Free will and foreknowledge

[james03]

Also, I think a tenseless theory of time rules out free will because it implies the universe is a static, frozen cube.

But you have a hidden premise:  God and man are the same.

Man is inside of time, God is outside of time.

To Man, the universe is undetermined.  To God, the universe is frozen, because He is already "there", at every point, and every "time", unchanged.  So we have Free Will for Man, and "fore"knowledge for God.

edit:  (From other thread, trying to consolidate):

Well, there's also the incompatibility of free will and foreknowledge, which completely refutes your religion.

So there is no incompatibility, and our religion is not refuted.  A statement that starts with "I think" does not "completely refute" anything.

[Matto]

I have a question. Which existence would you prefer? One where you have free will but lose your soul and are damned to eternal hellfire? Or one where you do not have free will but are numbered among the elect and are blessed with eternal heaven? I do believe in free will but it comes at such a high price of eternal pain and suffering.

[Daniel]

Free will = Random will. No responsibility.

Why do you keep saying that free will = random will? If the will were "random" then it would not be libertarian but deterministic (i.e. determined by indeterministic causes outside of the will itself). I can see what you mean when you say libertarian free will is inexplicable or impossible, but I'm not seeing where you're getting this idea of "random" from.

[james03]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe that Peter van Inwagen, who I am not familiar with, was trying to prove Free Will.  It appears that his opposition would be Calvinists.  I actually agree with the point he is making: if God merely revealed things to man, this would change things.  This disproves determinism and "puppetry", so I agree with him.  In a nutshell, man has a part to play.

[james03]

Or one where you do not have free will but are numbered among the elect and are blessed with eternal heaven?

This is an impossible choice.  Love is not possible without Free Will.  Heaven would be sterile for a puppet.

[Michael]

However you now have different worlds, one without the stone, which God is viewing, and one with the stone.  So it is invalid if you believe in forms and matter.

The stone doesn't cause anything, so it makes no difference to our choices whether He makes it or not. The mere fact that He could make one entails we don't have free will.

Free Will:  A Catholic does not mean randomness by this.  Instead this is a view counter to the Calvinist view that we are puppets.  Free Will means we are not compelled by God.

In another thread you said:

Free will has historically meant absence of coercion, nothing more.

Which is exactly what Calvinists say. They say we have free will because God doesn't force us to do anything against our desire. We still can't do otherwise since we always act on what we most desire.

To Man, the universe is undetermined.  To God, the universe is frozen, because He is already "there", at every point, and every "time", unchanged. 

That just means Man's perspective is wrong. Two contradictory perspectives can't both be true. If, from God's eyes, all our choices are frozen eternally, then it was never open for us to do otherwise, even if it appears so.

[Michael]

Why do you keep saying that free will = random will?

There's no reason the agent chooses A over B. It's a flip of the coin. The coin may have been thrown (and hence "caused") but it wasn't caused to land on a particular side.

[Daniel]

Why do you keep saying that free will = random will?

There's no reason the agent chooses A over B. It's a flip of the coin. The coin may have been thrown (and hence "caused") but it wasn't caused to land on a particular side.

Well that's a kind of indeterminism, but it's not libertarianism. Libertarianism says that you can trace the choice back no further than the will itself. If the choice is ultimately traced back to "randomness" (something outside the will), then we're no longer talking about libertarianism but some sort of compatibilism.

But here's a thought experiment: Suppose some person is going to eat breakfast and he chooses to eat the cereal rather than the waffles. But then then afterwards you send him back in time and you watch as he makes the choice again. And then you send him back in time again, and again, and so on. Will he ever choose the waffles?

I would say, if it's up to "randomness", he would sometimes choose the waffles. If it's up to deterministic causes, he would never choose the waffles. And if it's up to his own will, then I'm not sure... but I would think he'd never choose the waffles since he'd have no reason to change his mind.

[Arvinger]

That is incorrect understanding of the Atonement. Your argument is valid against the Reformed understanding of the Atonement, i.e. Penal Substitutionary Atonement. ...

So, your argumnt is valid against Protestant doctrine of the atonement, but not against Catholic doctrine, which is Satisfaction Atonement, in which Christ does not bear punishment for our sins, but rather through self-sacrificial love undoes the effects of sin and reconciles us to God.

No, it's valid against any version of the atonement which has Christ meriting the salvation of all and makes the non-necessity of salvation depend on those merits not being "applied", whether punishment is brought into it or not - because the very concept of merit necessarily entails that of application - if I merit something for you, that entails the merits are applied to you.  Bringing in substitutionary vs. satisfaction atonement only refutes the specific example of a fine being paid because a fine is punitive.  But money can be paid for other things, and the base of the argument still stands.  Yes, I know John paid the bill for your carry out order in advance, "meriting" the food, but we won't give you the food because, you see, the merits haven't been "applied" to you.

You can argue that in reality what happens is that some refuse to go to the restaurant and pick up the order, rather than the restaurant failing to provide the food for those that do go.  But also then, in reality, John didn't actually merit the food for you - he wanted to do so and did what he was able to do, but was prevented by something outside of his control.  John merited the food for you conditionally on you going to the restaurant.  But God's actions can't be conditional on something else outside of Him - that would violate Divine sovereignty and aseity.

Going to the restaurant to pick up the order is precisely what application of merit is. If you refuse to do so, merit which has been obtained through payment will not be applied to you - that does not mean that John did not merit food for you. So, you conceded that the food would indeed be merited, but the merit not applied (while earlier you argued against the merited/applied distinction itself), and move to a different argument, namely that it would be conditional and mean that God's actions would be conditional on actions of a creature. But that is a separate issue, and has to do with the fact that we will never fully understand predestination (no matter how you slice it, taken to its logical conclusion it ends up either with semi-Pelagianism or Calvinism - but both are wrong), and its best to leave it as a mystery, which you agreed with some time ago in a thread on predestination. Therefore, you don't seem to present any meaningful argument here. If you concede that there is an ontological difference between meriting something and application of these merits (and, by the way, the Holy Mass is an example of application of merit), then your objection is void.

[james03]

That just means Man's perspective is wrong. Two contradictory perspectives can't both be true. If, from God's eyes, all our choices are frozen eternally, then it was never open for us to do otherwise, even if it appears so.

It is not about perspective.  We are two entirely different beings.  We are inside of time.  He is outside of time.

[Quaremerepulisti]

Going to the restaurant to pick up the order is precisely what application of merit is. If you refuse to do so, merit which has been obtained through payment will not be applied to you - that does not mean that John did not merit food for you.

So, you conceded that the food would indeed be merited, but the merit not applied (while earlier you argued against the merited/applied distinction itself), and move to a different argument, namely that it would be conditional and mean that God's actions would be conditional on actions of a creature.

So what are you arguing precisely here?  That "application of merit" is in reality a human action (going to the restaurant)?  If so, I have no argument against it per se, except I believe it a rather novel interpretation of the phrase as the plain meaning is an action of God.  Or are you arguing that it is actually an action of God conditional on actions of a creature, which is philosophically impossible.

But that is a separate issue...

If you are proposing the impossible as a solution to the problem, it is a hardly a "separate issue" to bring up the impossibility.

...and has to do with the fact that we will never fully understand predestination (no matter how you slice it, taken to its logical conclusion it ends up either with semi-Pelagianism or Calvinism - but both are wrong), and its best to leave it as a mystery, which you agreed with some time ago in a thread on predestination.

Then you are saying Catholicism is logically incoherent and self-contradictory, and it's game over for all future debates.

Therefore, you don't seem to present any meaningful argument here. If you concede that there is an ontological difference between meriting something and application of these merits (and, by the way, the Holy Mass is an example of application of merit), then your objection is void.

If "application of these merits" is in reality just a fancy name for a human action, admitted; if a separate Divine action (which is what is naively understood by the words), denied.

[Arvinger]

So what are you arguing precisely here?  That "application of merit" is in reality a human action (going to the restaurant)?  If so, I have no argument against it per se, except I believe it a rather novel interpretation of the phrase as the plain meaning is an action of God.  Or are you arguing that it is actually an action of God conditional on actions of a creature, which is philosophically impossible.

False dichotomy - necessity of human action does not preclude God's grace as the reason for this action taking place.

If you are proposing the impossible as a solution to the problem, it is a hardly a "separate issue" to bring up the impossibility.

As above, I don't.

Then you are saying Catholicism is logically incoherent and self-contradictory, and it's game over for all future debates.

Absolutely not. I am saying that predestination is a mystery which either cannot be understood by human reason, or we have not found the right explanation yet. Essentially, the problem boils down to this: God who is omnipotent and without whom we can't do anything pleasing to Him, wants to save everyone, yet He does not predestine everyone. That seems contradictory, but it is not. So far we don't have an explanation - Thomism, Banezianism and Molinism all fail on different, but crucial points, as their logical conclusions lead to Calvinism or semi-Pelagianism. However, we know that there is no contradiction between God wanting to save all and God not predestining all, because the Church teaches both (and the Church cannot contradict herself). So, predestination remains a mystery, but there is no contradiction, and there cannot be.

This again highlights the problem with your epistemology. Essentially, you promote rationalism - for you to accept a doctrine taught by the Church you must first judge it on the basis of your reasoning and your evaluation whether it corresponds to your understanding of logic and reality. That makes you rather than the Church the final authority (just like in case of indefectibility - you reject Church's teaching because it does not match your interpretation of events in the Church, instead of submitting to Church's teaching and acknowledging that indefectibility is true and therefore there has to be some explanation of current crisis consistent with this doctrine, even if your reason did not find it yet). Also, you cannot expect to be able to rationally evaluate and understand everything the Church teaches - in such case faith would no longer be faith.

Pope Pius IX condemned rationalism in Syllabus of Errors:
"4. All the truths of religion proceed from the innate strength of human reason; hence reason is the ultimate standard by which man can and ought to arrive at the knowledge of all truths of every kind."

If "application of these merits" is in reality just a fancy name for a human action, admitted; if a separate Divine action (which is what is naively understood by the words), denied.

It is both - every good we do is a grace of God, including actions which lead to application of the atonement to us.

[Daniel]

I realized today that I was mistaking the Thomist position of predestination for the Molinist position this entire time. It's the Molinist position which is metaphysically impossible. The Thomistic one seems ok.

But now I'm a pretty confused. Apart from the lip service, how exactly is the Thomistic position any different from the condemned Augustinian/Calvinistic position? If everyone is damned by default (the "massa damnata"), and God chooses the elect, then He necessarily also chooses the damned. Because there are only two kinds of people, damned and elect. Not three.

I suppose we could shift the blame onto Adam since Adam is the cause of the massa damnata... but that just pushes it back a step: there still remains the question of how the fall is compatible with God's foreknowledge. Either the fall caused God's knowledge, or else God caused the fall. The former is metaphysically impossible, so it can't be that. That leaves "God caused the fall" as our only option. But if we say that God caused the fall, the Thomistic position would seem identical to the condemned Calvinistic position.
edit - Could it be that my division is non-exhaustive? Maybe it's neither the case that the fall caused God's knowledge nor the case that God caused the fall: maybe there just isn't any causal relationship. Though I'm not sure how that would work.

[awkwardcustomer]

I realized today that I was mistaking the Thomist position of predestination for the Molinist position this entire time. It's the Molinist position which is metaphysically impossible. The Thomistic one seems ok.

But now I'm a pretty confused. Apart from the lip service, how exactly is the Thomistic position any different from the condemned Augustinian/Calvinistic position? If everyone is damned by default (the "massa damnata"), and God chooses the elect, then He necessarily also chooses the damned. Because there are only two kinds of people, damned and elect. Not three.

I suppose we could shift the blame onto Adam since Adam is the cause of the massa damnata... but that just pushes it back a step: there still remains the question of how the fall is compatible with God's foreknowledge. Either the fall caused God's knowledge, or else God caused the fall. The former is metaphysically impossible, so it can't be that. That leaves "God caused the fall" as our only option. But if we say that God caused the fall, the Thomistic position would seem identical to the condemned Calvinistic position.
edit - Could it be that my division is non-exhaustive? Maybe it's neither the case that the fall caused God's knowledge nor the case that God caused the fall: maybe there just isn't any causal relationship. Though I'm not sure how that would work.

How about -

God created angels and men with free will.  Free will necessarily includes the freedom to choose evil.  A third of the angels exerted their free will and rebelled against God. Adam and Eve exerted their free will and ate the apple.  Neither the angels nor Adam and Eve were fallen when they chose to rebel.

God knew this would happen.   God created rational beings, knowing that a sizeable proportion of those rational beings would exert their free will by choosing evil and rebelling against Him.

What is the puzzle here? Rational creatures who aren't fallen can also choose to rebel against God.  Free will necessarily includes the freedom to choose evil.  Those who choose evil are rejected by God.

Although I can't help wondering why hell has to be so awful for them. Or maybe it's not so awful for them as it would be for us.

[Quaremerepulisti]

False dichotomy - necessity of human action does not preclude God's grace as the reason for this action taking place.

No it doesn't, but that still doesn't mean you've exactly defined "application of merit" in any coherent way.  Because according to this now it is something before John goes to the restaurant to pick up the order, whereas before you said it was John going to the restaurant to pick up the order.  So it is either:

1) An act of God prior to any human action;
2) A human action;
3) An act of God subsequent to a human action.
4) Other.

Which is it?

Then you are saying Catholicism is logically incoherent and self-contradictory, and it's game over for all future debates.

Absolutely not.

That is what you said.  You said predestination logically entails either semi-Pelagianism or Calvinism.  Glad to see you've backtracked from that.  For if that were the case, Catholicism would be self-contradictory.

I am saying that predestination is a mystery which either cannot be understood by human reason, or we have not found the right explanation yet. Essentially, the problem boils down to this: God who is omnipotent and without whom we can't do anything pleasing to Him, wants to save everyone, yet He does not predestine everyone. That seems contradictory, but it is not. So far we don't have an explanation - Thomism, Banezianism and Molinism all fail on different, but crucial points, as their logical conclusions lead to Calvinism or semi-Pelagianism. However, we know that there is no contradiction between God wanting to save all and God not predestining all, because the Church teaches both (and the Church cannot contradict herself). So, predestination remains a mystery, but there is no contradiction, and there cannot be.

Yes, but you refuse to take this a step further and realize that the problem must therefore be with our understanding of what it means for God to be "omnipotent", to "want to save everyone", or to "predestine" someone.  For, according to the common (naive) understanding of the terms, there is a contradiction which simply can't be waved under the catch-all rug of "mystery".  That's where my argument lies.

This again highlights the problem with your epistemology. Essentially, you promote rationalism - for you to accept a doctrine taught by the Church you must first judge it on the basis of your reasoning and your evaluation whether it corresponds to your understanding of logic and reality. That makes you rather than the Church the final authority (just like in case of indefectibility - you reject Church's teaching because it does not match your interpretation of events in the Church, instead of submitting to Church's teaching and acknowledging that indefectibility is true and therefore there has to be some explanation of current crisis consistent with this doctrine, even if your reason did not find it yet). Also, you cannot expect to be able to rationally evaluate and understand everything the Church teaches - in such case faith would no longer be faith.

No, rather, I insist that interpretation of Church teaching (by theologians, say) cannot be irrational, and must conform to sound logic and reality, and refuse to admit (as certain Protestants would have it) that my epistemological faculties are so weakened by original sin that I am unable to discern sound logic and reality, and that all that exists in reality is my subjective "understanding" of such.  If such interpretation turns out to be irrational then it must be thrown out.

If "application of these merits" is in reality just a fancy name for a human action, admitted; if a separate Divine action (which is what is naively understood by the words), denied.

It is both - every good we do is a grace of God, including actions which lead to application of the atonement to us.

But now, again, you're making the "application of the atonement" an act by God subsequent to a human action.