Catholic Principles for Voting

[Kaesekopf]

At first, I was assuming that the difference between Fr. Scott's and Fr. Cranny's writing could be attributed to these sort of differences in context and audience.    But, as I mention in another thread,  I have discovered something that raises the possibility of another explanation.  Fr. Cranny was deeply involved in the ecumenical movement.  This is an indication that he was influnced by modernist thinking. When he writes " it would be licit to vote for an unworthy man if the choice were only between or among unworthy candidates; and it might even be necessary to vote for such an unworthy candidate" the throwing in of a baseless "might" clause could be due to modernism.  It is the same technique for undermining traditional teaching that we see in "hell exists but there might not be anyone in it."  This would explain why Fr. Scott's "there can be no obligation to vote" for an unworthy candidate sounds like typical traditional moral theology, while Fr. Cranny's way of putting it seemed so strange and puzzling.

Hold up.  Have you found anything other than his obituary at Find-A-Grave to reinforce that he was "influnced by modernist thinking?"  For the record, let's check a few things out.  And, yea, this is one heck of a derail, because I think Jayne's WAY off base by saying this priest is a Modernist. 

First, his obituary.

Funeral services were held at Graymoor in Garrison April 30 for the Rev. Titus F. Cranny, SA, an Atonement Friar, who was wellknown among ecumenists and mariologists and who was influential in the early years of Roman Catholic involvement in the ecumenical movement in the United States. Father Cranny, 60, died April 28 after a prolonged illness. Born in Sioux City, Iowa, in 1921, Father Cranny came to Graymoor in 1939, received the Franciscan habit in 1941, and professed first vows as an Atonement Friar in 1942. He was ordained a priest at the Cathedral of the Epiphany, Sioux City, in 1948. Following his ordination, he returned to the Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, where he received a' master's degree in philosophy in 1949 and a doctorate in theology in 1952. In 1951 he was named rector of the Atonement Seminary, Washington, DC, and in 1954 he was appointed assistant director
of the Chair of Unity Apostolate at Graymoor, becoming national director the following year. From 1969 to 1972 he taught at Providence College and was assistant pastor at St. John Vianney Parish, Cumberland Hill, R.I. Failing health forced his early retirement in 1975. A noted interpreter of the life and influence of Father Paul Wattson, SA, founder of the Atonement Friars and pioneer American ecumenist, Father Cranny compiled and published privately fourteen volumes of "The Words of Father Paul." In addition to scores of articles which appeared in Catholic publications both in the United States and overseas, he authored several books, including "The Moral Obligation of Voting," "One Fold" and "Father Paul: Apostle of Unity." The latter volume was published in four languages. In 1963 he was awarded the University of Dayton's Marian Library Medal for publication of "Our Lady and Reunion." Once described in an Associated Press newsfeature as "looking more like a pro football tackle than a friendly friar," Father Cranny said that his greatest consolation was the League of Prayer for Unity which he helped to reestablish in 1955. Largely defunct in the United States, the League of Prayer continues to flourish in several European countries, most notably Italy. Rev. Kevin F. McMorrow, SA, superior general of the Atonement Friars, was principal celebrant and homilist at the Mass of Christian Burial at the Friary Chapel, Graymoor. Burial followed in the friars' cemetery at Graymoor. Father Cranny is survived by a brother, Robert, Sioux City, Iowa, and a sister, Sister Mary Lurana, BVM, Rock Island, Illinois.

So, he's an Atonement friar, well-known by ecumenists and mariologists.  That's not necessarily a bad thing.  If you look at the background of the Atonement Friars, you'll see they converted in the early 1900s.  Pope St Pius X approved a devotion of theirs, as well (the Chair of Unity Octave).

We see he was a biographer of Father Paul, and he also had a hand in "One Fold."  From John Vennari's article, we have this quote on the text "One Fold":

Father Edward Hanahoe [co-author or editor, it's hard to tell, with Fr Cranny], a superb theologian writing in the 1950s, pointed out a principal evil of the new ecumenism. He explained it has the effect of "perpetuating the state of separation, serving rather to keep people out of Church than to bring them into it."[3]
3. One Fold: Essays and Documents to Commemorate the Golden Jubilee of the Chair of Unity Octive, 1908-1958 edited by Edward F. Hanahoe, S.A., S.T.D., and Titus F. Cranny, S.A., S.T.D., M.A. [Graymoor: Chair of Unity Apostolate, 1959], p. 121.

Finally, we have this article penned by Fr Cranny in 1958 (go to page 6), where he writes about the Chair of Unity Octave, where, among other things, he writes the following:

The Chair of unity Octave should be a special time of prayer for all the faithful. Conscious of the precious gift of faith and longing to be instruments of salvation for others, they should burn with enthusiasm to promote the good of the Church and the welfare of souls. Father Paul said that we should share the longing of the Good Shepherd for the souls that are separated from the unity of the one fold. So we shall, in the measure that we appreciate the faith and love  the Incarnate Son of God.

He is also praised by an a presenter/writer in the text "Mary at the Foot of the Cross V: Immaculate Conception and Coredemption", a publishing of the "Acts of the International Symposium on Marian Coredemption", published by the FFI in 2005. 

Am I missing anything substantive out of Fr Cranny's life that would lead us to believe he is a Modernist or his thinking is somehow corrupted by Modernism?  Because, from what I'm gathering, he is a rather solid priest, author, and ecumenist (let us not forget that he was awarded his doctorate in sacred theology over the dissertation/text "Moral Obligation of Voting" in 1952 from CUA....).  Ecumenism is not a dirty word. 

[Jayne]

Hold up.  Have you found anything other than his obituary at Find-A-Grave to reinforce that he was "influnced by modernist thinking?"  For the record, let's check a few things out.  And, yea, this is one heck of a derail, because I think Jayne's WAY off base by saying this priest is a Modernist. 

I did not say that he was a modernist. I said there was evidence he was influenced by modernist thinking.  It is not sufficient evidence to conclude that Fr. Cranny was a modernist, just to raise it as a possibility. However, if he were a modernist, that would explain something that had puzzled me about what he wrote.

When a man is described as involved and influential in a movement don't you think this is evidence that he shares the thinking of the movement? The American ecumenism movement was known for modernism. However it is possible that Fr. Cranny himself had an orthodox understanding of ecumenism. We would need more evidence to say anything definite. 

Ecumenism is not a dirty word.

From the John Venari article you cited:

In 1933, when the ecumenical movement began to get underway, St. Maximilian Kolbe saw it for what it was. He declared ecumenism as the enemy of the Blessed Virgin Mary; a movement to be opposed and destroyed.

Fr. Cranny's obitituary describes him as influential in this movement.  We can't just assume that he was a solid pre-conciliar thinker as you did.  There is enough evidence to require further investigation before accepting him as a credible source.  Finding  a few good statements by him cannot be considered evidence that he was not a modernist, since it is a characteristic of modernism to mix together good and bad.  We would need to look at a large work by him on the topic of ecumenism to reach a conclusion.

[Jayne]

I don't see how it is possible to say of an act that, in itself, is material cooperation in grave intrinsic evil, that it is obligatory.  We could probably come up with a hypothetical situation in which it is clearly the most prudent decision, but that would not be the same as an absolute moral obligation.

OK, I do want to explore a hypothetical situation:

Suppose a mother has a starving child who needs to eat soon; to let it needlessly die of neglect would be a sin. Suppose there is no food in the house except a product made by a company that contributes to Planned Parenthood on occasion.

Using that product would be some kind of material cooperation with evil, correct? Perhaps "remote mediate material cooperation with a proportionately serious reason to justify tolerating the evil of another" (doing some googling!).

Now there is no moral obligation to use this product in general.  But isn't it possible that the mother would be committing the sin of imprudence if she let her child die, because she foolishly thought using the product would be a greater sin?

imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have

So couldn't there be the necessity (under pain of the sin of prudence, whether mortal or not) for material cooperation with evil here, in this specific instance, even if it is not an absolute moral obligation in general?

And are there other possible cases? (Perhaps this is where "angels fear to tread")

I don't think so. As I understand that section of the Summa, the sin of imprudence is not about how wrong or foolish the decision is but about the process of making the decision.  The person is at fault for not giving the matter sufficient thought or for not taking counsel, etc. rather than the imprudence in itself.  Simply being wrong is not a sin.

A person might commit a sin of this sort while deciding to refrain from material cooperation with evil but it is not the decision in itself that is sinful.

[Graham]

This is another moralist cited in Fr. Cranny:

Lehmkuhl says that it is never allowed to vote absolutely for a man of evil principles, but hypothetice it may be allowed if the election is between men of evil principles. Then one should vote for him who is less evil (1) if he makes known the reason for his choice; (2) if the election is necessary to exclude a worse candidate.

[Graham]

What is the moral principle that is operative in this discussion? When one lives under a democratic regime then one is morally required to vote? What if the regime is corrupt? What if you live under a tyrant who will manipulate all votes to justify his power? What if voting according to your conscience will result in your certain death? Will everyone here continue to tell us that it is a moral imperative to vote just as, say, not committing abortion is a moral imperative or attending Mass on Sunday is a moral imperative?

There actually are exceptions to the obligation to attend Mass on Sunday.  For example, one is not obliged if sick or if attending Mass endangers oneself physically or spiritually. The obligation to vote is similar in having exceptions that would remove the normal obligation.  Whether or not a given work on the subject will include information about exceptions is likely to depend on the context and the intended audience.  For example, if I were writing to people who believed that abortion is allowable, I would give little, if any, attention to the exceptions to "thou shalt not kill".  If I were writing to soldiers though, I would want to include lots of information on the principles which show that killing as part of a soldier's duty is an exception to the norm.

At first, I was assuming that the difference between Fr. Scott's and Fr. Cranny's writing could be attributed to these sort of differences in context and audience.    But, as I mention in another thread,  I have discovered something that raises the possibility of another explanation.  Fr. Cranny was deeply involved in the ecumenical movement.  This is an indication that he was influnced by modernist thinking.  When he writes " it would be licit to vote for an unworthy man if the choice were only between or among unworthy candidates; and it might even be necessary to vote for such an unworthy candidate" the throwing in of a baseless "might" clause could be due to modernism.  It is the same technique for undermining traditional teaching that we see in "hell exists but there might not be anyone in it."  This would explain why Fr. Scott's "there can be no obligation to vote" for an unworthy candidate sounds like typical traditional moral theology, while Fr. Cranny's way of putting it seemed so strange and puzzling.

I don't believe there's any issue with Fr. Cranny's "might" clause.

When unworthy candidates are running for office, ordinarily a citizen does not have the obligation of voting for them. Indeed he would not be permitted to vote for them if there were any reasonable way of electing a worthy man, either by organizing another party, by using the "write in" method, or by any other lawful means. On the other hand, it would be licit to vote for an unworthy man if the choice were only between or among unworthy candidates; and it might even be necessary to vote for such an unworthy candidate (if the voting were limited to such personalities) and even for one who would render harm to the Church, provided the election were only a choice from among unworthy men and the voting for the less unworthy would prevent the election of another more unworthy.

The first sentence does not posit any moral difference between the unworthy candidacies. Nor does it posit a situation in which they are the only options. The necessity arises when a moral difference is posited between two unworthy candidates in a zero sum situation, and it hinges on understanding that the citizens of a democracy or democratic republic have an obligation to vote. Fr. Cranny is saying that that obligation is such that it might make voting for an unworthy candidate necessary, in that situation, and especially when grave issues are at stake.

It's clear from the quotation of Pius XII (provided by someone in another thread) that the circumstances of an election, the potential gravity of its consequences, can have a bearing on the obligation to vote. "Under the present circumstances, it is a strict obligation to vote..." [paraphrased]. This is not consequentialism, of course, since the consequences are but one factor among others in the moral evaluation.

[mikemac]

Simply being wrong is not a sin.

In this instance Monsignor Charles Pope would disagree when he writes this in his 09/29/2016 article titled
'Vote as a Catholic with a Catholic Moral Vision'
http://www.ncregister.com/blog/msgr-pope/vote-as-a-catholic-with-a-catholic-moral-vision

Proverbs 24 says, Rescue those who are being led off to death; hold back those who are being carried to slaughter. And if you say, "Behold, we did not know this," does not he who weighs the heart perceive you? Does not he who keeps watch over your soul know it, and will he not repay man according to his work? (Prov 24:11-14) If we do not oppose this moral evil, we are part of the problem and God will judge us.

[LouisIX]

Jayne, LouisIX,

It depends upon what we mean by "unworthy". Given the context of the quotation, it would seem to me that "unworthy" here means simply that the candidate supports some grave moral evil.
...
If our options were Clinton or a candidate who firmly campaigned on all Catholic social teaching except he waffled on, say, contraception, that candidate would be "unworthy" but perhaps prudentially choiceworthy.

Forget for the moment about the Trump and Clinton specifics.

Suppose one candidate firmly campaigned on all Catholic social teaching, except that he supported a law permitting funding for contraception in some cases. (Or even assume you would not normally consider him "choiceworthy") What if the other candidate supported a law requiring sacrilege in every church (and total destruction of Catholic practices...)?  Aren't there times when you really are obliged to vote for the less unworthy candidate (even though he supports a grave moral evil, the other candidate supports something even much worse).  Of course you cannot sin to prevent a greater evil; but are you necessarily sinning simply because you are voting for one unworthy candidate?

Don't bring up the many possible factors that should affect your vote.  Just consider the two things: a grave moral evil vs. another that can prudently be considered far worse.

Of course one could be excused from voting for good reasons, such as being ill.

I think that in a situation like that it might be prudent to vote for the lesser evil, but I still wouldn't speak of it being obligatory, and certainly not obligatory under pain of mortal sin.

Is it possible that such a vote could be made obligatory by the bishop(s)/Pope (based on their prudential judgement)?  This is talking about SOME PARTICULAR REAL CASE, not my contrived example. (The obligation would be one of obedience)

Obviously I am not talking about Trump/Clinton here!!

Certainly.

[LouisIX]

Simply being wrong is not a sin.

In this instance Monsignor Charles Pope would disagree when he writes this in his 09/29/2016 article titled
'Vote as a Catholic with a Catholic Moral Vision'
http://www.ncregister.com/blog/msgr-pope/vote-as-a-catholic-with-a-catholic-moral-vision

Proverbs 24 says, Rescue those who are being led off to death; hold back those who are being carried to slaughter. And if you say, "Behold, we did not know this," does not he who weighs the heart perceive you? Does not he who keeps watch over your soul know it, and will he not repay man according to his work? (Prov 24:11-14) If we do not oppose this moral evil, we are part of the problem and God will judge us.

Do you understand what culpability means?

[LouisIX]

I don't see how it is possible to say of an act that, in itself, is material cooperation in grave intrinsic evil, that it is obligatory.  We could probably come up with a hypothetical situation in which it is clearly the most prudent decision, but that would not be the same as an absolute moral obligation.

OK, I do want to explore a hypothetical situation:

Suppose a mother has a starving child who needs to eat soon; to let it needlessly die of neglect would be a sin. Suppose there is no food in the house except a product made by a company that contributes to Planned Parenthood on occasion.

Using that product would be some kind of material cooperation with evil, correct? Perhaps "remote mediate material cooperation with a proportionately serious reason to justify tolerating the evil of another" (doing some googling!).

Now there is no moral obligation to use this product in general.  But isn't it possible that the mother would be committing the sin of imprudence if she let her child die, because she foolishly thought using the product would be a greater sin?

imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have

So couldn't there be the necessity (under pain of the sin of prudence, whether mortal or not) for material cooperation with evil here, in this specific instance, even if it is not an absolute moral obligation in general?

And are there other possible cases? (Perhaps this is where "angels fear to tread")

Of course, although that situation is a bit more cut-and-dry and a political decision with a very unworthy candidate. However, since the 'To-Trump-Or-Not-Trump' decision isn't an obvious obligation but is instead prudential, I'm not going to run around and tell people that they're not Catholic or that they're sinning if they vote for Trump. I think that it is the wrong decision and I think that it might very well be sinful, but it's not my place to make that judgment.

[Kaesekopf]

Hold up.  Have you found anything other than his obituary at Find-A-Grave to reinforce that he was "influnced by modernist thinking?"  For the record, let's check a few things out.  And, yea, this is one heck of a derail, because I think Jayne's WAY off base by saying this priest is a Modernist. 

I did not say that he was a modernist. I said there was evidence he was influenced by modernist thinking.  It is not sufficient evidence to conclude that Fr. Cranny was a modernist, just to raise it as a possibility. However, if he were a modernist, that would explain something that had puzzled me about what he wrote.

When a man is described as involved and influential in a movement don't you think this is evidence that he shares the thinking of the movement? The American ecumenism movement was known for modernism. However it is possible that Fr. Cranny himself had an orthodox understanding of ecumenism. We would need more evidence to say anything definite. 

Ecumenism is not a dirty word.

From the John Venari article you cited:

In 1933, when the ecumenical movement began to get underway, St. Maximilian Kolbe saw it for what it was. He declared ecumenism as the enemy of the Blessed Virgin Mary; a movement to be opposed and destroyed.

Fr. Cranny's obitituary describes him as influential in this movement.  We can't just assume that he was a solid pre-conciliar thinker as you did.  There is enough evidence to require further investigation before accepting him as a credible source.  Finding  a few good statements by him cannot be considered evidence that he was not a modernist, since it is a characteristic of modernism to mix together good and bad.  We would need to look at a large work by him on the topic of ecumenism to reach a conclusion.

How can we trust any of Fr Peter Scott's writings?  He's an Australian-born Protestant convert (!) who was ordained in 1988.  He went from Protestant in 1978, to converting in 1979, to entering seminary in the early 1980s.  Such a rapid time for someone to eliminate all modernist influences from his thought.  We also know that all his thinking/rationale is not 100% accurate, as can be seen with the wonderful response on the Divine Mercy devotion. 

To add to that, we have a man who spread malicious lies about Fr Rizzo.

"Meanwhile, Fr. Scott was telling the SSPX faithful in the pews that Rizzo had a rare kidney disease and was slowly dying."

"In saying good-bye, Rizzo said: "God bless you, Father." Scott's reply is burned into the memory of Fr. Rizzo: "I will not bless you, because I know God will not bless your work." "

"Fr. Peter Scott has also written a letter which was made public by the Society stating that Fr. Rizzo is a vagus (meaning wandering, unsettled) priest, having broken "his vow of obedience," and is violating canon law. Scott's charges are interesting in the light of his own situation as a priest in a schismatic sect, but he is evidently unfamiliar with the old adage about residents of glass domiciles and the propulsion of certain kinds of mineral deposits.

Scott's letter is particularly difficult for Rizzo to swallow. "They use terminology to deceive the faithful," he complains. "They said I broke vows. The Society of St. Pius X doesn't have vows. There is what is called an 'engagement' ceremony that is taken every December 8 to renew one's engagement in the Society, but even Archbishop Lefebvre once said the engagement promises did not bind under pain of sin.""

Seems really suspect to trust a Protestant medical student turned Catholic convert turned SSPX priest who has no problem smearing his brother priests. 

[Non Nobis]

I don't see how it is possible to say of an act that, in itself, is material cooperation in grave intrinsic evil, that it is obligatory.  We could probably come up with a hypothetical situation in which it is clearly the most prudent decision, but that would not be the same as an absolute moral obligation.

OK, I do want to explore a hypothetical situation:

Suppose a mother has a starving child who needs to eat soon; to let it needlessly die of neglect would be a sin. Suppose there is no food in the house except a product made by a company that contributes to Planned Parenthood on occasion.

Using that product would be some kind of material cooperation with evil, correct? Perhaps "remote mediate material cooperation with a proportionately serious reason to justify tolerating the evil of another" (doing some googling!).

Now there is no moral obligation to use this product in general.  But isn't it possible that the mother would be committing the sin of imprudence if she let her child die, because she foolishly thought using the product would be a greater sin?

imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have

So couldn't there be the necessity (under pain of the sin of prudence, whether mortal or not) for material cooperation with evil here, in this specific instance, even if it is not an absolute moral obligation in general?

And are there other possible cases? (Perhaps this is where "angels fear to tread")

I don't think so. As I understand that section of the Summa, the sin of imprudence is not about how wrong or foolish the decision is but about the process of making the decision.  The person is at fault for not giving the matter sufficient thought or for not taking counsel, etc. rather than the imprudence in itself.  Simply being wrong is not a sin.

A person might commit a sin of this sort while deciding to refrain from material cooperation with evil but it is not the decision in itself that is sinful.

I did not say the woman would be guilty simply because she was wrong, but that it was possible that she was committing the sin of imprudence.  St. Thomas says that this sin is the "lack of that prudence which a man can and OUGHT to have".  It is  "not giving the matter sufficient thought or for not taking counsel" that causes the man to not have the prudence that he OUGHT to have. (I think we are basically agreed on this). But the thought and the counsel have the goal of reaching the truth in some particular circumstances, even if it is not reached because of innocent mistake.

It seems that (in some particular cases):  if the woman had the prudence she OUGHT to have, she would see that using the product was not a sin (even considered in itself), and that it was therefore NECESSARY to use it to feed her child. Of course she might not know about "material cooperation with evil", and all the distinctions that theologians rightly make, but her Catholic common sense and prudence (which might require a little thought) would tell her what was truly NECESSARY in her case.

Basically, I think that material cooperation with evil (where the cooperation is not itself sin) is sometimes necessary to meet some good end, and the end might even be morally required (IF it is not obtained by sin).

(Excuse all the SHOUTING;  I use it for emphasis, but maybe that is not really the best way...)

[Jayne]

How can we trust any of Fr Peter Scott's writings?  He's an Australian-born Protestant convert (!) who was ordained in 1988.  He went from Protestant in 1978, to converting in 1979, to entering seminary in the early 1980s.  Such a rapid time for someone to eliminate all modernist influences from his thought.  We also know that all his thinking/rationale is not 100% accurate, as can be seen with the wonderful response on the Divine Mercy devotion. 

Please don't do this.  I know Fr. Scott personally and really like him. 

We can't take any priest's words as infallible.  We have to measure everything that everyone says against Church teaching.  The vast majority of what I have read by Fr. Scott has passed that test.  On the topic of voting, what he wrote is completely consistent with everything that I know about moral theology.  It is not especially different from any of the other authorities that have been quoted in these threads. 

The main thing to look at is content, not authors.  If you want to delete everything I wrote about Fr. Cranny, that's fine.  I do not want to make this into a thread about digging up dirt on priests.

[Jayne]

This is another moralist cited in Fr. Cranny:

Lehmkuhl says that it is never allowed to vote absolutely for a man of evil principles, but hypothetice it may be allowed if the election is between men of evil principles. Then one should vote for him who is less evil (1) if he makes known the reason for his choice; (2) if the election is necessary to exclude a worse candidate.

I am not sure what point you are making.  This is another authority who says that voting for an unworthy candidate is permissible when both are unworthy.  He explains how those who vote in that situation should act. There is nothing to suggest that voting is obligatory in this situation.

Oh wait!  Is somebody agreeing with me?  I didn't see that coming.

[Graham]

He says one should vote for the less evil candidate, not that one who is voting should vote for the less evil candidate.

[Jayne]

He says one should vote for the less evil candidate, not that one who is voting should vote for the less evil candidate.

Look at the passage as a whole.

Lehmkuhl says that it is never allowed to vote absolutely for a man of evil principles, but hypothetice it may be allowed if the election is between men of evil principles. Then one should vote for him who is less evil (1) if he makes known the reason for his choice; (2) if the election is necessary to exclude a worse candidate.

The first sentence sentence says that voting for a man of evil principles may be allowed, i.e. it is permissible, if the election is between men of evil principle.  The next sentence begins with then connecting it to the first sentence.  It means "when in the situation just described" i.e. taking up the allowance to choose between men of evil principles.  In that situation, one should vote for the less evil and meet conditions (1) and ( 2).  It is not a general statement of "one should vote for him who is less evil".