An argument against Molinism

[james03]

P2.5: Evil is something

There is a debate on this.  The accepted principle is that evil is a lack of the Good.  I agree in part, but think this is incomplete.  Evil is the free will rejection of God.  It will ultimately be a rejection of the True, Beautiful, and the Good.  Evil manifests itself as Ugliness, Lies, and Hatred. Just look around you.

P3.5: Evil, being something, cannot occur without God causing it.

Partially true.  God's giving us Free Will is the First Cause.  But God is not the efficient cause of evil.  As the St. Thomas quote states Man is his own (efficient) cause of his actions.

P4: God is the first cause of evil, and thus its author.

No, it doesn't make God the author of evil.  God can create deer because they are beautiful animals.  Some parents can be lazy and their toddler wanders off and approaches a buck.  The buck gores the child and it dies.  God is the first cause in that He created the deer, however the choice of laziness by the parents is the efficient cause.  To say that God is the author of the child's death (evil) is an over-stretch.

As far as natural evils, see my discussion on WW2 being necessary for my (our) existence.  Same holds for a tornado.

God is limited.  What can limit God?  Well, can God make a circle be a circle and a square?  No, because it wouldn't be true.  But God is Truth, and has a name: Word, Logos, Jesus.  Therefore the limit on God is God.  And reality abides in Truth.  And the darkness hated the Truth and rejected God.

[Melkite]

Evil as a privation is a theological opinion, not a dogmatic principle, right? (I'm sincerely unsure about that.)  Moral evil may be said to be a privation of a good, but it still constitutes an act, and that act is a substantive positive.  A true nothing could not be punished, and would deserve no punishment.  So moral evil, even if not a material thing, must be an essential thing.  If it is a thing, it is a something, and that falls back on the third premise.  So the above (Michael Wilson's post - james03 posted while I was writing this) doesn't avoid God being the author of evil.

[Michael Wilson]

Evil as a privation is a theological opinion, not a dogmatic principle, right? (I'm sincerely unsure about that.)  Moral evil may be said to be a privation of a good, but it still constitutes an act, and that act is a substantive positive.  A true nothing could not be punished, and would deserve no punishment.  So moral evil, even if not a material thing, must be an essential thing.  If it is a thing, it is a something, and that falls back on the third premise.  So the above doesn't avoid God being the author of evil.

Physical evil is indeed a privation, something that should be there, such as health in a sick person; sight in an eye; soundness in a broken limb.
Moral evil, is indeed "something", since it involves a real act, of both the intellect and the will and even a physical act. A person who internally denies his faith, has sinned. A person who deliberately strikes another in anger, has also committed an "act"; in both these, there is also a "lack" or defect, in the first, in the not professing the Catholic faith; and in the second, the exercising of control over one's anger, and refraining from striking/killing our neighbor.
In the first case, God could be said to be the "indirect" cause of the evil, because of the limited and defective nature of creatures i.e. DNA doesn't perfectly replicate all the necessary genes all the time, resulting in birth defects.
In the second, God doesn't will the evil act, but cooperates with the free will decisions of the creature; so if I want to shoot my neighbor, I can, and God permits me to come to this decision, and with my physical movements to grab the gun and aim it and shoot it at my neighbor, and with the physical laws that explode the gunpowder and send the bullet flying towards him and kill him. But God does not approve of the act and even condemns it.

[james03]

Evil as a privation I partially agree with.  As I said, I find this incomplete.  Michael says this only applies to natural evils.  While I agree, I think the privation argument is also used to define moral evil.  Too lazy to research it and I could be wrong.

So moral evil, even if not a material thing, must be an essential thing.

Beauty is also not a material thing.  Principles are not a material thing.  They are immaterial things, as evil, according to my opinion, is an immaterial thing.  Neither here nor there as pertains to this discussion, but I thought I'd point it out.

doesn't avoid God being the author of evil.

As I said, this is an overstretch.  Michael goes into detail on why.  In short, the efficient cause of moral evil is man's freewill choice.  Therefore man is the author of evil.  God is the First Cause of Man's Free Will.

[Melkite]

In the second, God doesn't will the evil act, but cooperates with the free will decisions of the creature; so if I want to shoot my neighbor, I can, and God permits me to come to this decision, and with my physical movements to grab the gun and aim it and shoot it at my neighbor, and with the physical laws that explode the gunpowder and send the bullet flying towards him and kill him. But God does not approve of the act and even condemns it.

In short, the efficient cause of moral evil is man's freewill choice.  Therefore man is the author of evil.  God is the First Cause of Man's Free Will.

I agree with both of you that this is actually how it is. But I think this makes other Michael's premise 3 impossible. Some things actually can occur without God causing them.

Perhaps Michael can specify whether he meant that nothing can occur without God being the direct cause, or the indirect cause.

[Michael Wilson]

I think that Michael would agree with that last part.

[Michael]

God causes evil acts, though He does not cause evil. I will change the argument:

Premise 1, P1: If Molinism is true, then God has prevolitional (or middle) knowledge of what creatures would freely do.

P2. If no act can occur without God causing it, then any middle knowledge of what acts creatures would cause is, by implication, middle knowledge of what acts God would cause.

P3. No act can occur without God causing it.

P4. Any middle knowledge of what acts creatures would cause is, by implication, middle knowledge of what acts God would cause.

P5. One cannot have middle knowledge of one's own choices.

P6. God cannot have middle knowledge.

Conclusion: Molinism is false.

[Melkite]

God causes evil acts, though He does not cause evil. I will change the argument:

Premise 1, P1: If Molinism is true, then God has prevolitional (or middle) knowledge of what creatures would freely do.

P2. If no act can occur without God causing it, then any middle knowledge of what acts creatures would cause is, by implication, middle knowledge of what acts God would cause.

P3. No act can occur without God causing it.

P4. Any middle knowledge of what acts creatures would cause is, by implication, middle knowledge of what acts God would cause.

P5. One cannot have middle knowledge of one's own choices.

P6. God cannot have middle knowledge.

Conclusion: Molinism is false.

Would you explain what you mean by God causing evil acts but not evil itself?  Does he cause evil acts to occur logically prior to or after the acts become evil?

[james03]

I reply the same with St. Thomas:

But man, judging about his course of action by the power of reason, can also judge about his own decision inasmuch as he knows the meaning of an end and of a means to an end, and the relationship of the one with reference to the other. Thus he is his own cause not only in moving but also in judging. He is therefore endowed with free choice—that is to say, with a free judgment about acting or not acting.

So P3 is in opposition to St. Thomas.

[Michael Wilson]

Michael:

Premise 1, P1: If Molinism is true, then God has prevolitional (or middle) knowledge of what creatures would freely do.

P2. If no act can occur without God causing it, then any middle knowledge of what acts creatures would cause is, by implication, middle knowledge of what acts God would cause.

P3. No act can occur without God causing it.

The conclusion is that there is really no free will; which the Thomist position entails and which also leads to the theory of "Negative Reprobation".
If no act can occur without God causing it, including the future free acts of His creatures; the only way that God can know these is if He pre-determines to cause these. He does so through the theory of "physical premotion", God physically determines what a creature will do in a future act. That also means that ultimately and inescapably, God is immediate cause of both good and evil acts of His intelligent creatures; otherwise He would not have any way of knowing what their future free acts would be. Which also would include those acts that would lead to man's eternal salvation or perdition. In order to "escape" this necessary conclusion that God does not will the salvation of all men, the Thomists came up with the theory of "sufficient" grace i.e. That grace with gives the potentiality to perform a salutary act, but not the ability to do the act itself. For a man to actually perform a salutary act, he needs a secondary "efficacious" grace which God does not give to all men. Therefore those men who do receive this grace, will be saved; and those who do not, will be infallibly lost. Which also implies that man is not free to accept or reject God's grace.
Thomism's theory of grace leads many people to discouragement and despair. St. Francis the Sales was one of those who was nearly driven to such by the Thomistic theory of predestination before foreseen merits (APM).
I can see why people are attracted to this, because its very tightly reasoned and works perfectly, until one comes to the necessary conclusions that it entails. 

[Michael Wilson]

So P3 is in opposition to St. Thomas.

P3 would be in opposition to St. Thomas if the author means that God determines the free will choices of His intelligent creatures.
 God is the first cause of all acts, and no act can occur without God's co-operation; but God does not determine the acts of His intelligent creatures.
But this is where the Thomistic theory of "Physical premotion" leads to.

[Michael Wilson]

Melkite,

Would you explain what you mean by God causing evil acts but not evil itself?  Does he cause evil acts to occur logically prior to or after the acts become evil?

God does not cause the evil acts; He is the principle of all acts of His creatures, but He does not "push" His intelligent creatures to specifically determine what act they will perform. Although the Thomistic system certainly leads to this.

[Michael]

So P3 is in opposition to St. Thomas.

Something can be the cause of its own movement and still be caused to move by God.

Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

Besides, God not only gives powers to things but, beyond that, no thing can act by its own power unless it acts through His power, as we showed above. So, man cannot use the power of will that has been given him except in so far as he acts through the power of God. Now, the being through whose power the agent acts is the cause not only of the power, but also of the act. This is apparent in the case of an artist through whose power an instrument works, even though it does not get its own form from this artist, but is merely applied to action by this man. Therefore, God is for us the cause not only of our will, but also of our act of willing.

Would you explain what you mean by God causing evil acts but not evil itself?  Does he cause evil acts to occur logically prior to or after the acts become evil?

God causes whatever has positive ontology in the act.

Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.

The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin.

The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.

[james03]

And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

This is Molinism.

There is a difference between First Cause and Efficient Cause.  Man is the Efficient Cause of his actions. 

Same holds for evil.  God HAS to be the First Cause of a sinful act, because by necessity there has to be a single, First Cause for everything that exists.  However Man is the Efficient Cause of his sin.

[james03]

There is another problem with this argument against Molinism in that it make Grace superfluous.

Why is it needed at all?

Put it another way, suppose God didn't give any Grace, would the world be different?  For that matter if God withheld just one Grace that He has given, the world would be different by some measure.  And so we are left with asking Why He gave the Graces that He has/will given.

And it is clear that these Graces are given to move men of Free Will according to His secret purpose.

And thus, either God is randomly giving out Graces, or God knows how each man will respond to the Graces given, the second option being called Molinism.