Author Topic: Counsel  (Read 101 times)

Offline TerrorDæmonum

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Counsel
« on: July 27, 2022, 01:29:25 PM »
Quote from: Ecclesiasticus 32:24
My son, do thou nothing without counsel, and thou shalt not repent when thou hast done.

Quote from: Psalms 1:1
Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the chair of pestilence.

Quote from: Proverbs 13:10, 16
Among the proud there are always contentions: but they that do all things with counsel, are ruled by wisdom.

The prudent man doth all things with counsel: but he that is a fool, layeth open his folly.

Quote from: Ecclesiasticus 32:22-28
A man of counsel will not neglect understanding, a strange and proud man will not dread fear: Even after he hath done with fear without counsel, he shall be controlled by the things of his own seeking. My son, do thou nothing without counsel, and thou shalt not repent when thou hast done. Go not in the way of ruin, and thou shalt not stumble against the stones; trust not thyself to a rugged way, lest thou set a stumblingblock to thy soul. And beware of thy own children, and take heed of them of thy household. In every work of thine regard thy soul in faith: for this is the keeping of the commandments. He that believeth God, taketh heed to the commandments: and he that trusteth in him, shall fare never the worse.

Quote from: Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 14
Article 4. Whether counsel is about all things that we do?

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to science or art."

I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above (Article 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].

Article 3. Whether counsel is only of things that we do?

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "We take counsel of things that are within our competency and that we are able to do."

I answer that, Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.

Quote from: Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 51
Article 1. Whether euboulia (deliberating well) is a virtue?

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) euboulia (deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue consists in right reason. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (II-II:47:4) the nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in Ethic. x.

But euboulia (deliberating well) signifies goodness of counsel, for it is derived from the eu, good, and boule, counsel, being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel." Hence it is evident that euboulia (deliberating well) is a human virtue.

Article 2. Whether euboulia (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?

On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10. But this does not apply to euboulia (deliberating well). Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), virtue is properly directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ according to different acts, especially when there is a different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity.

Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another. Consequently euboulia (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal, so euboulia (deliberating well) is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.

Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding it, to euboulia (deliberating well) by eliciting it.

Quote from: Catechism of Pius X
The Gifts of the Holy Ghost

1 Q. Name the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.
A. The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are, Wisdom, Understanding, Counsel, Fortitude, Knowledge, Piety and the Fear of the Lord.

5 Q. What is Counsel?
A. Counsel is a gift by which, amidst the doubts and uncertainties of human life, we are enabled to recognise those things that redound more to God’s glory, to our own salvation, and to that of our neighbour.

Quote from: Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 52
Article 1. Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

On the contrary, It is written (Isaiah 11:2): "(The Spirit of the Lord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude."

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:68:1), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22). Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Article 2. Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?

On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore they correspond to one another.

I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.

Article 4. Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift of counsel?

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from evils so great, to pardon, and to give."

I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end. Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 Timothy 4:8, "Godliness  is profitable to all things." Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.