Catholic Principles for Voting

[Jayne]

Here is a large quote from Fr. Cranny's section on CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ONE MAY VOTE FOR UNWORTHY CANDIDATES in his dissertation Catholic Principles of the Obligation of Voting .  I am going to bold every instance of words that refer to allowance to vote and underline instances referring to obligation to vote when there are no worthy candidates:

When unworthy candidates are running for office, ordinarily a citizen does not have the obligation for voting for them. Indeed he would not be permitted to vote for them if there were any reasonable way of electing a worthy man, either by organizing another party, by using the "write in" method, or by any other lawful means. On the other hand, it would be licit to vote for an unworthy man if the choice were only between or among unworthy candidates; and it might even be necessary to vote for such an unworthy candidate (if the voting were limited to such personalities) and even for one who would render harm to the Church, provided the election were only a choice from among unworthy men and the voting for the less unworthy would prevent the election of another more unworthy.

Since the act of voting is good, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate provided there is a proportionate cause for the evil done and the good lost. This consideration looks simply to the act of voting itself and does not consider other factors such as scandal, encouragement of unworthy men, and a bad influence upon other voters. Obviously, if any or all of these other factors are present, the excusing cause for voting for an unworthy candidate would have to be proportionally graver. [177]

Lehmkuhl says that it is never allowed to vote absolutely for a man of evil principles, but hypothetice it may be allowed if the election is between men of evil principles. Then one should vote for him who is less evil (1) if he makes known the reason for his choice; (2) if the election is necessary to exclude a worse candidate. [178] The same author in his Casus conscientiae lists the general argument, adding that there must be no approbation of the unworthy man or of his programme. [179]

Tanquerey declares that if the vote is between a socialist and another liberal, the citizen may vote for the less evil, but he should publicly declare why he is voting this way, to avoid any scandalum pusillorum. [180] Prümmer says the same. [181] Actually, however, in the United States and in other countries where the balloting is secret, there seems to be no need of declaring one's manner of voting.

Several authors including Ubach, [181a] Merkelbach, [182] Iorio, [183] Piscetta-Gennaro, [184] and Sabetti-Barrett [185] allow for material cooperation in the election of an unworthy candidate when there are two unworthy men running for office. Ubach adds this point: (1) There must be no cooperation in the evil which the man brings upon society after assuming office; (2) The voting must not be taken as an approval of the candidate or of his unworthiness. Merkelbach asserts that such cooperation may be licit per accidens if there is no hope that good men will be elected without voting for the bad ones in the same election.

As a practical point it may be remarked that at times a citizen may have to vote for an unworthy man in order to vote for a worthy one, e.g., when people have to vote a straight party ticket, at least in a primary election when the "split ticket" is not permitted. However the good to be gained would have to outweigh the evil to be avoided, or at least be equal to it.

In his Casus Genicot, [186] sets up a case of an election between a liberal and a Communist. To avoid scandal the citizen should give reasons for voting for the liberal. One does not support the evil candidate but simply applies the principle of double effect. This author also says that a person may use a mental reservation in promising to vote for an unworthy man.

Cardinal Amette, Archbishop of Paris, implies the liceity of voting for an unworthy candidate when he writes of voting for a less worthy one. "It would be lawful to cast them," he writes," for candidates who though not giving complete satisfaction to all our legitimate demands, would lead us to expect from them a line of conduct useful to the country, rather than to keep your votes for those whose program would indeed be more perfect, but whose almost certain defeat might open the door to the enemies of religion and of the social order." [187]

Thus we may say that it is permitted to vote for unworthy candidates (that is, give material cooperation) if these are the only type of men on the ballot lists; in order to exclude the more unworthy; in order to secure the election of one who is somewhat unworthy instead of voting for a good man whose defeat is certain; and when the list is mixed containing both worthy and unworthy men, so that a citizen can vote for the former only by voting for the latter at the same time.

There is one reference to obligation as opposed to many sources speaking of permission.  And that sole reference to obligation is "might even be necessary".  If this is a collection of pre-conciliar authoritative sources (as it was introduced into our discussion - "a pretty solid pre-conciliar text with its quotations of pre-eminent moral theologians (Pruemmer and Tanqueray)"), the consensus position is clearly that voting for unworthy candidates is permissible rather than obligatory.  This is the position of the specifically mentioned Prummer and Tanqueray.  Even the one mention that it "might even be necessary" is accompanied by the statement that "ordinarily a citizen does not have an obligation."

While there are many references in authoritative sources to an obligation to vote, these refer to the norm, not to the extraordinary situation of choosing between unworthy candidates.  We have not seen any sources claiming that there is an absolute obligation to vote which pertains in all circumstances.

If voting for an unworthy candidate is permissible rather than obligatory, there is no basis for claiming that it is a mortal sin to abstain from voting when both candidates are unworthy. 

[mikemac]

Simply being wrong is not a sin.

In this instance Monsignor Charles Pope would disagree when he writes this in his 09/29/2016 article titled
'Vote as a Catholic with a Catholic Moral Vision'
http://www.ncregister.com/blog/msgr-pope/vote-as-a-catholic-with-a-catholic-moral-vision

Proverbs 24 says, Rescue those who are being led off to death; hold back those who are being carried to slaughter. And if you say, "Behold, we did not know this," does not he who weighs the heart perceive you? Does not he who keeps watch over your soul know it, and will he not repay man according to his work? (Prov 24:11-14) If we do not oppose this moral evil, we are part of the problem and God will judge us.

Do you understand what culpability means?

Yes, it means blame or the responsibility for a fault or wrong.

Synonyms: guilt, blame, fault, responsibility, accountability, liability, answerability.

[Greg]

It would appear to me that you need Catholic principles, for voting.

[Jayne]

We need to understand Catholic principles in order to understand what we read about voting. In another thread, mikemac gives a large number of quotes from multiple authors and chides me for disregrding them. However, most, if not all, of them are consistent with my position. This is clear when one understands the underlying principles.

1) Normally there is an obligation to vote. Depending on the motives and circumstances, abstaining from voting can be a mortal or venial sin. (Although it is not necessairly a sin.)

2) Normally it is a sin to vote for candidates who support grave intrinsic evils, especially the evil of abortion since this attacks the most fundamental right.

3) Neither of these norms is binding in the extraordinary situation in which both candidates support abortion or a comparable evil. There is no longer an obligation to vote. One may vote for the candidate who supports abortion less.

We need to know these principles to understand statements made about voting. We need to identify whether a given statement refers to the norm or the exception. Because a choice between Trump and Clinton involves two candidates who support abortion, we need to apply the principles which pertain to that situation. Recognizing that one is in the extraordinary situation in no way denies the norms.

Imagine a Catholic who believes that Trump is the one that Catholics ought to vote for, but doesn't think it is worth the bother because she lives in a blue state and her vote won't make a difference. To this person we should speak of the obligation to vote and the possibility that she sins by abstaining. It does not however makes sense to say such things to a person who says that she cannot in good conscience vote for a person who supports abortion to the degree that Trump does, not even to prevent the election of Clinton. This latter person is following Catholic principles.

[Miriam_M]

We need to know these principles to understand statements made about voting. We need to identify whether a given statement refers to the norm or the exception. Because a choice between Trump and Clinton involves two candidates who support abortion, we need to apply the principles which pertain to that situation. Recognizing that one is in the extraordinary situation in no way denies the norms.

Imagine a Catholic who believes that Trump is the one that Catholics ought to vote for, but doesn't think it is worth the bother because she lives in a blue state and her vote won't make a difference. To this person we should speak of the obligation to vote and the possibility that she sins by abstaining. It does not however makes sense to say such things to a person who says that she cannot in good conscience vote for a person who supports abortion to the degree that Trump does, not even to prevent the election of Clinton. This latter person is following Catholic principles.

Moral theology doesn't work in such a narrow and simplistic model as this, Jayne.  Catholic moral theology is built on hierarchies of good and evil, as well as the magnification of good and evil, and degrees of good and evil, both in individual culpability (about anything) and in collective outcomes.  Clinton doesn't "just" support abortion; she does much more than that.  She consciously represents and champions contempt for woman's biological role in preference for an artificial construct -- a construct which has been shown to support the frequency of abortion.  She pushes federally funded child care so that women can work outside the home....so that they can prefer their careers over motherhood....so that an "inconvenient" conceptus can be disposed of with the support of federal policies and federal dollars.  Clinton's model of womanhood is to rip it from its moorings as soon and as much as possible, with deliberate purpose and speed.  Importantly, she and her marketing people consciously shape her image as one that young girls should model themselves after.  Thus, she is, symbolically, one who sees herself as forming young women away from their inconvenient biological roles and toward a masculine conception of womanhood.  Her influence is vastly more dangerous than that of Trump, whom people overall regard variously as foolish, humorous, egotistical, skillful, or decisive.  But he is not crafting an image of himself as the role model for young men, at least certainly not on the personal level.  With Hellary, the image-making and attempt at role-modeling is personal, persistent, and comprehensive.

Trump is also not attached to propaganda; Hellary is.  She speaks fluent propaganda (lies), and is thus dangerous to all classes of society.  She's a control freak and will stop at nothing to achieve her One World "vision."

[Graham]

He says one should vote for the less evil candidate, not that one who is voting should vote for the less evil candidate.

Look at the passage as a whole.

Lehmkuhl says that it is never allowed to vote absolutely for a man of evil principles, but hypothetice it may be allowed if the election is between men of evil principles. Then one should vote for him who is less evil (1) if he makes known the reason for his choice; (2) if the election is necessary to exclude a worse candidate.

The first sentence sentence says that voting for a man of evil principles may be allowed, i.e. it is permissible, if the election is between men of evil principle.  The next sentence begins with then connecting it to the first sentence.  It means "when in the situation just described" i.e. taking up the allowance to choose between men of evil principles.  In that situation, one should vote for the less evil and meet conditions (1) and ( 2).  It is not a general statement of "one should vote for him who is less evil".

Right, it says that in such an election, one should vote for the less evil candidate.

[Graham]

Here is a large quote from Fr. Cranny's section on CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ONE MAY VOTE FOR UNWORTHY CANDIDATES in his dissertation Catholic Principles of the Obligation of Voting .  I am going to bold every instance of words that refer to allowance to vote and underline instances referring to obligation to vote when there are no worthy candidates:

When unworthy candidates are running for office, ordinarily a citizen does not have the obligation for voting for them. Indeed he would not be permitted to vote for them if there were any reasonable way of electing a worthy man, either by organizing another party, by using the "write in" method, or by any other lawful means. On the other hand, it would be licit to vote for an unworthy man if the choice were only between or among unworthy candidates; and it might even be necessary to vote for such an unworthy candidate (if the voting were limited to such personalities) and even for one who would render harm to the Church, provided the election were only a choice from among unworthy men and the voting for the less unworthy would prevent the election of another more unworthy.

Since the act of voting is good, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate provided there is a proportionate cause for the evil done and the good lost. This consideration looks simply to the act of voting itself and does not consider other factors such as scandal, encouragement of unworthy men, and a bad influence upon other voters. Obviously, if any or all of these other factors are present, the excusing cause for voting for an unworthy candidate would have to be proportionally graver. [177]

Lehmkuhl says that it is never allowed to vote absolutely for a man of evil principles, but hypothetice it may be allowed if the election is between men of evil principles. Then one should vote for him who is less evil (1) if he makes known the reason for his choice; (2) if the election is necessary to exclude a worse candidate. [178] The same author in his Casus conscientiae lists the general argument, adding that there must be no approbation of the unworthy man or of his programme. [179]

Tanquerey declares that if the vote is between a socialist and another liberal, the citizen may vote for the less evil, but he should publicly declare why he is voting this way, to avoid any scandalum pusillorum. [180] Prümmer says the same. [181] Actually, however, in the United States and in other countries where the balloting is secret, there seems to be no need of declaring one's manner of voting.

Several authors including Ubach, [181a] Merkelbach, [182] Iorio, [183] Piscetta-Gennaro, [184] and Sabetti-Barrett [185] allow for material cooperation in the election of an unworthy candidate when there are two unworthy men running for office. Ubach adds this point: (1) There must be no cooperation in the evil which the man brings upon society after assuming office; (2) The voting must not be taken as an approval of the candidate or of his unworthiness. Merkelbach asserts that such cooperation may be licit per accidens if there is no hope that good men will be elected without voting for the bad ones in the same election.

As a practical point it may be remarked that at times a citizen may have to vote for an unworthy man in order to vote for a worthy one, e.g., when people have to vote a straight party ticket, at least in a primary election when the "split ticket" is not permitted. However the good to be gained would have to outweigh the evil to be avoided, or at least be equal to it.

In his Casus Genicot, [186] sets up a case of an election between a liberal and a Communist. To avoid scandal the citizen should give reasons for voting for the liberal. One does not support the evil candidate but simply applies the principle of double effect. This author also says that a person may use a mental reservation in promising to vote for an unworthy man.

Cardinal Amette, Archbishop of Paris, implies the liceity of voting for an unworthy candidate when he writes of voting for a less worthy one. "It would be lawful to cast them," he writes," for candidates who though not giving complete satisfaction to all our legitimate demands, would lead us to expect from them a line of conduct useful to the country, rather than to keep your votes for those whose program would indeed be more perfect, but whose almost certain defeat might open the door to the enemies of religion and of the social order." [187]

Thus we may say that it is permitted to vote for unworthy candidates (that is, give material cooperation) if these are the only type of men on the ballot lists; in order to exclude the more unworthy; in order to secure the election of one who is somewhat unworthy instead of voting for a good man whose defeat is certain; and when the list is mixed containing both worthy and unworthy men, so that a citizen can vote for the former only by voting for the latter at the same time.

There is one reference to obligation as opposed to many sources speaking of permission.  And that sole reference to obligation is "might even be necessary".  If this is a collection of pre-conciliar authoritative sources (as it was introduced into our discussion - "a pretty solid pre-conciliar text with its quotations of pre-eminent moral theologians (Pruemmer and Tanqueray)"), the consensus position is clearly that voting for unworthy candidates is permissible rather than obligatory.  This is the position of the specifically mentioned Prummer and Tanqueray.  Even the one mention that it "might even be necessary" is accompanied by the statement that "ordinarily a citizen does not have an obligation."

While there are many references in authoritative sources to an obligation to vote, these refer to the norm, not to the extraordinary situation of choosing between unworthy candidates.  We have not seen any sources claiming that there is an absolute obligation to vote which pertains in all circumstances.

If voting for an unworthy candidate is permissible rather than obligatory, there is no basis for claiming that it is a mortal sin to abstain from voting when both candidates are unworthy.

I read it in quite a different way. It is not meant to establish permissible rather than obligatory, but permissible rather than impermissible.

[Jayne]

He says one should vote for the less evil candidate, not that one who is voting should vote for the less evil candidate.

Look at the passage as a whole.

Lehmkuhl says that it is never allowed to vote absolutely for a man of evil principles, but hypothetice it may be allowed if the election is between men of evil principles. Then one should vote for him who is less evil (1) if he makes known the reason for his choice; (2) if the election is necessary to exclude a worse candidate.

The first sentence sentence says that voting for a man of evil principles may be allowed, i.e. it is permissible, if the election is between men of evil principle.  The next sentence begins with then connecting it to the first sentence.  It means "when in the situation just described" i.e. taking up the allowance to choose between men of evil principles.  In that situation, one should vote for the less evil and meet conditions (1) and ( 2).  It is not a general statement of "one should vote for him who is less evil".

Right, it says that in such an election, one should vote for the less evil candidate.

To be more precise, it says that, if one votes at all, one should vote for the less evil candidate. So, for example, one could not simply say "they both support abortion anyhow so I will vote for Clinton." One needs to establish which is less evil.

My point was that the Lemkuhl quote is not saying that there is an obligation to vote in that situation.

[Jayne]

Moral theology doesn't work in such a narrow and simplistic model as this, Jayne.  Catholic moral theology is built on hierarchies of good and evil, as well as the magnification of good and evil, and degrees of good and evil, both in individual culpability (about anything) and in collective outcomes.  Clinton doesn't "just" support abortion; she does much more than that.  She consciously represents and champions contempt for woman's biological role in preference for an artificial construct -- a construct which has been shown to support the frequency of abortion.  She pushes federally funded child care so that women can work outside the home....so that they can prefer their careers over motherhood....so that an "inconvenient" conceptus can be disposed of with the support of federal policies and federal dollars.  Clinton's model of womanhood is to rip it from its moorings as soon and as much as possible, with deliberate purpose and speed.  Importantly, she and her marketing people consciously shape her image as one that young girls should model themselves after.  Thus, she is, symbolically, one who sees herself as forming young women away from their inconvenient biological roles and toward a masculine conception of womanhood.  Her influence is vastly more dangerous than that of Trump, whom people overall regard variously as foolish, humorous, egotistical, skillful, or decisive.  But he is not crafting an image of himself as the role model for young men, at least certainly not on the personal level.  With Hellary, the image-making and attempt at role-modeling is personal, persistent, and comprehensive.

Trump is also not attached to propaganda; Hellary is.  She speaks fluent propaganda (lies), and is thus dangerous to all classes of society.  She's a control freak and will stop at nothing to achieve her One World "vision."

I don't disagree with your analysis of Clinton at all. This is why I would probably vote for Trump myself if I could vote. I was simplifying a bit to make it clearer how certain moral principles interact with each other.  You are right that the principle of hierarchies of good and evil is very important in voting decisions.  I am not sure that one could determine which is the less evil candidate without this principle.  In real life, a Catholic with a well-formed conscience would probably consider more factors than I mentioned.

I hope that it is clear that I am not suggesting that your decision to vote for Trump is in any way inconsistent with Catholic moral theology.  On the contrary, your reasoning reminds me of my own thought process in the last Canadian election.

I do not like voting.  The history of women in Canada getting the vote is morally problematic.  And I cannot stand how feminists claim women voting as justification and/or support of feminism.  In a way, it has been a relief to me that most of the recent elections here have been between candidates who similarly supported abortion and other grave intrinsic evils, meaning that I was not obliged to vote. The last election here, however, had a candidate so evil that I felt obliged in conscience to vote against him.

[Jayne]

Here is a large quote from Fr. Cranny's section on CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ONE MAY VOTE FOR UNWORTHY CANDIDATES in his dissertation Catholic Principles of the Obligation of Voting .  I am going to bold every instance of words that refer to allowance to vote and underline instances referring to obligation to vote when there are no worthy candidates:

When unworthy candidates are running for office, ordinarily a citizen does not have the obligation for voting for them. Indeed he would not be permitted to vote for them if there were any reasonable way of electing a worthy man, either by organizing another party, by using the "write in" method, or by any other lawful means. On the other hand, it would be licit to vote for an unworthy man if the choice were only between or among unworthy candidates; and it might even be necessary to vote for such an unworthy candidate (if the voting were limited to such personalities) and even for one who would render harm to the Church, provided the election were only a choice from among unworthy men and the voting for the less unworthy would prevent the election of another more unworthy.

Since the act of voting is good, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate provided there is a proportionate cause for the evil done and the good lost. This consideration looks simply to the act of voting itself and does not consider other factors such as scandal, encouragement of unworthy men, and a bad influence upon other voters. Obviously, if any or all of these other factors are present, the excusing cause for voting for an unworthy candidate would have to be proportionally graver. [177]

Lehmkuhl says that it is never allowed to vote absolutely for a man of evil principles, but hypothetice it may be allowed if the election is between men of evil principles. Then one should vote for him who is less evil (1) if he makes known the reason for his choice; (2) if the election is necessary to exclude a worse candidate. [178] The same author in his Casus conscientiae lists the general argument, adding that there must be no approbation of the unworthy man or of his programme. [179]

Tanquerey declares that if the vote is between a socialist and another liberal, the citizen may vote for the less evil, but he should publicly declare why he is voting this way, to avoid any scandalum pusillorum. [180] Prümmer says the same. [181] Actually, however, in the United States and in other countries where the balloting is secret, there seems to be no need of declaring one's manner of voting.

Several authors including Ubach, [181a] Merkelbach, [182] Iorio, [183] Piscetta-Gennaro, [184] and Sabetti-Barrett [185] allow for material cooperation in the election of an unworthy candidate when there are two unworthy men running for office. Ubach adds this point: (1) There must be no cooperation in the evil which the man brings upon society after assuming office; (2) The voting must not be taken as an approval of the candidate or of his unworthiness. Merkelbach asserts that such cooperation may be licit per accidens if there is no hope that good men will be elected without voting for the bad ones in the same election.

As a practical point it may be remarked that at times a citizen may have to vote for an unworthy man in order to vote for a worthy one, e.g., when people have to vote a straight party ticket, at least in a primary election when the "split ticket" is not permitted. However the good to be gained would have to outweigh the evil to be avoided, or at least be equal to it.

In his Casus Genicot, [186] sets up a case of an election between a liberal and a Communist. To avoid scandal the citizen should give reasons for voting for the liberal. One does not support the evil candidate but simply applies the principle of double effect. This author also says that a person may use a mental reservation in promising to vote for an unworthy man.

Cardinal Amette, Archbishop of Paris, implies the liceity of voting for an unworthy candidate when he writes of voting for a less worthy one. "It would be lawful to cast them," he writes," for candidates who though not giving complete satisfaction to all our legitimate demands, would lead us to expect from them a line of conduct useful to the country, rather than to keep your votes for those whose program would indeed be more perfect, but whose almost certain defeat might open the door to the enemies of religion and of the social order." [187]

Thus we may say that it is permitted to vote for unworthy candidates (that is, give material cooperation) if these are the only type of men on the ballot lists; in order to exclude the more unworthy; in order to secure the election of one who is somewhat unworthy instead of voting for a good man whose defeat is certain; and when the list is mixed containing both worthy and unworthy men, so that a citizen can vote for the former only by voting for the latter at the same time.

There is one reference to obligation as opposed to many sources speaking of permission.  And that sole reference to obligation is "might even be necessary".  If this is a collection of pre-conciliar authoritative sources (as it was introduced into our discussion - "a pretty solid pre-conciliar text with its quotations of pre-eminent moral theologians (Pruemmer and Tanqueray)"), the consensus position is clearly that voting for unworthy candidates is permissible rather than obligatory.  This is the position of the specifically mentioned Prummer and Tanqueray.  Even the one mention that it "might even be necessary" is accompanied by the statement that "ordinarily a citizen does not have an obligation."

While there are many references in authoritative sources to an obligation to vote, these refer to the norm, not to the extraordinary situation of choosing between unworthy candidates.  We have not seen any sources claiming that there is an absolute obligation to vote which pertains in all circumstances.

If voting for an unworthy candidate is permissible rather than obligatory, there is no basis for claiming that it is a mortal sin to abstain from voting when both candidates are unworthy.

I read it in quite a different way. It is not meant to establish permissible rather than obligatory, but permissible rather than impermissible.

That is how I read it too. The author assumes that normally it is not permissible to vote for an unworthy candidate and seeks to establish the conditions that allow for an exception.

I was writing about obligation because some people here seem to have misunderstood this passage as saying  that one is obliged to vote in this situation.

[Jayne]

Miriam and Graham, could you please clarify something?  I have not seen either of you make an explicit statement that US voters are obliged, under pain of mortal sin, to vote for Trump in this election.  Neither do I see this position implied in your posts.  Am I understanding this correctly?  Does either of you take this position?

[Graham]

Miriam and Graham, could you please clarify something?  I have not seen either of you make an explicit statement that US voters are obliged, under pain of mortal sin, to vote for Trump in this election.  Neither do I see this position implied in your posts.  Am I understanding this correctly?  Does either of you take this position?

I think it quite possible that they are. I don't feel confident enough to assert it more strongly than that. I will say that it is simply false that material cooperation in evil can never be necessary or morally obligatory. So when you have an evident moral difference with potentially grave consequences, a zero sum situation, and an obligation to help select an outcome, I think conditions are in place to make that argument.

[Jayne]

Miriam and Graham, could you please clarify something?  I have not seen either of you make an explicit statement that US voters are obliged, under pain of mortal sin, to vote for Trump in this election.  Neither do I see this position implied in your posts.  Am I understanding this correctly?  Does either of you take this position?

I think it quite possible that they are. I don't feel confident enough to assert it more strongly than that. I will say that it is simply false that material cooperation in evil can never be necessary or morally obligatory. So when you have an evident moral difference with potentially grave consequences, a zero sum situation, and an obligation to help select an outcome, I think conditions are in place to make that argument.

I think you must be right about material cooperation with evil in general, since Louis also said that.  I still have trouble understanding how it would work.  And I find it even more difficult to understand how it could apply to voting.  Doesn't the existence of the option of not voting mean that it cannot be considered a zero sum situation?

[Graham]

Miriam and Graham, could you please clarify something?  I have not seen either of you make an explicit statement that US voters are obliged, under pain of mortal sin, to vote for Trump in this election.  Neither do I see this position implied in your posts.  Am I understanding this correctly?  Does either of you take this position?

I think it quite possible that they are. I don't feel confident enough to assert it more strongly than that. I will say that it is simply false that material cooperation in evil can never be necessary or morally obligatory. So when you have an evident moral difference with potentially grave consequences, a zero sum situation, and an obligation to help select an outcome, I think conditions are in place to make that argument.

I think you must be right about material cooperation with evil in general, since Louis also said that.  I still have trouble understanding how it would work.  And I find it even more difficult to understand how it could apply to voting.  Doesn't the existence of the option of not voting mean that it cannot be considered a zero sum situation?

Zero sum refers to the possible outcomes, and suggests why voting third party might be wrong, at least if you're somewhere where one vote could conceivably affect the outcome. Not voting is an option, but on the other hand there is an obligation to vote, which is perhaps not always lifted by the absence of realistic Catholic options. It might be similar to say that not paying taxes is an option.

[Jayne]

Zero sum refers to the possible outcomes, and suggests why voting third party might be wrong, at least if you're somewhere where one vote could conceivably affect the outcome. Not voting is an option, but on the other hand there is an obligation to vote, which is perhaps not always lifted by the absence of realistic Catholic options. It might be similar to say that not paying taxes is an option.

We agree that in the ordinary situation there is an obligation to vote. In the extraordinary situation of both candidates supporting grave intrinsic evil, the authoritative sources say that, although it is normally wrong to vote for such candidate, it can be permissible to vote for the lesser evil, when meeting certain conditions.  You seem to be positing an extra-extraordinary situation in which, rather than being permissible to vote for the lesser evil, it is obligatory. 

If that were really the outcome of applying Catholic moral principles, I would have expected to see it mentioned in the sources.  Fr. Cranny's summary did not give any quotes from a moral theologian taking that position. It seems likely that he would have included such a quote if he knew of its existence.  Aren't we introducing a novelty when we claim there is an obligation in a situation that theologians traditionally did not make that claim for?