Sufficient grace to elude formally mortal sins or sins of grave matter?

[St. Columba]

My question is: does God give sufficient grace to avoid formal mortal sins (grave matter, full knowledge, full consent all present), or does He give sufficient grace to avoid all sins that are grave matter?

Consider a person who is addicted to something that is gravely sinful (alcoholism, masturbation, etc...).  Under the assumption that the will is not free when the person consents, as the addiction is acutely present, is it guaranteed that God will give the minimum requisite grace to avoid any materially objective mortal sin, or just the minimum grace to ward off a formally contracted mortal sin?

I think the answer is the latter, but I suspect some of you will disagree.  I am interested in your reasons.

My main argument for believing it is the latter is that (a) AFAIK, God does not give sufficient grace to avoid every venial sin (although, I even have problems integrating this into my thinking), and (b) He gives sufficient grace for salvation to everyone, but not sufficient grace to never offend him venially (again, hard for me to accept....but anyways...)

Ok.  So, say some guy is addicted to the solitary sexual sin say.  And, suppose the will is not completely free (condition of anxiety, grave fear, force of habit, all present).  I think there is a good case here that the sin is only venial.  So, must we assume God gave sufficient grace to elude the sin?  I think not, but am not sure.

Or, take a 5 year old who rejects the Catholic religion.  Objectively grave, but no full knowledge.  Hence, no mortal sin, and therefore, God did not "have to" give sufficient grace.  Or did he?

(I suspect many of you will react viscerally to the implications of my first scenario, but not the second, which is incongruous, I think.)

Thanks for any information.

[St.Justin]

 C. Protestant Errors

"Luther and Calvin taught as their fundamental error that no free will properly so called remained in man after the fall of our first parents; that the fulfillment of God's precepts is impossible even with the assistance of grace, and that man in all his actions sins. Grace is not an interior gift, but something external. To some sin is not imputed, because they are covered as with a cloak by the merits of Christ. Faith alone saves, there is no necessity for good works. Sin in Luther's doctrine cannot be a deliberate transgression of the Divine law. Jansenius, in his "Augustinus", taught that according to the present powers of man some of God's precepts are impossible of fulfilment, even to the just who strive to fulfil them, and he further taught that grace by means of which the fulfilment becomes possible is wanting even to the just. His fundamental error consists in teaching that the will is not free but is necessarily drawn either by concupiscence or grace. Internal liberty is not required for merit or demerit. Liberty from coercion suffices. Christ did not die for all men. Baius taught a semi-Lutheran doctrine. Liberty is not entirely destroyed, but is so weakened that without grace it can do nothing but sin. True liberty is not required for sin. A bad act committed involuntarily renders man responsible (propositions 50-51 in Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchiridion", nn. 1050-1). All acts done without charity are mortal sins and merit damnation because they proceed from concupiscence. This doctrine denies that sin is a voluntary transgression of Divine law. If man is not free, a precept is meaningless as far as he is concerned. "

[An aspiring Thomist]

Good questions. One thing to note is that even if God didn't give grace or rather an abundant amount of grace to avoid grave matter, I think most Catholics today would apply that way to generally. I had a religion teacher tell me one time that she thought almost no suicides were in fact mortally sinful because of lack of full concent. Same for many other grave sins.

[St.Justin]

"The Church strives continually to impress her children with a sense of the awfulness of sin that they may fear it and avoid it. We are fallen creatures, and our spiritual life on earth is a warfare. Sin is our enemy, and while of our own strength we cannot avoid sin, with God's grace we can. If we but place no obstacle to the workings of grace we can avoid all deliberate sin. If we have the misfortune to sin, and seek God's grace and pardon with a contrite and humble heart, He will not repel us. Sin has its remedy in grace, which is given us by God, through the merits of His only-begotten Son, Who has redeemed us, restoring by His passion and death the order violated by the sin of our first parents, and making us once again children of God and heirs of heaven. Where sin is looked on as a necessary and unavoidable condition of things human, where inability to avoid sin is conceived as necessary, discouragement naturally follows. Where the Catholic doctrine of the creation of man in a superior state, his fall by a willful transgression, the effects of which fall are by Divine decree transmitted to his posterity, destroying the balance of the human faculties and leaving man inclined to evil; where the dogmas of redemption and grace in reparation of sin are kept in mind, there is no discouragement. Left to our-selves we fall, by keeping close to God and continually seeking His help we can stand and struggle against sin, and if faithful in the battle we must wage shall be crowned by God in heaven."
My two post are from A. C. O'NEIL a domican. https://www.catholic.com/encyclopedia/sin

[St. Columba]

A related question: how can God not give sufficient grace to avoid venial sin? 

The purpose of life is to glorify God.  We don't glorify him, and we turn away from our proper end, when we sin, either mortally or venially.  So why does God only guarantee sufficient grace in the former case?  The fact that we are still saved in the latter seems to be a lesser consideration, and a woefully inadequate answer.

How can God not provide enough grace, at a minimum, so that his creatures can meet the minimum requirements for their very raison d'etre?  (maybe he did initially before the Fall? ...is that the answer? ..ah yes, it might be!)

Just to be clear, I am just asking questions to gain knowledge.  I am not trying to challenge God or the faith.  I think sometimes I give that impression, but it is my way of investigating things, I guess....thanks...

[St.Justin]

A related question: how can God not give sufficient grace to avoid venial sin? 

The purpose of life is to glorify God.  We don't glorify him, and we turn away from our proper end, when we sin, either mortally or venially.  So why does God only guarantee sufficient grace in the former case?  The fact that we are still saved in the latter seems to be a lesser consideration, and a woefully inadequate answer.

How can God not provide enough grace, at a minimum, so that his creatures can meet the minimum requirements for their very raison d'etre?  (maybe he did initially before the Fall? ...is that the answer? ..ah yes, it might be!)

Just to be clear, I am just asking questions to gain knowledge.  I am not trying to challenge God or the faith.  I think sometimes I give that impression, but it is my way of investigating things, I guess....thanks...

"If we but place no obstacle to the workings of grace we can avoid all deliberate sin" This means that His Grace is in fact sufficient to avoid sin but it does not interfere with our free will.
You are also somewhat correct about our fallen nature( or concupience). Before the fall we were in what is called a preternatural state. One of the effects of this is that man could not be tempted internally but only externally. This one of the reasons I laugh when people talk about Jesus being tempted.

[Kreuzritter]

And, suppose the will is not completely free (condition of anxiety, grave fear, force of habit, all present).

What does that even mean, "will is not completely free"? An act is either deliberate or it is not - there is no "in between". Has grave fear made one lose ones mind? Has habit made the act reflexive without intervening judgment? If the idea of act X comes to my mind and I judge that I am going to perform it, then I am morally responsible for it - if it is a grave offence against the natural law then it is automatically mortal.

For the last time, unless I am actually deprived of my reason and volition in performing such an act, I am sinning mortally. Overwhelming temptation caused by factors like fear and habit is not a deprivation of that which makes me morally responsible in the first place, namely free agency. It may lessen the severity of my punishment on the side of my motives, but it doesn't change the nature of the act.

[Kreuzritter]

Or, take a 5 year old who rejects the Catholic religion. 

A five-year-old can't "reject" anything in that sense. He's not capable of such an intellectual act in the first place.

[Miriam_M]

What does that even mean, "will is not completely free"?

What it means is modernism imposed on Catholic dogma with the intent to undermine it.  For example, the men who wrote the modern "catechism," peppered with modernistic language with its excuses for deliberate sin.  The concept of "addiction" in contemporary society is completely out of control.  Habit is not addiction.  It's the willed continuation of an action that provides comfort, such as the habit of exploding and using expletives whenever one is angry, such as the overuse of recreational electronics, such as the habitual use and self-pleasuring from pornography, such as the avoidance of emotional pain, boredom, and work or activity of a productive nature, in exchange for recreational shopping. (When you're buying or looking, you're not producing; you're entertaining yourself -- just a form of self-pleasuring unless that looking/examination is purposefully related to work you do in or out of the home, or toward an act of love for another rightly loved.  Not all shopping, just excessive, repetitive, recreational & frivolous shopping.)  Etc.

So here's the way you confess these grave sins for which "you" (we) are 100% responsible:

Bless me Father, for I have sinned.
It has been X days/weeks/months/years since my last confession.  These are my sins, in order of gravity:
I allowed myself of my own free will to become habituated to [X activity], to such a serious level that it has become more difficult to remove myself from it than any other kind of sin I have ever done.  This sin has become a pattern in my life.  I have been negligent in delaying or excusing it, based on so-called "addiction" to it.  I now realize that I am responsible for that condition of addiction, adding to the gravity of my sin.  I beg God's forgiveness and implore your help, Father, in ridding this vice from my life so that I can share in divine life and to stop denying that I have control over my actions.

An act is either deliberate or it is not - there is no "in between". Has grave fear made one lose ones mind? Has habit made the act reflexive without intervening judgment? If the idea of act X comes to my mind and I judge that I am going to perform it, then I am morally responsible for it - if it is a grave offence against the natural law then it is automatically mortal.

Only mental situations truly out of the control of the individual excuse the individual from responsibility.  One of those situations is Alzheimer's disease.  Another is psychosis, chemically or biologically caused.

[St.Justin]

And, suppose the will is not completely free (condition of anxiety, grave fear, force of habit, all present).

What does that even mean, "will is not completely free"? An act is either deliberate or it is not - there is no "in between". Has grave fear made one lose ones mind? Has habit made the act reflexive without intervening judgment? If the idea of act X comes to my mind and I judge that I am going to perform it, then I am morally responsible for it - if it is a grave offence against the natural law then it is automatically mortal.

For the last time, unless I am actually deprived of my reason and volition in performing such an act, I am sinning mortally. Overwhelming temptation caused by factors like fear and habit is not a deprivation of that which makes me morally responsible in the first place, namely free agency. It may lessen the severity of my punishment on the side of my motives, but it doesn't change the nature of the act.

You seem to be confusing objective (the nature of the act) and subjective (will is not completely free or some other mitigating circumstance.)

[Miriam_M]

And, suppose the will is not completely free (condition of anxiety, grave fear, force of habit, all present).

What does that even mean, "will is not completely free"? An act is either deliberate or it is not - there is no "in between". Has grave fear made one lose ones mind? Has habit made the act reflexive without intervening judgment? If the idea of act X comes to my mind and I judge that I am going to perform it, then I am morally responsible for it - if it is a grave offence against the natural law then it is automatically mortal.

For the last time, unless I am actually deprived of my reason and volition in performing such an act, I am sinning mortally. Overwhelming temptation caused by factors like fear and habit is not a deprivation of that which makes me morally responsible in the first place, namely free agency. It may lessen the severity of my punishment on the side of my motives, but it doesn't change the nature of the act.

You seem to be confusing objective (the nature of the act) and subjective (will is not completely free or some other mitigating circumstance.)

I don't think he's confusing the two at all.  I think he is reaffirming the Church's traditional stance on the agency of the will and the limited situations in which the actor is not responsible for his actions.

Infants explore their bodies and discover many pleasurable areas with many of the senses -- touch, taste, etc.  It's part of their natural development.  Since God created that developmental stage, it is by nature good.  Second, they have not reached the age of reason so even bad or dangerous experiments with anything -- their bodies, objects, etc. -- have no moral value to them; it's just up to adults to keep infants from harming themselves through exploration.

But an older child or an adult who is not brain-impaired, brain-diseased, or brain-limited relative to his age of development, is responsible for his actions, both because of natural law and any adult instruction about right and wrong.  The only other 'mitigating circumstance' outside of brain impairment is being forced by someone to perform an immoral action -- physically forced, threatened, coerced, etc.  Voluntary habit is not the same thing as force, nor is it the same thing as lack of control. 

It is a dogma of the faith that outside of brain disease (which can produce compulsion) or coercion from the outside, it is always possible to resist temptations to sin.  That's not the same thing as saying all temptations are easy to conquer, or that all temptations are equally difficult for each person.  Some people are more tempted by food or material goods than they are by sexual sins.  But it is a dogma that grace is available for all temptations.  Persisting in any sin will seem to make that grace less available, but only because we are attached to the habit (venial or mortal).  It remains our moral responsibility to divest ourselves of comfortable habits.

[St. Columba]

It is a dogma of the faith that outside of brain disease (which can produce compulsion) or coercion from the outside, it is always possible to resist temptations to sin. 

Hi Miriam.  I am interested if you could provide an authoritative quote for this assertion.

If it is "always possible to resist sin", then it is possible to resist every venial sin through one's whole life.  Is that a claim you would like to make, as a logical consequence of your stated assertion?

Thanks for your valuable input Miriam.

[Non Nobis]

And, suppose the will is not completely free (condition of anxiety, grave fear, force of habit, all present).

What does that even mean, "will is not completely free"? An act is either deliberate or it is not - there is no "in between". Has grave fear made one lose ones mind? Has habit made the act reflexive without intervening judgment? If the idea of act X comes to my mind and I judge that I am going to perform it, then I am morally responsible for it - if it is a grave offence against the natural law then it is automatically mortal.

For the last time, unless I am actually deprived of my reason and volition in performing such an act, I am sinning mortally. Overwhelming temptation caused by factors like fear and habit is not a deprivation of that which makes me morally responsible in the first place, namely free agency. It may lessen the severity of my punishment on the side of my motives, but it doesn't change the nature of the act.

But St. Thomas does speak of an act (as opposed to willing that act; the willing is always free) being more or less voluntary in some sense of the word.

As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.

He speaks of acts done out of fear as being voluntary absolutely/simply but involuntary in some sense:

That which is done through fear, is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threatening.

If you have a gun pointed at you that influences you to do what is objectively a mortal sin, surely in some sense your act is less voluntary - your will doesn't WANT what you do; you are not happy to do it.  I think that reduces your culpability, but does not turn the mortal sin to venial. Absolutely speaking, your act was voluntary.

If fear turns your brain to mush (maybe not psychosis, but heading in that direction), both voluntariness and knowledge  might be affected. Only God can judge what is mortal and what is venial at this level (the workings of the mind and heart).

[Non Nobis]

And, suppose the will is not completely free (condition of anxiety, grave fear, force of habit, all present).

What does that even mean, "will is not completely free"? An act is either deliberate or it is not - there is no "in between". Has grave fear made one lose ones mind? Has habit made the act reflexive without intervening judgment? If the idea of act X comes to my mind and I judge that I am going to perform it, then I am morally responsible for it - if it is a grave offence against the natural law then it is automatically mortal.

For the last time, unless I am actually deprived of my reason and volition in performing such an act, I am sinning mortally. Overwhelming temptation caused by factors like fear and habit is not a deprivation of that which makes me morally responsible in the first place, namely free agency. It may lessen the severity of my punishment on the side of my motives, but it doesn't change the nature of the act.

But St. Thomas does speak of an act (as opposed to willing that act; the willing is always free) being more or less voluntary in some sense of the word.

As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.

He speaks of acts done out of fear as being voluntary absolutely/simply but involuntary in some sense:

That which is done through fear, is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threatening.

If you have a gun pointed at you that influences you to do what is objectively a mortal sin, surely in some sense your act is less voluntary - your will doesn't WANT what you do; you are not happy to do it.  I think that reduces your culpability, but does not turn the mortal sin to venial. Absolutely speaking, your act was voluntary.

If fear turns your brain to mush (maybe not psychosis, but heading in that direction), both voluntariness and knowledge  might be affected. Only God can judge what is mortal and what is venial at this level (the workings of the mind and heart).

St.Columba, notice this:  St. Thomas says that acting from concupiscence is in NO way involuntary (unlike acting from fear).  I think this should be obvious.

He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; for his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.

God DOES give the grace to do what is POSSIBLE - not sin in any way, in every case. You know, you will, you sin; no excuse of "insufficient grace". God can judge culpability, but there was grace and there is sin.

[Kreuzritter]

And, suppose the will is not completely free (condition of anxiety, grave fear, force of habit, all present).

What does that even mean, "will is not completely free"? An act is either deliberate or it is not - there is no "in between". Has grave fear made one lose ones mind? Has habit made the act reflexive without intervening judgment? If the idea of act X comes to my mind and I judge that I am going to perform it, then I am morally responsible for it - if it is a grave offence against the natural law then it is automatically mortal.

For the last time, unless I am actually deprived of my reason and volition in performing such an act, I am sinning mortally. Overwhelming temptation caused by factors like fear and habit is not a deprivation of that which makes me morally responsible in the first place, namely free agency. It may lessen the severity of my punishment on the side of my motives, but it doesn't change the nature of the act.

You seem to be confusing objective (the nature of the act) and subjective (will is not completely free or some other mitigating circumstance.)

I'm not confusing anything. An act is either deliberate on the part of the actor or it is not. This notion of there existing some kind of in-between state, which is repeatedly being implied here but left undefined, is a nonsense. It's as much a nonsense as the notion that the will, in itself, can be less than free. Your ability to insert a word in to a sentence in a manner that appears to obey the rules of language doesn't of itself make the result meaningful. "Will" is in its essence something that is free; speaking of a less-than-free will is like speaking of a less-than cognizant consciousness; I put forward that it is YOU who are confusing the pure act of willing with factors, like drives, which are external to the will itself but make it harder to choose "rightly" - nevertheless, if I choose, that act is, in itself, free in principle, an act of my spirit which is not ontologically mixed with material things or the lower processes of the soul. In the case of, e.g., an habitual reflex, intoxication by certain mind-altering substances, or madness, there generally isn't any act of the will involved when the body "sins".

Furthermore, there are some things in which it is impossible to separate the objective nature of the act from the subjective state of the one performing it: all sins of the mind, for one, but also a public sin like apostasy. At the risk of offending the dogmatic Aristotelians here I'd go further than that in saying that "acts" as being real self-identical "things" unto which one can impute a moral status, rather than abstractions of phenomenological processes, are only such by virtue of a real -self-identical subject consciously performing them - animals perform actions but do not act - and whenever a man acts he is morally responsible for that act, as it indeed "belongs" to him in the deepest ontological sense.