tell lies for the sake of amusement, and those who plead motives of interest, claiming that without recourse to lies, they can neither buy nor sell to advantage. The pastor should endeavour to reform both these kinds of liars. He should correct the former by showing how strong a habit of sinning is contracted by their practice, and by strongly impressing upon them the truth that for every idle word they shall render an account. As for the second class, he should upbraid them with greater severity, because their very excuse is a most serious accusation against themselves, since they show thereby that they yield no faith or confidence to these words of God: Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.

you might as well just say all sports are immoral.

Question 168. Modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body

Article 3. Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?

On the contrary, A gloss on Proverbs 14:13, "Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A mourning that will last for ever." Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.

I answer that, In all things dirigible according to reason, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated (Article 2) that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason. Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be "discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene," when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.

Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience to God.

[The Curt Jester]

Can we see some posting on scrupulosity?

[TerrorDæmonum]

The Necessity of Purging Away All Tendency to Venial Sins

As daylight waxes, we, gazing into a mirror, see more plainly the soils and stains upon our face; and even so as the interior light of the Holy Spirit enlightens our conscience, we see more distinctly the sins, inclinations and imperfections which hinder our progress towards real devotion. And the selfsame light which shows us these blots and stains, kindles in us the desire to be cleansed and purged therefrom.

You will find then, my child, that besides the mortal sins and their affections from which your soul has already been purged, you are beset by sundry inclinations and tendencies to venial sin; mind, I do not say you will find venial sins, but the inclination and tendency to them. Now, one is quite different from the other. We can never be altogether free from venial sin,--at least not until after a very long persistence in this purity; but we can be without any affection for venial sin. It is altogether one thing to have said something unimportant not strictly true, out of carelessness or liveliness, and quite a different matter to take pleasure in lying, and in the habitual practice thereof. But I tell you that you must purify your soul from all inclination to venial sin;--that is to say, you must not voluntarily retain any deliberate intention of permitting yourself to commit any venial sin whatever. It would be most unworthy consciously to admit anything so displeasing to God, as the will to offend Him in anywise. Venial sin, however small, is displeasing to God, although it be not so displeasing as the greater sins which involve eternal condemnation; and if venial sin is displeasing to Him, any clinging which we tolerate to mortal sin is nothing less than a resolution to offend His Divine Majesty. Is it really possible that a rightly disposed soul can not only offend God, but take pleasure therein?

These inclinations, my child, are in direct opposition to devotion, as inclinations to mortal sin are to love:--they weaken the mental power, hinder Divine consolations, and open the door to temptations;--and although they may not destroy the soul, at least they bring on very serious disease. "Dead flies cause the ointment to send forth a stinking savour," says the Wise Man.He means that the flies which settle upon and taste of the ointment only damage it temporarily, leaving the mass intact, but if they fall into it, and die there, they spoil and corrupt it. Even so venial sins which pass over a devout soul without being harboured, do not permanently injure it, but if such sins are fostered and cherished, they destroy the sweet savour of that soul--that is to say, its devotion. The spider cannot kill bees, but it can spoil their honey, and so encumber their combs with its webs in course of time, as to hinder the bees materially. Just so, though venial sins may not lose the soul, they will spoil its devotion, and so cumber its faculties with bad habits and evil inclinations, as to deprive it of all that cheerful readiness which is the very essence of true devotion; that is to say, if they are harboured in the conscience by delight taken therein. A trifling inaccuracy, a little hastiness in word or action, some small excess in mirth, in dress, in gaiety, may not be very important, if these are forthwith heeded and swept out as spiritual cobwebs;--but if they are permitted to linger in the heart, or, worse still, if we take pleasure in them and indulge them, our honey will soon be spoilt, and the hive of our conscience will be cumbered and damaged. But I ask again, how can a generous heart take delight in anything it knows to be displeasing to its God, or wish to do what offends Him?

The Sacrament of Penance

25 Q. What is the examination of conscience?
A. The examination of conscience is a diligent search for the sins committed since the last good confession.

26 Q. How is the examination of conscience made?
A. The examination of conscience is made by carefully calling to mind before God all the sins committed but not confessed, in thought, word, deed and omission, against the Commandments of God and the Church, and against the duties of our state.

27 Q. On what else should we examine ourselves?
A. We should also examine ourselves on our bad habits and on the occasions of sin.

28 Q. In our examination should we also try to discover the number of our sins?
A. In our examination we should also try to discover the number of our mortal sins.

[TheSaintsAreComing]

By the same logic that "lying" in a game of trickery is a sin, is acting also a sin? I mean these are people up there simulating whole scenarios that got nothing to do with reality