I'm left unconvinced by St. Thomas's argument for the Filioque

[Kreuzritter]

Before I dig into it, please be aware that this isn't meant as a denial of the Filioque, though perhaps it might be an implicit rejection of the Thomistic understanding of that Latin doctrine. Still, "A" for admirable effort by the Medieval Doctor.

To quote the core argument presented in the Summa:

On the contrary, Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."

I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above (I:28:3; I:30:2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved above (I:28:44). And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of what is "from the principle." Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.

I do not find this to be a sound argument, and I would certainly never accept it as such if I came from a Greek background. In particular, it hinges not least on an understanding of the Trinitarian formula that is quintessentially of post-Augustinian Latin origin, and upon an invocation of an Aristotelian claim which, as far as I can see, is dubiously applied.

It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above (I:28:3; I:30:2).

Here, indeed, is the invocation of Aristotle, so let's look at the first reference.

According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically.

Let nobody say to me that Thomism is not founded upon Aritotelian presuppositions and that Thomas doesn't repeatedly appeal to the authority of the Athenian as if that settled a matter. Yes, what is being alluded to here is called the transitivity of identity, but it holds absolutely if the objects in question are truly identical.

Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another.

This is a typical example of a word game. It's clear that in Aristotle's example, "action" and "passion" are "the same" as "motion" in the sense of being kinds of "motion" like elements of a set, and this in no wise implies their identity with motion which would allow us to invoke the transitivity of identity. But for goodness' sake, do not say "they are the same" and "they are not the same". Thus two totally distinct concepts of two things being "the same" are being used and equivocated upon here, and while "action" and "passion" have something essential in common by or in that we can conceive of them as kinds of "motion", they are not identical and can be really distinguihsed precisely because they absolutely do not have one and the same essence by this sense of "sameness": "action" being "from which" and "passion" in turn "which is from", these are real properties among those which make "action" and "passion" what they are, and they are as such essential to these. Thus the applicability to the "persons", which supposedly have one identical essence according to the Thomistic understanding of the Trinitarian dogma, falls apart.

Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

And there we have it. There is the equivocation on "the same as" to have his cake and eat it too. He wants the "persons" to be "the same as" in the sense of them being identical to the divine "essence" while at the same time being "the same as" in the Aristotelian example as only having something essentially in common. There is no way around this: either the dogmatic definition of "one ousia in three hypostases" of the Trinity allows for the latter sense, in which case we can make real and essential distinctions among the "persons", or it is intended in the sense of "three persons identical in essence", in which case the transitivity of identity forces us into a monism that at best becomes modalistic if one insists on retaining some meaning in "Father, Son and Holy Spirit".

To make my position here clear: I do not accept that it is ever possible for things to be identical with a third thing yet distinct from one another. Either the hypostases of the Trinity are identical with the ousia, in which case they are identical with each other and we contradict the "three hypostases" part of the dogma, or the three hypostases, though the ousia exists in them, are not all of them identical with the ousia. To invoke the Aristotelian example that things can be "the same" as a third thing yet distinct among themselves is to take the second position and reject the first; but St. Thomas apparently, and he is forced into it by his doctrine of absolute divine simplicity derived from the Greeks, wants to keep the first position and nevertheless utliise the Aristotelian example. This is an error. Even if true that the "persons" are only "relationally" distinct, they are nevertheless essentially distinct because these relations are then essential to their being what they are, distinct "persons"; but this does not contradict the Nicene definition because that definition uses the term ousia which is not what is intended by Thomists with essence.

A final curiosity in this reference is this:

Objection 2. Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction of paternity and filiation.

Reply to Objection 2. Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.

But what does it matter if "do not import any opposition in their respective natures" when St. Thomas has not shown anywhere that relations of opposition imply that such distinctions are not nominal but real; the reply is irrelevant to the substance of the objection unless he does that. But the aforegoing Aristotelian argument does not show this.

Back to the main text.

For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence.

This appears to be true of essence. However, the dogmatic definition of the Trinity is one ousia in three hypostases, and the ousia is the one divine subject that exists in the three objective, distinct and concrete realities of the hypostases; it is not the "essence" of the "persons" but something and its physis, or nature, that is essentially common to them. There is nothing in the hypostases being "really" and "absolutely" distinct which violates their unity of ousia, any more than the distinctions of my soul and body and their parts violate the fact that I am but one self-identical subject existing in them and a human nature belongs to them.

Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations.

How can the sole distinctions among the divine persons consist in their relations when distinct relations presuppose distinct objects to relate? For instance, an object can be related to itself by identity. Sure, I might relate myself to myself by my consciousness of myself, but this is then a relation between my consciousness and my self. Which brings us right back to the problem of absolute divine simplicity: all St. Thomas is attempting to do with his "solution" is move the problem one step backwards: despite divine simplicity and identical essence, the "persons" can nevertheless be really distinguished in the relations; but  wherein and how can the relations be really distinguished? The Father is distinct from the Son in generating being distinct from being generated; but how, in the absolutely simple divinity, is it possible for generating to be really distinct from being generated? In any case, this is putting the cart before the horse. It may be fine to say that the Son is the person generated by the Father, but what is generated? The generated is generated? Really? A tautology is the essence of your Trinitarian dogma? And with each person being the divine essence, what stops us from saying the essence is generating and generated, and what must we infer from that in light of absolute divine simplicity?

Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations;

He hasn't shown anywhere here that "opposite relations" and not mere relations are necessary to distinguish "persons". He does mention this

The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation (Article 1), there must also be a real opposition.

but it is no argument.

which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one person of the Father.

This makes no sense. The Son is generated and the Holy Spirit spirated. This is what tradition tells us. These distinctions, whatever they are, would not be made meaningless if the Son did not also spirate the Holy Spirit.

If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other,

Again, he has not demonstrated that they need be opposite to each other.

as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them.

Another incomprehensible claim.

Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father.

Doesn't follow.

But this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved above (I:28:44). And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of what is "from the principle." Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.

Quod erat demonstrandum. If you're wondering where any of these invoked concepts and unnamed presuppositions are to be found in revelation, well, you can keep scratching your head. If one wants to play philosopher and reason back to the nature of the Trinity on the basis of reason, why not go ahead and take that claim "either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says" and ask the question "How did Mary conceive the incarnate Logos by the Holy Spirit coming over her? Does that not perhaps imply that the Logos came out of the Holy Spirit in some sense  ?" Ah, the wonders of rationalism. Let's be honest with ourselves: if the doctrine of the Church had been Sabellianism, Quadtrinitarianism or whatever, the philosophers would have found some way to "prove" whatever doctrines flow from them.

[Xavier]

Well, I did a study on Patristic and Conciliar or Ecumenical Council Tradition on the Filioque, and for me it was just amazing and mind-blowing how many and how great were the dogmatic sources of Tradition that taught Filioque. Reading Cardinal St. Robert's article greatly confirmed me in the Faith on Filioque.

Online at: http://www.catholicapologetics.info/apologetics/protestantism/procession.htm

Did you see the first proof, Kreuzritter, that St. Thomas cited - the authority of Patriarch St. Athanasius the Great, the Venerable "Father of Orthodoxy", whose Sacred Dogmatic Creed - written at a time the holy Doctors orthodoxy was being questioned - Pope St. Julius and the ancient Church adopted as Her own. "The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son ... not generated but proceeding". What is telling is that St. Athanasius distinguished the Persons and Their respective Hypostatic Properties just as St. Thomas did. St. Robert also cites this and refutes the modernistic claim that St. Athanasius did not compose the Athanasian Creed, proving this from the authority of St. Augustine in the West and St. Gregory Nazianzen in the East.

5 Ecumenical Councils, 15 Greek Fathers and 15 Latin Fathers are cited in dogmatic proof. Ninth of these is Pope St. Leo the Great, "Ninth Blessed Leo, "There is one who generates; another who is generated; another who proceeds from both." And this is that Leo the Great whom in the fourth Synod 630 Bishops, almost all Oriental, extolled with the greatest praise, and about whom they repeated again and again that as Leo believes so also do we believe." Again, Pope St. Leo the Great, who was controverting a Sabellian sect in this letter, refutes their heresy of denial of Dinstinction of Persons in the One Consubstantial Essence of the Holy Trinity (the Son being Consubstantial with the Father by Being His Eternal Word; the Holy Ghost being Consubstantial with the Father and the Son by Being Their Eternal Spirit, the Eternal Spirit of the Eternal Father Eternally given to the Eternally Begotten Son) by Generation, Procession and the Filioque.

5 Ecumenical Councils prove Filioque is a Sacred Dogma, as Patriarch St. Cyrils letter to Nestorius that taught it was approved in them. The Fifth Council further decreed, "We further declare that we hold fast to the decrees of the four Councils, and in every way follow the holy Fathers, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Theophilus, John (Chrysostom) of Constantinople, Cyril, Augustine, Proclus, Leo and their writings on the true faith."

For those who did not grasp or for those who don't wish to read the whole Summa and would like a simpler summary of the Angelic Doctor's proof from theological reason, here's a syllogism:

1. The Persons are distinguished only by Hypostatic relations.
2. If there were no hypostatic relation between Son and Spirit, they would therefore be but One Person Only; but this is heretical and destroys Faith.
3. Hence, it must needs be confessed that the Holy Spirit, as the Third Hypostasis in the Holy Trinity, is produced by the Father through the Son.

For us Catholic Christians, as Patriarch St. Athanasius, the God-bearing Father of Orthodoxy taught us in his Creed some 1650 years ago, even before Constantinople I Council, "The Catholic Faith is this, that we worship God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity: which Faith except every one does hold firmly and faithfully without doubt he will perish in eternity ... The Holy Spirit is of the Father and of the Son; not made or created, not begotten but proceeding... He therefore who will be saved, let him think thus on the Trinity". So taught St. Athanasius and all the East, St. Augustine and all the West, as well as Popes St. Damasus, Pope St. Leo and several other Popes uniterruptedly for more than 1,500 years. Let us thank God for the gift of our Catholic Faith, which we must persevere in to be saved, and pray all Orthodox Christians are soon happily united with us in Catholic Communion with the Apostolic Throne of St. Peter. Unity in Truth and Love is so dear to the holy Hearts of Jesus and Mary, as so many Saints and Mystics have testified, and so it should be to ours too.

God bless.

[John Lamb]

The difficulty is solved by the doctrine of the perichoresis or circumincession – the infinite interpenetration of the divine Persons into one and other in the one divine essence or ousia.



This is how St. Thomas can "have his cake and eat it too".

Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

And there we have it. There is the equivocation on "the same as" to have his cake and eat it too. He wants the "persons" to be "the same as" in the sense of them being identical to the divine "essence" while at the same time being "the same as" in the Aristotelian example as only having something essentially in common. There is no way around this: either the dogmatic definition of "one ousia in three hypostases" of the Trinity allows for the latter sense, in which case we can make real and essential distinctions among the "persons", or it is intended in the sense of "three persons identical in essence", in which case the transitivity of identity forces us into a monism that at best becomes modalistic if one insists on retaining some meaning in "Father, Son and Holy Spirit".

Because of the infinite interpenetration of the divine Persons in the divine essence, the essence can be said to be the divine Paternity without really excluding the Son or the Holy Spirit, because the Son and the Holy Spirit are in the Father. Likewise, the essence can be said to be the Filiation because the Father and the Holy Spirit are in the Son, etc. So where the Father is, the Son and the Spirit are; where the Son is, the Father and the Spirit are; and where the Spirit is, the Father and the Son are. So you can, so to speak, imagine the Trinity as an infinite fractal where the divine relations are infinitely interpenetrating one and other while maintaining their unique identities in the one divine essence. The divine essence of the Trinity is the Father, is the Son, and is the Holy Spirit – and the Father is the divine essence, the Son is the divine essence, and the Holy Spirit is the divine essence – yet the three Persons maintain their unique identities because of their unique processions from one and other in which they infinitely contain and are contained in one and other, but in relatively distinct ways: the Father as principle without principle, the Son as proceeding from the Father, and the Spirit as proceeding from the Father and the Son.

[Kreuzritter]

Well, I did a study on Patristic and Conciliar or Ecumenical Council Tradition on the Filioque, and for me it was just amazing and mind-blowing how many and how great were the dogmatic sources of Tradition that taught Filioque. Reading Cardinal St. Robert's article greatly confirmed me in the Faith on Filioque.

The issue here is, as I said, not the Filioque.

In fact, it's Thomistic divine simplicity, or absolute divine simplicity in general, and the failure of St. Thomas with his doctrine fo "relations of opposition" to reconcile this throroughly Greek philosophical idea with the dogma of three really distinct divine hypostases.

1. The Persons are distinguished only by Hypostatic relations.
2. If there were no hypostatic relation between Son and Spirit, they would therefore be but One Person Only; but this is heretical and destroys Faith.
3. Hence, it must needs be confessed that the Holy Spirit, as the Third Hypostasis in the Holy Trinity, is produced by the Father through the Son.

The first premise is false. And it would be seen to be false even without further investigation into Aquinas's erroneous argument by a simple glance at the Hypostatic Union, a reality which is not a mere relation of opposition that nevertheless distinguishes Son from Father and Holy Spirit.

The second "premise", really a sub-argument, is also dubitable. If generation is in itself really distinct from spiration, then it doesn't follow. If anything, it leaves a hole in Aquinas's system of relations of opposition that casts further doubt upon it:

The Father and Son are distinguished by a relation of opposition of generation. The Father and Holy Spirit are distinguished by a relation of opposition of spiration. Now you want to tell me that, unless Son and Holy Spirit are also distinguished by the same latter operation, "generation" and "spiration" would have to be identical? So "generation" and "spiration" are in turn really distinguished by what? By one being one coming from another and the other one coming from two others?

This is how St. Thomas can "have his cake and eat it too".

Quote

    Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

No. The staement above is a nonsense that violates the transitivity of identity.

Because of the infinite interpenetration of the divine Persons in the divine essence, the essence can be said to be the divine Paternity without really excluding the Son or the Holy Spirit, because the Son and the Holy Spirit are in the Father.

You're not getting it. They cannot interpenetrate the divine essence if they are each identical with the divine essence. This is at best tautolagous, otherwise total nonsense.

The divine essence of the Trinity is the Father, is the Son, and is the Holy Spirit – and the Father is the divine essence, the Son is the divine essence, and the Holy Spirit is the divine essence – yet the three Persons maintain their unique identities because of their unique processions from one and other in which they infinitely contain and are contained in one and other, but in relatively distinct ways: the Father as principle without principle, the Son as proceeding from the Father, and the Spirit as proceeding from the Father and the Son.

"Unique identities" indeed. There can't be any procession without something proceeding, and that presupposes a distinct something that cannot, in turn, be wholly defined by its proceeding. Something proceeding from itself, as itself, into itself, even if not mere word play, doesn't generate something distinct.

[Xavier]

Hello Kreuzritter. Grace be with you.

The issue here is, as I said, not the Filioque.

I disagree. Divine Simplicity is absolutely a True Doctrine - and can be proved from Scripture, Father and the early Councils - but Divine Simplicity relates only to the Essence, not the Persons. There is nothing that can be predicated of the Divine Essence that is not individually true of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. This is what the Creed of St. Athanasius teaches us.

Thus, God is Almighty, the Word is Almighty, the Spirit is Almighty. God the Father is God. God the Son, begotten of Him alone in eternity, as His Own Consubstantial Word by Whom all things were made, is God. God the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son eternally, as Their Own Consubstantial Spirit, is God. The Father is Infinite. The Son Infinite. The Spirit Infinite. And so on.

But something can be predicated of the Son of God that cannot be predicated of the Father. Namely, that the Son is Begotten, but the Father is not Begotten. That the Father is Unbegotten, but the Son is not unbegotten. That the Son is from the Father, but the Father is not from the Son. And here, and here alone, lies the difference between the First Two Divine Persons in the Most Holy Trinity in Eternity.

Are we in agreement on this much, Kreuz? After the Incarnation, yes, it is true to say, the Son became flesh, the Father and Holy Ghost did not.

In fact, it's Thomistic divine simplicity, or absolute divine simplicity in general, and the failure of St. Thomas with his doctrine fo "relations of opposition" to reconcile this throroughly Greek philosophical idea with the dogma of three really distinct divine hypostases.

Not at all. St. Thomas does not fail, but proceeds (pun intended!) just like the Fathers did. First, St. Athanasius himself - what is he saying in his Creed? - the Father is distinguished from the Son by the relation of being Unbegotten; the Son by being Begotten; the Holy Spirit by Proceeding from Both. This is how the Persons differ, in Three respective absolutely distinct hypostatic properties. Second proof, from Pope St. Leo - this proof is especially compelling because the Pope was controverting Sabellians - "And so under the first head is shown what unholy views they hold about the Divine Trinity: they affirm that the person of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost is one and the same, as if the same God were named now Father, now Son, and now Holy Ghost: and as if He who begat were not one, He who was begotten another, and He who proceeded from both yet another" See: https://onepeterfive.com/filioque-separated-east/ for the citation.

Q. What is the Pope saying, how are the Persons distinguished? He Who Begat is One Person, He Who is Begotten Another, He Who Proceeds the Third. What does this mean, except that Relations of Opposition alone do really distinguish the Divine Persons?

The Father and Son are distinguished by a relation of opposition of generation. The Father and Holy Spirit are distinguished by a relation of opposition of spiration. Now you want to tell me that, unless Son and Holy Spirit are also distinguished by the same latter operation, "generation" and "spiration" would have to be identical

Actually, Generation and Spiration are distinguished in that Generation is from One Person, but Spiration is from Two Persons.

Here I will cite a Third Authority, Archbishop St. Isidore of Seville, and the Council of Toledo; "There is, however, this difference between generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, that the Son is begotten of One, but the Spirit proceeds from Both." The Latin reads, "Hoc autem interest inter nascentem Filium et procedentum Spiritum sanctum, quod Filius ex uno nascitur; Spiritus sanctus ex utroque procedit." Source cited on: http://www.orthodoxchristianity.net/forum/index.php?topic=73898.0

The Councils of Toledo said, Quicumque spiritum sanctum non credit aut non crediderit a patre et filio procedere, eumque non dixerit coaeternum esse patri et filio et coessentialem, anathema sit. (i.e. Whoever does not believe in the Holy Spirit or does not believe Him to proceed from the Father and the Son, and says He is not co-eternal with the Father and the Son and consubstantial [with Them], let him be anathema) http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/quellen/chga/chga_045t.htm In the Council texts, the Persons are clearly said to be distinguished by Their Hypostatic Relations with One Another.

God bless.