Intrinsically Evil Acts

[TerrorDæmonum]

Again, failure is possible in many ways...but success in only one. The is why the one is easy and the other is difficult; it is easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it. Here, then, is another reason why excess and deficiency fall under evil, and the mean state under good; "For men are bad in countless ways, but good in only one.".

979 (a) An act is indifferent or good, when it does not tend to evil from its very nature or the circumstances, but has purposes that are not bad. It is bad when either intrinsically (i.e., from its nature) or extrinsically (i.e., from circumstances) it tends necessarily to evil.

296. Relation of the Natural Law to Other Laws.

(a) The Natural Law is inferior to the Eternal Law; for, while the Eternal Law exists in the mind of God, underived from any other law and is regulative of all created things, the Natural Law exists in the mind of man, as a derivation and image of the Eternal Law and a rule for man's acts only.

(b) It is superior to Positive Law, for all Positive Law is a deduction from or a determination of Natural Law.

306. The Natural Law is of universal obligation. It is in force in all places, at all times, and for all persons. (a) Thus, those who have not the use of reason, such as infants and the insane, are subject to the Natural Law on account of their human nature which is injured by any transgression of its inclinations. Their ignorance, of course, excuses them from formal sin (see 24 sqq., 97 sqq.).

307. The Natural Law is unchangeable, not as regards additions, but as regards subtractions. (a) Additions may be made to the Natural Law, for, in many points not determined by it, it is well that supplementary regulations be made to provide for particular situations. These additions, made by Positive Law, divine and human, are amplifications rather than changes, for they must not be out of harmony with Natural Law. (b) Subtractions may not be made from the Natural Law--that is, there can be no exception when it declares that a certain thing must always be observed, and there can be no abrogation when it declares that a certain thing must be observed usually.

414.... (a) [Epikeia] is based on the fact that a certain case is not comprehended in a law, because the legislator did not foresee it.

Hence, epikeia is not applicable to the Divine Law; for the Divine Lawgiver foresaw all cases that could arise, and so excluded all exceptions (see 315). This is clear as regards the Ten Commandments and other precepts of the Natural Law, since they deal with what is intrinsically good or bad, and are unchangeable (see 307).

Article 3. Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.

I answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.

Article 8. Whether any action is indifferent in its species?

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that "there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a good or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment." Therefore some actions are indifferent according to their species.

I answer that, As stated above (Articles 2 and 5), every action takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms to a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.